Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court denied a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) filed by Millhouse, a Lewisburg prisoner. The court identified five strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), and found that Millhouse failed to establish that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury. The statute limits IFP status: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger. The Third Circuit vacated. For purposes of this appeal, Millhouse has only one strike. The court must look to the date the notice of appeal is filed, not the date on which the court rules, in assessing whether a particular dismissal counts as a strike and a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim does not rise to the level of a strike. View "Millhouse v. Heath" on Justia Law

Ferriero was chairman of the Bergen County Democratic Organization (BCDO) from 1998 until he resigned in 2009. Ferriero took payments from a vendor (C3) that provided emergency notification systems for local governments in exchange for recommending to officials that their towns hire the firm. Ferriero’s corporation executed a contract, described as an “agreement . . . to provide governmental relations consulting services required in connection with marketing of a product known as C3 and any other related products or services.” The municipalities that bought the product were unaware that Ferriero stood to benefit financially. The Third Circuit affirmed Ferriero’s convictions, a forfeiture order, and sentence based on violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), and the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The evidence was sufficient to prove New Jersey bribery as a predicate act for his Travel Act and RICO convictions. There was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to conclude Ferriero participated in the conduct of the BCDO’s affairs by means of a pattern of bribery and to conclude that failure to disclose Ferriero’s C3 interest amounted to a materially false or fraudulent misrepresentation. View "United States v. Ferriero" on Justia Law

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, requires employer-provided health insurance plans to cover various preventative services, including FDA-approved contraceptives, at no cost to participating employees. The “Contraceptive Mandate” includes a limited exemption for houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries. Religious non-profit and for-profit employers may receive an accommodation whereby they opt out of providing contraceptive coverage, with the government then arranging for their employees to receive the coverage through third parties at no cost to, and with no participation of, the objecting employers. An anti-abortion group argued that, under the Equal Protection Clause, if a religious organization may be exempted from the Contraceptive Mandate, then non-religious entities with an identical stance on contraceptives must also be exempted. Employees of the group argued that the Contraceptive Mandate violated the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 300a–7(d), and that maintaining a health insurance plan that covers contraceptives through their employer violates their religious rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb to 2000bb-4. The Third Circuit affirmed rejection of those claims. The Contraceptive Mandate does not exempt a secular anti-abortion group with no religious affiliation and an employee’s religious beliefs are not substantially burdened by the law’s requirement that his employer’s insurance plan cover contraceptives. View "Real Alternatives Inc v. Secretary Department of Health" on Justia Law

While serving a state prison sentence in 2006, Chapman wrote a letter, intercepted by prison staff, threatening to kill President Bush. In an interview with Secret Service agents, Chapman admitted that he wanted to kill the President and made additional threats. He pled guilty to threatening the President, 18 U.S.C. 871(a). and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. In 2007, Chapman mailed a letter to a federal judge, including threats against the judge and other court staff. Chapman was sentenced to an additional 48 months imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 876(c). Chapman was released from custody in 2014. He violated the terms of his supervised release and received a sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment. While serving that sentence, Chapman mailed a letter with threats against the federal prosecutor who handled Chapman’s revocation proceedings and the probation officer involved with Chapman’s case. He pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 876(c) and was sentenced to 70 months, at the low end of the U.S.S.G. range. The Third Circuit affirmed application of the career offender enhancement to his sentence calculation, rejecting an argument that his convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 876(c) did not qualify as crimes of violence. That section proscribes mailing a communication containing a threat to injure a person. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

When Eclipse, a jet aircraft manufacturer, declared bankruptcy in November 2008, it reached an agreement to sell the company to its largest shareholder, ETIRC, which would have allowed Eclipse to continue its operations. The sale required significant funding from VEB, a state-owned Russian Bank. The funding never materialized. For a month, Eclipse waited for the deal to go through with almost daily assurances that the funding was imminent. Delays were attributed to Prime Minister Putin needing “to think about it.” Eventually, Eclipse was forced to cease operations and notify its workers that a prior furlough had been converted into a layoff. Eclipse’s employees filed a class action complaint as an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court alleging that Eclipse’s failure to give them 60 days’ notice before the layoff violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2101-2109, and asserting that Eclipse could invoke neither the Act’s “faltering company” exception nor its “unforeseeable business circumstances” exception. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the employees’ claims on summary judgment, holding that the “unforeseeable business circumstances” exception barred WARN Act liability. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. Eclipse demonstrated that its closing was not probable until the day that it occurred. View "In re: AE Liquidation, Inc." on Justia Law

Ildefonso-Candelario, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. unlawfully, allegedly in 1996. In 2015, he pled guilty in Pennsylvania state court to a misdemeanor count of obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function. Immigration and Customs Enforcement took Ildefonso-Candelario into custody, charging him with being removable as an alien present without admission or parole, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). At his first hearing, Ildefonso-Candelario stated his intention to seek cancellation of removal. Counsel for ICE suggested that Ildefonso-Candelario’s prior conviction might qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, which would render him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). The Immigration Judge issued an initial holding that the offense was “categorically” a crime involving moral turpitude. ICE added a charge of removability for committing a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge then ordered Ildefonso-Candelario removed to Mexico. A single member of the BIA upheld the ruling “[f]or the reasons given by the Immigration Judge.” The Third Circuit remanded to the BIA, holding hold that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5101 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The offense encompasses non-fraudulent as well as fraudulent conduct, such as obstruction by “physical interference or obstacle.” View "Ildefonso-Candelario v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

J.B., a U.S. citizen, was born in Ukraine in 2008 to Charles, a U.S. citizen, and Olga, a Ukrainian citizen and lawful U.S. permanent resident. In 2011, Charles secured a job in Germany; Olga was accepted to a Ph.D. program at the University of Pittsburgh. Olga and J.B. moved to Pittsburgh, separately from Charles. In 2013, J.B. underwent surgery. Charles went to Pittsburgh to be with J.B. He unsuccessfully sought jobs in the U.S. The three then went to Germany. In 2015, Olga returned to Pittsburgh to complete her Ph.D. program, taking J.B. The parties agreed to divorce. Charles sent an email, indicating that he might move to another country. Olga responded that J.B. was happy in Pittsburgh, so by the end of the year, returning to Berlin might not be his wish. Charles did not object. In 2016, the parties exchanged emails indicating that they may have previously agreed that J.B. would live with each for a year at a time. A Pennsylvania court issued an interim custody order, allowing J.B. to continue to reside with the Olga. Charles sought J.B.’s return to Germany under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of relief. To the extent an agreement could be discerned, the parents’ intent was that J.B. would move to the U.S. not for a visit, but with a settled purpose. Because J.B. had acclimatized to his life in the U.S. at the time of the retention, that was then his habitual residence and the retention was not wrongful under the Convention. View "Blackledge v. Blackledge" on Justia Law

Long Branch Police Lieutenant Johnson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging racial discrimination, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, by subjecting him “to different and harsher disciplinary measures than similarly situated white colleagues who committed the same or similar . . . infractions.” The EEOC served Long Branch with a notice to charge and requested “all disciplinary records” for Johnson and six Caucasian comparator officers. Long Branch responded that it would not produce the materials unless the EEOC executed a confidentiality agreement. The EEOC refused to execute the agreement and served a subpoena on Long Branch. The city responded with a “Notice of Motion to Quash Subpoena,” captioned for the Superior Court of New Jersey. A person or entity intending not to comply with an EEOC subpoena must submit a petition to modify or revoke the subpoena to the EEOC’s Director or General Counsel within five days after service, 29 C.F.R. 1601.16(b)(1). Long Branch never did so. The EEOC sought enforcement of its subpoena in federal court. The Third Circuit vacated an order enforcing the subpoena in part without reaching claims concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies and disclosure to the charging party of other employees’ records. The court noted a significant procedural defect pertaining to the treatment of the motion to enforce under the Federal Magistrates Act. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Long Branch" on Justia Law

A gunman murdered Cooley in an Erie, Pennsylvania bar in 1994. Four years later, the Commonwealth tried Haskell for Cooley’s murder. The primary issue was whether Haskell was the gunman. In addition to circumstantial evidence, the Commonwealth presented four eyewitnesses: One recanted his pre-trial testimony implicating Haskell and two had previously denied that they could identify the shooter. The fourth eyewitness, Blue, did provide consistent testimony claiming she could identify the shooter. She claimed to expect nothing in exchange for her testimony but Blue and the prosecutor knew that she expected to receive help in her own pending criminal matters in exchange for her testimony. The prosecutor failed to correct Blue’s statement and went on to rely on it and vouch for Blue in his closing argument. The Third Circuit granted Haskell’s habeas petition. Haskell was not required to show Blue’s perjured testimony caused him “actual prejudice” under the Supreme Court’s standard in Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993). Brecht does not apply when the state has knowingly presented or failed to correct perjured testimony. In those circumstances, a petitioner carries his burden when he has shown a reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury, under the Supreme Court’s 1972 "Giglio" holding. View "Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Wrensford and Muller had an altercation with a man at a car wash. Hours later, the man returned with Hendricks. A truck passed the car wash, turned around, and chased Hendricks. The passenger (Wrensford) fired several shots. Hendricks died from gunshot wounds. Officer Mendez drove in the direction that witnesses said the truck was going, and 45 minutes later, encountered two men walking on the road. Before he could approach, both men ran. Mendez broadcast a general description. Officer Cruz heard the transmission that two “black, rasta males” were on the run. Cruz thereafter saw a “rasta guy,” drew his gun, ordered Wrensford to get on the ground. Wrensford was transported to the police station. Officers later recovered a pistol close to where Wrensford had been standing. Witnesses, taken to the police station, saw Wrensford and “blurted out” that they saw the shooter (Wrensford) outside the station. They identified Muller from a photo array. The Third Circuit vacated Wrensford’s conviction for determination of whether an exception to the Fourth Amendment applies and renders the identification evidence admissible; Wrensford was de facto arrested when, without probable cause, he was transported to the police station. The court affirmed as to Muller; he waived his challenge to the suppression rulings. The court did not abuse its discretion by polling the jury and instructing it to redeliberate, or refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. View "United States v. Wrensford" on Justia Law