Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shuker underwent a hip replacement surgery that resulted in unexpected complications and brought tort claims against Smith & Nephew, the manufacturer of his hip replacement system. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976, added comprehensive medical device approval processes to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, prescribing tiers of federal requirements for certain devices corresponding to the device’s inherent risk level. In exchange for compliance with the strictest federal mandates, Congress afforded manufacturers express preemption from state laws imposing different or additional “safety or effectiveness” requirements for those devices, 21 U.S.C. 360k(a)(2). Shuker’s medical device was comprised of multiple components, some of which are from “Class III” medical devices subject to federal requirements and some of which are from medical devices that carry a different class designation and are not subject to those requirements. The Third Circuit affirmed a determination that Shuker’s negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty claims are expressly preempted. The court reversed the dismissal of other claims. Shuker adequately pleaded non-preempted claims based on Smith & Nephew’s alleged off-label promotion in violation of federal law and loss of consortium, and jurisdictional discovery is warranted with respect to personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants. View "Shuker v. Smith & Nephew PLC" on Justia Law

Shuker underwent a hip replacement surgery that resulted in unexpected complications and brought tort claims against Smith & Nephew, the manufacturer of his hip replacement system. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976, added comprehensive medical device approval processes to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, prescribing tiers of federal requirements for certain devices corresponding to the device’s inherent risk level. In exchange for compliance with the strictest federal mandates, Congress afforded manufacturers express preemption from state laws imposing different or additional “safety or effectiveness” requirements for those devices, 21 U.S.C. 360k(a)(2). Shuker’s medical device was comprised of multiple components, some of which are from “Class III” medical devices subject to federal requirements and some of which are from medical devices that carry a different class designation and are not subject to those requirements. The Third Circuit affirmed a determination that Shuker’s negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty claims are expressly preempted. The court reversed the dismissal of other claims. Shuker adequately pleaded non-preempted claims based on Smith & Nephew’s alleged off-label promotion in violation of federal law and loss of consortium, and jurisdictional discovery is warranted with respect to personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants. View "Shuker v. Smith & Nephew PLC" on Justia Law

Mondragon-Gonzalez was admitted to the U.S. in 2008 on an immigrant visa. In 2015, he pled guilty under Pennsylvania law, which provides: A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact with a minor" for specified purposes. He admitted to sending a girl pictures of his penis and was sentenced to a prison term of eight to 23 months. DHS commenced deportation proceedings. An Immigration Judge found that Mondragon-Gonzalez’s conviction fell within 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of . . . a crime of child abuse . . . is deportable.” The BIA dismissed his appeal, comparing the elements of the state conviction and its interpretation of a “crime of child abuse” in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Given Congress’ intent to make crimes that harm children deportable offenses, the BIA’s interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. The Pennsylvania law requires intentional contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging in sexual abuse of children; it meets the generic definitional requirement in section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), that the act constitute maltreatment of a child such that there was a sufficiently high risk of harm to a child’s physical or mental well-being. View "Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Mondragon-Gonzalez was admitted to the U.S. in 2008 on an immigrant visa. In 2015, he pled guilty under Pennsylvania law, which provides: A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact with a minor" for specified purposes. He admitted to sending a girl pictures of his penis and was sentenced to a prison term of eight to 23 months. DHS commenced deportation proceedings. An Immigration Judge found that Mondragon-Gonzalez’s conviction fell within 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of . . . a crime of child abuse . . . is deportable.” The BIA dismissed his appeal, comparing the elements of the state conviction and its interpretation of a “crime of child abuse” in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Given Congress’ intent to make crimes that harm children deportable offenses, the BIA’s interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. The Pennsylvania law requires intentional contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging in sexual abuse of children; it meets the generic definitional requirement in section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), that the act constitute maltreatment of a child such that there was a sufficiently high risk of harm to a child’s physical or mental well-being. View "Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

After paying a total of $15,493.00 on his $5,000 loan, MacDonald filed a putative class action concerning the loan agreement. He cited RICO and New Jersey state usury and consumer laws, arguing that the agreement is usurious and unconscionable for containing a provision requiring that all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by a representative of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (CRST) and a clause that delegates questions about the arbitration provision’s enforceability to the arbitrator. No CRST arbitral forum exists. The agreement also purported to waive all of the borrower’s state and federal statutory rights. The district court denied a motion to compel arbitration. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the agreement directs arbitration to an illusory forum without a provision for an alternative forum, and the forum selection clause is not severable, so that the entire agreement to arbitrate, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable. View "MacDonald v. Cashcall Inc." on Justia Law

Investigating Playpen, a global dark-web child pornography forum with more than 150,000 users, the FBI relied on a single search warrant, issued in the Eastern District of Virginia, to search the computers of thousands of Playpen users all over the world, using malware called a “Network Investigative Technique” (NIT). Werdene, a Pennsylvania citizen, was a Playpen user whose computer was compromised by the NIT. He was charged in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The NIT warrant violated the prior version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) with respect to jurisdictional limits and the magistrate judge exceeded her authority under the Federal Magistrates Act. The warrant was therefore void ab initio, and the Rule 41(b) infraction was a Fourth Amendment violation. However, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule may apply to warrants that are void ab initio. The warrant was issued by a neutral, detached, duly-appointed magistrate judge, who determined that it was supported by probable cause and particularly described the places to be searched and things to be seized. The FBI, therefore, acted in good-faith; there is no evidence that it exceeded the scope of the warrant. View "United States v. Werdene" on Justia Law

Metro, a managing clerk at a New York City law firm, engaged in a five-year scheme in which he disclosed material nonpublic information concerning corporate transactions to his friend Tamayo. Tamayo told his stockbroker, Eydelman, who made trades for Tamayo, himself, his family, his friends, and other clients. Metro did not hold the involved stocks himself and did not collect proceeds but relied on Tamayo to reinvest the proceeds from their unlawful trades in future insider trading. During the government’s investigation, Tamayo promptly admitted his role in the scheme and cooperated with the government. The insider trading based on Metro’s tips resulted in illicit gains of $5,673,682. The court attributed that entire sum to Metro in determining his 46-month sentence after Metro pled guilty to conspiracy to violate securities laws, 18 U.S.C. 371, and insider trading, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff. Metro denies being aware of Eydelman’s existence until one year after he relayed his last tip to Tamayo, and contends that he never intended any of the tips to be passed to a broker or any other third party. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court failed to make sufficient factual findings to support the attribution of the full $5.6 million to Metro and gave too broad a meaning to the phrase “acting in concert.” View "United States v. Metro" on Justia Law

More than 10 years ago, Tatis incurred a debt of $1,289.86 to Bally Fitness. Allied, a debt collector, sent Tatis a letter dated May 18, 2015 stating: “[The creditor] is willing to accept payment in the amount of $128.99 in settlement of this debt. You can take advantage of this settlement offer if we receive payment of this amount or if you make another mutually acceptable payment arrangement within 40 days.” The six-year New Jersey limitations period for debt-collection actions had already run. Tatis filed a class action, alleging that Allied’s letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 1692) because Tatis interpreted the word “settlement” to mean that she had a “legal obligation” to pay and the letter “[f]alsely represent[ed] the legal status of the debt" made “false threats to take action that cannot legally be taken,” and used “false representations and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect." The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. Collection letters may violate the FDCPA by misleading or deceiving debtors into believing they have a legal obligation to repay time-barred debts even when the letters do not threaten legal action. The least-sophisticated debtor could plausibly be misled by the specific language used in Allied’s letter. View "Tatis v. Allied Interstate LLC" on Justia Law

More than 10 years ago, Tatis incurred a debt of $1,289.86 to Bally Fitness. Allied, a debt collector, sent Tatis a letter dated May 18, 2015 stating: “[The creditor] is willing to accept payment in the amount of $128.99 in settlement of this debt. You can take advantage of this settlement offer if we receive payment of this amount or if you make another mutually acceptable payment arrangement within 40 days.” The six-year New Jersey limitations period for debt-collection actions had already run. Tatis filed a class action, alleging that Allied’s letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 1692) because Tatis interpreted the word “settlement” to mean that she had a “legal obligation” to pay and the letter “[f]alsely represent[ed] the legal status of the debt" made “false threats to take action that cannot legally be taken,” and used “false representations and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect." The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. Collection letters may violate the FDCPA by misleading or deceiving debtors into believing they have a legal obligation to repay time-barred debts even when the letters do not threaten legal action. The least-sophisticated debtor could plausibly be misled by the specific language used in Allied’s letter. View "Tatis v. Allied Interstate LLC" on Justia Law

During Greene’s 1996 trial for murder, robbery, and conspiracy, the prosecution introduced the redacted confessions of Greene’s non-testifying codefendants. Pennsylvania’s High Court summarily dismissed an appeal in which Greene argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1998 "Gray" holding, decided after the Superior Court rejected Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim, entitled him to relief. Pennsylvania courts also rejected his post-conviction petitions. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the denial of Greene's 2004 habeas petition, noting that Gray had not sought certiorari relief after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed his appeal and did not assert his “Gray” claim in his state post-conviction petition. Three years later, Greene filed a pro se Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate, arguing that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise Greene to petition the U.S. Supreme Court, citing the Court’s 2012 decision (Martinez v. Ryan) that “[w]here, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, citing the Supreme Court’s 2017 holding (Davila v. Davis) that “a federal court [may not] hear a substantial, but procedurally defaulted, claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when a prisoner’s state post-conviction counsel provides ineffective assistance by failing to raise that claim.” View "Greene v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law