Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation contends that the licensed practical nurses (LPNs) employed at its nursing home could not unionize because they were “supervisors,” having the “authority” to “discipline other employees[] . . . or effectively to recommend such action,” 29 U.S.C. 152(11). Their duties included filling out forms that recommended discipline for certified nursing assistants (CNAs). The National Labor Relations Board held that New Vista’s refusal to bargain was unlawful because the nurses did not have the authority to effectively recommend discipline. The Third Circuit denied enforcement of the order and remanded, first noting the complicated procedural status of the case because the Board was not legally configured for a period while the matter was pending. The Board applied a four-part test "squarely at odds" with controlling Third Circuit precedent, NLRB v. Attleboro Associates, Ltd. Attleboro rejected the Board’s position that an employee does not have authority to effectively recommend discipline if the employee’s supervisors independently investigate the employee’s recommendation. In addition, the “number of instances” of supervision does not determine whether employees are supervisors. View "New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mathias was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder based on a shooting that killed one person and severely injured another. The judge properly instructed the jurors they must find the accomplice himself had the specific intent to kill but, over defense counsel’s objection and contrary to Pennsylvania law, also indicated that the jurors could convict an accomplice based on the specific intent of the principal. While appellate counsel raised the jury instructions on criminal conspiracy, he did not raise the murder instructions. The state court observed that appellate counsel had not adequately briefed any of Mathias’s claims and deemed them waived but rejected the conspiracy instruction claim on the merits. Mathias filed a pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, untimely raising a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Superior Court rejected it on the merits. Mathias filed a pro se petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed a grant of habeas relief on Mathias’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due process claims based on the murder instruction despite waiving the Rule 4(a)(3) timeliness requirement. Regardless of whether counsel’s performance was deficient, the state court did not clearly err in determining there was no prejudice and its decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent on internally inconsistent jury instructions. View "Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville SCI" on Justia Law

Acting on apparent insider information from a drug courier, Washington and his co-conspirators planned to rob a Philadelphia property where they thought 10 kilograms of cocaine were stored. The “stash house” was a trap; the “courier” was an undercover ATF agent. The cocaine did not exist. Washington was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and drug charges (18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and 21 U.S.C. 846) but acquitted on a gun charge. The fictitious amount of cocaine triggered a 20-year mandatory minimum. Washington was sentenced to 264 months in prison. Washington claimed that people of color are swept up in such stings in disproportionate numbers, that the use of the statutory mandatory minimum term violated his due process rights, and that his attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. The Third Circuit rejected those arguments but remanded for limited post-judgment discovery. While stash-house reverse stings can raise constitutional concerns, the use of a mandatory minimum sentence did not deprive Washington of due process. With respect to denial of pretrial discovery on ATF’s operations and enforcement statistics, the court agreed that a district court may exercise its discretion to grant limited discovery, or otherwise to conduct in camera analysis of government data before deciding whether limited discovery is warranted even if a defendant seeking discovery on a selective enforcement claim has not otherwise met his full burden under Supreme Court precedent concerning selective prosecution. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs assert that they developed cancer after being exposed to excessive radiation emissions from the Nuclear Material and Equipment Company’s Apollo, Pennsylvania facility. The district court held that their common-law claims against were preempted by the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act and rejected their Price-Anderson “public liability” claims on summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although the Act preempted common-law negligence claims, the public liability claims require Plaintiffs to prove versions of the traditional negligence elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. With respect to duty, the court noted the restrictions on access to the facility; Plaintiffs did not establish the existence of excessive radiation outside the restricted area. The facility’s license did not establish a tort duty. Even with state-of-the-art data, it is impossible to determine with certainty that radiation is the cause of a given incidence of cancer. Plaintiffs failed to offer evidence from which a jury could find that each plaintiff was exposed to radiation from Defendants’ uranium effluent sufficiently frequently, regularly, and proximately to substantially cause their illnesses. View "McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Mendoza was born in Honduras in 1989. Mendoza’s father (Martinez) was politically active in the Liberal Party. He routinely spoke out against the National Party. In 2000, a National Party activist assassinated Martinez and wounded Martinez’s wife. In 2002, Mendoza’s uncle was assassinated by a National Party activist. Mendoza was president of the local Liberal Party’s youth division, gave speeches supporting the Party, and worked for the Party during the 2013 national election. He received a message that threatened him with the same fate as his father. Mendoza reported this incident. He was denied a visa to enter the U.S., crossed the border without inspection, and was returned to Honduras. When he was detained after his second entry Mendoza requested asylum or withholding of removal because he feared for his life if returned to Honduras. He was placed into a “withholding only” proceeding. An IJ ordered his removal. The Third Circuit reversed, noting evidence of the politically motivated death threats, inaction on Mendoza’s complaints, a perpetrator and judge who shared a political affiliation in opposition to that of Mendoza, and evidence of a politically corrupt system that failed to reign in politically motivated violence. The Honduran government was unwilling or unable to protect Mendoza; he could not safely return. View "Mendoza-Ordonez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Globus, a publicly-traded medical device company, terminated its relationship with one of its distributors, Vortex, in keeping with a policy of moving toward in-house sales. Several months later, in August 2014, Globus executives alerted shareholders that sales growth had slowed, attributed the decline in part to the decision to terminate its contract with Vortex, and revised Globus’s revenue guidance downward for fiscal year 2014. The price of Globus shares fell by approximately 18% the following day. Globus shareholders contend the company and its executives violated the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5 and defrauded investors by failing to disclose the company’s decision to terminate the distributor contract and by issuing revenue projections that failed to account for this decision. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case. Globus had no duty to disclose either its decision to terminate its relationship with Vortex or the completed termination of that relationship. Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead that a drop in sales was inevitable; that the revenue projections were false when made; nor that that Globus incorporated anticipated revenue from Vortex in its projections. View "Williams v. Globus Medical, Inc." on Justia Law

About 99.5% of the Orion Project, 12.9 miles of pipeline looping that would transport an additional 135,000 dekatherms per day of natural gas through Pennsylvania, would run alongside existing pipelines. According to Riverkeeper, construction will lead to deforestation, destruction of wetland habitats, and other forms of environmental damage. Riverkeeper asserts that such damage can be avoided by building or upgrading a compressor station. The Army Corps of Engineers, which administers certain provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7) issued a Section 404 permit approving the project. The Third Circuit rejected Riverkeeper’s challenge. The Corps considered the compression alternative but rejected it for reasons supported by the record. While the compression alternative would disturb less land, its impact would be mostly permanent. The pipeline project would disturb more land, but its impact would be mostly temporary. In making a policy choice between those environmental tradeoffs, the agency’s discretion “was at its apex.” View "Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

In 1991, Bruce and others went Vine’s mussel shell camp, tied up Vine and his fiance, shot them, set the house ablaze and completed a robbery. Federal authorities became involved, leading to Bruce’s 1996 convictions for witness tampering murder. In 2011, the Supreme Court decided “Fowler,” interpreting the statute under which Bruce was convicted, making it a crime “to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States . . . of information relating to the . . . possible commission of a Federal offense,” 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(C). Fowler addressed situations where the defendant killed with the intent to prevent communication with officers in general but did not have federal officers in mind at the time. Ordinarily, federal prisoners collaterally challenge their convictions or sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Bruce never pursued his statutory interpretation argument on direct appeal or in his initial section 2255 motion. Section 2255(h) does not permit a second petition for previously unavailable rules of statutory interpretation, but a savings clause allows a federal prisoner to seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 when 2255’s remedy “is inadequate or ineffective.” The Third Circuit concluded that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under section 2241, but that this is not the extraordinary case in which a successful showing of actual innocence has been made View "Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP" on Justia Law

E.R.'s parents and Ridley School District disputed Ridley’s obligations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1482, “individualized education program” (IEP) requirement. An IEP may require the child to be placed in a private school with reimbursement from the school district. E.R.’s parents enrolled her in a private school and sought reimbursement. The hearing officer agreed with E.R.’s parents, rendering E.R.’s private-school placement her “then-current educational placement.” The Third Circuit reversed the hearing officer. E.R.’s parents did not pursue their IEP-related claims but asked Ridley to reimburse them for their private-school expenses between the 2009 administrative decision and the 2012 conclusion of the appeal Ridley declined. E.R.’s parents sued under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), seeking reimbursement through final resolution of the dispute. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s reimbursement order. Ridley’s certiorari petition to the Supreme Court was denied in 2015; Ridley then reimbursed E.R.’s parents. They sought attorneys’ fees under 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). The Third Circuit reversed denial of the motion. A fee award is available to parents who, after unsuccessfully challenging a school district’s proposed educational placement for their child, later obtain a court order requiring the district to reimburse them for the costs of the child’s “stay put” placement—the “then-current educational placement” in which the Act permitted the child to remain while administrative and judicial proceedings were pending. View "M. R. v. Ridley School District" on Justia Law

Vanderklok wanted to fly from Philadelphia to Miami, to run a half-marathon. In his carry-on luggage, he had a heart monitor and watch stored inside a piece of PVC pipe, capped on both ends. During screening at the airport security checkpoint, the pipe and electronics prompted secondary screening, supervised by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employee Kieser. According to Vanderklok, Kieser was disrespectful, so Vanderklok stated an intent to file a complaint against him. Vanderklok claims that Kieser, in retaliation, called the Philadelphia police and falsely reported that Vanderklok had threatened to bring a bomb to the airport. Vanderklok was arrested. He was acquitted because Kieser’s testimony about Vanderklok’s behavior did not match airport surveillance footage. Vanderklok sued. The district court concluded that Kieser lacked qualified immunity as to Vanderklok’s First Amendment claim and that a reasonable jury could find in Vanderklok’s favor as to his Fourth Amendment claim. The Third Circuit vacated. Because Kieser sought and was denied summary judgment on the merits of Vanderklok’s Fourth Amendment claim, rather than on the basis of qualified immunity, that claim cannot be reviewed on interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that no First Amendment claim against a TSA employee for retaliatory prosecution even exists in the context of airport security screenings. View "Vanderklok v. United States" on Justia Law