Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the early morning of December 15, 1987, Richard Laird and Frank Chester brutally murdered Anthony Milano in a wooded area in Bristol, Pennsylvania. Milano, a 26-year-old homosexual man, was beaten and had his neck and throat slashed multiple times, leading to his death. Laird and Chester were arrested and tried for first-degree murder, among other charges. Both were convicted and sentenced to death. Laird's defense included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding the failure to present expert testimony on the sexual abuse he suffered as a child.Laird's initial conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1991. He sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the PCRA Court and affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1999. Laird then filed a federal habeas petition, which resulted in the vacating of his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence in 2001. The case was remanded for a retrial, and in 2007, Laird was again convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this conviction and sentence in 2010.Laird filed another PCRA petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present an expert on childhood sexual abuse. The PCRA Court denied relief, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the additional expert testimony would have been cumulative and not likely to change the outcome. Laird then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied by the District Court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether counsel was ineffective for not presenting an additional expert on childhood sexual abuse. The court held that the PCRA Court's decision was reasonable and that counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court affirmed the District Court's denial of the habeas petition. View "Laird v. Secretary of Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Joseph Cammarata and his associates, Eric Cohen and David Punturieri, created Alpha Plus Recovery, LLC, a claims aggregator that submitted fraudulent claims to securities class action settlement funds. They falsely represented that three entities, Nimello, Quartis, and Invergasa, had traded in securities involved in class action settlements, obtaining over $40 million. The fraudulent claims included falsified trade data and fabricated reports. The scheme unraveled when a claims administrator, KCC, discovered the fraud, leading to the rejection of the claims and subsequent legal action.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering. Cohen and Punturieri pled guilty, while Cammarata proceeded to trial and was found guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced Cammarata to 120 months in prison, ordered restitution, and forfeiture of certain property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld most of the District Court's rulings but found issues with the restitution order and the forfeiture of Cammarata's vacation home. The court held that the restitution order did not fully compensate the victims, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), and remanded for reconsideration. The court also found procedural error in the forfeiture process, as Cammarata was deprived of his right to a jury determination on the forfeitability of his property. The court vacated the forfeiture order in part and remanded for the Government to amend the order to reflect that the property is forfeitable as a substitute asset under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). View "USA v. Cammarata" on Justia Law

Malik Moss was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the quantity and purity of the methamphetamine attributable to Moss for sentencing purposes. The government presented evidence of two purchases by Moss and his co-conspirator, Jacob Santiago, on October 27-28, 2021, and November 11, 2021. The evidence included phone calls, cellphone data, text messages, and recorded statements indicating that Moss and Santiago bought a total of fifteen pounds of methamphetamine. The District Court also considered the purity levels of controlled purchases made directly from Moss, which ranged from 62% to 95%, and applied the lowest purity level of 62% to calculate Moss's sentence.The District Court initially scheduled the evidentiary hearing for December 12, 2022, but rescheduled it for December 21 due to Santiago's absence. During the December 12 proceeding, the government informed the court that a cooperating co-conspirator wished to breach his cooperation agreement and not testify. At the December 21 hearing, U.S. Marshals observed Moss's girlfriend's friend attempting to record the proceeding. The government later submitted evidence from Moss's prison communications showing that he had arranged for the recording to expose the co-conspirator and had sent threatening notes to the co-conspirator's family. Based on this evidence, the District Court applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement and added two points to Moss's base offense level.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found no clear error in the District Court's factual findings related to the drug quantity, drug purity, and the application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, upholding Moss's 384-month sentence. View "United States v. Moss" on Justia Law

George Pitsilides, a successful restaurateur and professional poker player, was convicted in 1998 in Pennsylvania for criminal conspiracy to commit pool selling and bookmaking, and two counts of pool selling and bookmaking. These offenses are classified as first-degree misdemeanors in Pennsylvania, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Consequently, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Pitsilides is barred from possessing a firearm. Despite these convictions, Pitsilides continued to engage in illegal gambling activities, leading to further convictions in Virginia in 2011 for operating an illegal gambling enterprise.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, applying the two-step framework from Binderup v. Attorney General. The court concluded that Pitsilides failed to show his convictions were not serious and rejected his argument that his offenses fell within the carveout for business-related offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the legal landscape had changed significantly since the District Court's decision, particularly with the Supreme Court's rulings in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General. These cases emphasized the need for individualized assessments of whether a felon poses a danger to public safety when challenging firearm prohibitions under the Second Amendment.The Third Circuit concluded that the record was insufficient to determine whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Pitsilides. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for further factual development to assess whether Pitsilides poses a special danger of misusing firearms. View "Pitsilides v. Barr" on Justia Law

Michael Milchin pleaded guilty to healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, and possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to 168 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Milchin filed multiple motions for compassionate release and sentence reductions based on various grounds, including his health and the threat of COVID-19, but these were denied. This appeal concerns his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the new U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which allows an offense-level reduction for certain offenders with zero criminal history points at the time of sentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first concluded that Milchin was not eligible for the reduction on November 13, 2023, and dismissed his motion without prejudice due to a stay on motions seeking retroactive application of § 4C1.1. Milchin's subsequent request for appointment of counsel was denied on March 1, 2024, as the court determined he did not qualify for a sentence reduction. On March 4, 2024, Milchin filed an "Emergency Motion for Sentence Reduction," which was also denied by the District Court, citing its earlier orders. Milchin then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Milchin was not eligible for the offense-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 because he had received an aggravating role adjustment. The court interpreted § 4C1.1(a)(10) to disqualify any defendant who either received an aggravating role adjustment or was engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. The court affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that Milchin did not meet the criteria for a sentence reduction under the new guideline. View "USA v. Michael Milchin" on Justia Law

Corrigan Clay, an American citizen, pleaded guilty to sexually abusing his minor adopted daughter while living in Haiti, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). Clay argued that Congress lacked the power to enact § 2423(c), which criminalizes illicit sexual conduct by U.S. citizens abroad. He contended that his non-commercial conduct did not fall under Congress's authority to regulate foreign commerce or its treaty power.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Clay's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that § 2423(c) was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate the channels of foreign commerce. The court did not address the treaty power arguments. Clay then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to 235 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines range. He appealed, challenging the constitutionality of § 2423(c) and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that § 2423(c) is a permissible exercise of congressional power under both the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The court reasoned that Congress has broader authority to regulate foreign commerce than interstate commerce, and § 2423(c) fits within this power as it regulates the channels of foreign commerce and activities that substantially affect foreign commerce. Additionally, the court found that § 2423(c) is rationally related to implementing the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, thus falling under the Necessary and Proper Clause.The Third Circuit also found no procedural or substantive errors in Clay's sentencing, affirming the District Court's judgment. The court concluded that the sentence was reasonable and appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. View "USA v. Clay" on Justia Law

Prestige Home Care Agency, operated by Nursing Home Care Management Inc., did not compensate its employees for travel time between clients' homes. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) sued Prestige for this and other violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court found Prestige's actions to be willful violations of the FLSA and granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL. Prestige appealed the summary judgment, the exclusion of its expert witness, and the denial of its motion for sanctions against the DOL.The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania excluded Prestige’s expert witness, denied Prestige’s motion for sanctions, and granted summary judgment for the DOL on all claims. The court found that Prestige willfully violated the FLSA by not compensating for travel time, failing to pay for short breaks, improperly compensating overtime, and not keeping accurate records.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that travel time between job sites during the workday is compensable under the FLSA. It affirmed the District Court’s finding that Prestige violated the FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements and acted willfully in its violations, extending the statute of limitations to three years. The court also upheld the District Court’s calculation of back wages and liquidated damages, finding the DOL’s estimates sufficient given Prestige’s inadequate records.The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s exclusion of Prestige’s expert witness, who made several legal errors in his report. The court also upheld the denial of sanctions against the DOL, as the documents in question were already in Prestige’s possession and had little impact on the case. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment in all respects. View "Secretary United States Department of Labor v. Nursing Home Care Management Inc." on Justia Law

Krishna Kishore Geda and Chaya Durga Sruthi Keerthi Nunna, married Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on employment-based nonimmigrant visas, filed I-485 applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents. After waiting nearly eight years, they were informed that their applications were on hold due to the unavailability of the required immigrant visa. Frustrated by the delay, they sued the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its Director, claiming unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed their claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary decision shielded from judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that the decision to delay adjudication of the Gedas' applications under the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary action specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. Consequently, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court concluded that only the executive and legislative branches could provide the relief sought by the Gedas. View "Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration" on Justia Law

Aqudre Quailes and Ayinda Harper were separately charged with being felons in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Harper was on Pennsylvania state probation and parole when his probation officer discovered photographs of him holding firearms on social media. During a home visit, officers found a semiautomatic pistol in his residence. Harper had thirteen prior felony convictions. Quailes, on parole for one of his six prior felony convictions, was arrested for absconding from parole. Authorities found firearms and ammunition in his girlfriend’s apartment, where he had been staying.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed both indictments, ruling that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that the defendants' status as parolees or probationers did not negate their Second Amendment rights. The Government appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to state parolees and probationers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Quailes and Harper because neither had completed their criminal sentences. The court referenced its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional for a felon who had completed his sentence, and United States v. Moore, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) for felons still serving their sentences. The court concluded that historical practices support disarming convicts who are still serving their sentences, including those on state parole or probation. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s orders and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "USA v. Quailes" on Justia Law

Dwayne Sherman was indicted for several offenses related to drug trafficking in Central Pennsylvania, including six counts of money laundering, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and one count of conspiracy to launder money. The charges stemmed from activities between 2012 and 2018. Evidence presented at trial included testimony from a drug dealer, Paul Alston, who bought cocaine from Sherman, and FBI informant Ruben Martin, who received large sums of cash from Sherman intended for Mexico. Sherman admitted to selling cocaine and making money drops but claimed ignorance of the money's criminal origins.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Sherman’s motion for a new trial but vacated three of his money-laundering convictions, finding they were separate means of committing a single offense. At sentencing, the court applied a dangerous-weapon enhancement based on Sherman’s testimony about having access to handguns while storing drug proceeds at home, resulting in a 262-month imprisonment sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Sherman argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, the government’s proof of the drug conspiracy varied from the indictment, and the district court erred in applying the dangerous-weapon enhancement. The Third Circuit found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, including Sherman’s knowledge and intent regarding the money laundering and drug conspiracy charges. The court also found no impermissible variance between the indictment and the trial evidence and upheld the district court’s application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Sherman" on Justia Law