Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

S.E.R.L., a native of Honduras, fled to the U.S. in 2014 and unsuccessfully sought asylum and statutory withholding of removal based on membership in a proposed particular social group “immediate family members of Honduran women unable to leave a domestic relationship.” She fears persecution by Angel, who abducted, raped, and continues to stalk S.E.R.L.’s daughter, who has already been granted asylum. Orellana, S.E.R.L.’s stepfather, has repeatedly abused S.E.R.L.’s mother. An immigration judge found S.E.R.L. credible but concluded that S.E.R.L. had not met her burden to establish eligibility for relief. The IJ reasoned that Angel had targeted S.E.R.L.’s daughter, not her and that “her stepfather never physically harmed her.” The IJ stated that any harm she suffered was not on account of a protected ground; her proposed group “lack[ed] the requisite level of particularity and social distinction” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42). The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, citing the BIA’s three-part test for proving the existence of a cognizable particular social group, which requires applicants to establish that the group [at issue] is composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, defined with particularity, and socially distinct within the society in question. That interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that S.E.R.L. has not met its requirements. View "S.E.R.L. v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Minarski, the part-time secretary to Yadlosky, Director of Susquehanna County’s Department of Veterans Affairs, claims that Yadlosky made unwanted sexual advances toward her for years. The two worked separately from other employees. Minarski never reported this conduct because her young daughter had cancer and she depended on the income. Minarski later learned that on two prior occasions, the Chief County Clerk became aware of Yadlosky’s inappropriate behavior toward other women and reprimanded him. A County Commissioner was aware of one incident. After both incidents, there was no further action nor was any notation placed in Yadlosky’s personnel file. Minarsky also learned that other women had similar encounters with Yadlosky. The County terminated Yadlosky when the persistent nature of his behavior toward Minarsky was revealed. Minarsky sought to hold Yadlosky liable for sexual harassment, and her former employer, Susquehanna County, vicariously liable. The County raised the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense. In granting the County summary judgment, the district court held that the elements of this defense had been proven as a matter of law. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that, in this case, the availability of the defense regarding both elements--whether the County took reasonable care to detect and eliminate the harassment and whether Minarsky acted reasonably in not availing herself of the County’s anti-harassment safeguards--should be decided by a jury. View "Minarsky v. Susquehanna County" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Yahoo in a putative class action alleging that Yahoo violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending plaintiff thousands of unsolicited text messages. In light of the D.C. Circuit's holding in ACA International v. FCC, the court interpreted the statutory definition of an autodialer as it did prior to the issuance of the 2015 Declaratory Ruling. Therefore, plaintiff could no longer rely on his argument that the Email SMS Service had the latent or potential capacity to function as autodialer. The court also held that plaintiff failed to provide evidence to show that the Email SMS Service had the present capacity to function as autodialer. View "Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc." on Justia Law

Firefighters alleged that they suffered hearing losses caused by the loud noise emitted by a manufacturer’s fire sirens. A perfunctory investigation conducted by the manufacturer during discovery revealed the firefighters’ lawsuit to be clearly time-barred, and also revealed that one firefighter had not even suffered hearing loss attributable to noise exposure. Eventually, Plaintiffs requested the district court to dismiss the case with prejudice (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2)). In doing so, the court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of the manufacturer, making an explicit reference to plaintiffs’ counsel’s practice of repeatedly suing the fire siren manufacturer in jurisdictions throughout the country in a virtually identical fashion. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although attorneys’ fees and costs are typically not awarded when a matter is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, such an award is appropriate when exceptional circumstances exist. Exceptional circumstances include a litigant’s failure to perform a meaningful pre-suit investigation, as well as a repeated practice of bringing meritless claims and then dismissing them with prejudice after both the opposing party and the judicial system have incurred substantial costs. Such exceptional circumstances are present in this case. View "Carroll v. E One Inc." on Justia Law

The district court refused to enjoin the School District from allowing transgender students to use bathrooms and locker rooms that are consistent with the students’ gender identities rather than the sex they were determined to have at birth. The District required students claiming to be transgender to meet with licensed counselors. There are several multi-user bathrooms; each has individual stalls. Several single-user restrooms are available to all. "Cisgender" students claimed the policy violated their constitutional rights of bodily privacy; Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681; and tort law. The Third Circuit affirmed. Under the circumstances, the presence of transgender students in the locker and restrooms is no more offensive to privacy interests than the presence of the other students who are not transgender. The constitutional right to privacy must be weighed against important competing governmental interests; transgender students face extraordinary social, psychological, and medical risks. The District had a compelling interest in shielding them from discrimination. Nothing suggests that cisgender students who voluntarily elect to use single-user facilities face the same extraordinary consequences as transgender students would if they were forced to use them. The cisgender students were claiming a broad right of personal privacy in a space that is just not that private. The mere presence of a transgender individual in a bathroom or locker room would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person. View "Doe v. Boyertown Area School District" on Justia Law

Mothers and children fled violence perpetrated by gangs in Honduras and El Salvador and were apprehended near the U.S. border. They were moved to a Pennsylvania detention center. Immigration officers determined that they were inadmissible. They were ordered expeditiously removed, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), and unsuccessfully requested asylum. They sought habeas relief, claiming that Asylum Officers and IJs violated their constitutional and statutory rights in conducting the “credible fear” interviews. The Third Circuit initially affirmed the dismissal of the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that, while the Suspension Clause of the Constitution would allow an aggrieved party with sufficient ties to the U.S. to challenge that lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners’ relationship to the U.S. amounted only to presence for a few hours before their apprehension. The children were subsequently accorded Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status—a classification intended to safeguard abused, abandoned, or neglected alien children who are able to meet rigorous eligibility requirements. The Third Circuit then reversed the dismissal, noting that protections afforded to SIJ children include eligibility for application of adjustment of status to that of lawful permanent residents, exemption from various grounds of inadmissibility, and procedural protections to ensure their status is not revoked without good cause. The jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as applied to SIJ designees seeking judicial review of expedited removal orders. View "Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 1998, Ramos threw a brick at a child, who then required medical treatment; Ramos pled guilty to aggravated assault. In 1999, Ramos was apprehended with heroin and convicted of manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and knowingly possessing a controlled substance. In 2001, Ramos broke into a store and stole furniture; he pled guilty to burglary. In 2008, Philadelphia police observed Ramos selling crack cocaine out of a truck, arrested Ramos, and recovered a loaded handgun from the vehicle. Ramos pled guilty, stipulating that he was a career offender. The court concluded that Ramos had three predicate drug or violent felony convictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act and was subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. Factoring in Ramos’s acceptance of responsibility, the court determined that Ramos’s Guidelines range was 248-295 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Ramos to 180 months of imprisonment. In 2016, Ramos sought post-conviction relief (28 U.S.C. 2255), arguing that, under the Supreme Court’s “Johnson” decision his burglary conviction was no longer a career offender predicate. The Third Circuit applied the modified categorical approach to Pennsylvania’s divisible aggravated assault statute and held that Ramos’s conviction for second-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 18 Pa. C.S. 2702(a)(4), is categorically a crime of violence. View "United States v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit affirmed Welsans’s conviction for distribution and possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252). The court rejected an argument that his due process right to a fair trial was violated because the prosecution informed the jury, through evidence and argument, that his pornography files included deeply abhorrent videos and images of bestiality, bondage, and acts of violence against very young children. While the challenged evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly appealed to the passions of the jury, the misconduct did not so infect Welshans’s trial with unfairness as to violate due process. The evidence against Welshans was overwhelming; there was no dispute that his computers contained child pornography; Welshans was the sole user of the computers; he installed and used a file-sharing network, which was used to distribute child pornography; Welshans used the Internet account from which the child pornography was distributed. Welshans nonetheless claimed, based solely on his credibility, that he did not know that there was child pornography on his computers. The court remanded for resentencing. Welshans’s attempt to put files in the computer’s recycling bin when he knew the police were coming did not merit the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement. View "United States v. Welshans" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit affirmed Welsans’s conviction for distribution and possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252). The court rejected an argument that his due process right to a fair trial was violated because the prosecution informed the jury, through evidence and argument, that his pornography files included deeply abhorrent videos and images of bestiality, bondage, and acts of violence against very young children. While the challenged evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly appealed to the passions of the jury, the misconduct did not so infect Welshans’s trial with unfairness as to violate due process. The evidence against Welshans was overwhelming; there was no dispute that his computers contained child pornography; Welshans was the sole user of the computers; he installed and used a file-sharing network, which was used to distribute child pornography; Welshans used the Internet account from which the child pornography was distributed. Welshans nonetheless claimed, based solely on his credibility, that he did not know that there was child pornography on his computers. The court remanded for resentencing. Welshans’s attempt to put files in the computer’s recycling bin when he knew the police were coming did not merit the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement. View "United States v. Welshans" on Justia Law

Gillispie, an RN, worked for the Medical Center, addressing possible medical errors. In October 2012, a pregnant patient, “E.R.,” went to the Center’s emergency room complaining of pain and vaginal bleeding. After examining E.R., Center personnel discharged her, telling her to “[g]o directly to Uniontown Hospital” to see a gynecologist. The Center had no gynecologist on staff. Center personnel did not transport E.R. Two days later, Cowie, the Center’s CEO, held a meeting to investigate whether E.R.’s discharge violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. 1395dd, or triggered reporting requirements. Gillispie contends that she insisted at two meetings that EMTALA required a report, but Cowie instructed the attendees not to report. Pennsylvania Department of Health representatives subsequently investigated a complaint regarding another patient, L.S.; Gillispie stated that Cowie had falsely told L.S.’s family that nurses had been disciplined for L.S.’s treatment. Cowie terminated Gillispie’s employment. Gillispie later reported the Center’s discharge of E.R., then filed suit under EMTALA’s whistleblower protection provision. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Gillispie did not give anyone at the Center any information about E.R.’s discharge that they were not already aware of, so she did not make a report and did not engage in activity protected by EMTALA’s whistleblower provision. Gillispie’s complaint with respect to L.S. have a statutory remedy, so she may not also allege a public policy-based wrongful discharge claim. View "Gillispie v. Regionalcare Hospital Partners, Inc." on Justia Law