Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Tanksley, a Philadelphia actor and producer, created a three-episode television pilot, Cream, for which he received a copyright. In 2015, Fox Television debuted a new series, Empire, from award-winning producer and director Lee Daniels. Tanksley sued, claiming that Empire infringed on his copyright of Cream. The district court found no substantial similarity between the two shows and dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. Superficial similarities notwithstanding, Cream and Empire are not substantially similar as a matter of law. The shared premise of the shows—an African-American, male record executive— is unprotectable. These characters fit squarely within the class of “prototypes” to which copyright protection has never extended. Considering the protectable elements of Cream, “no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are substantially similar.” View "Tanksley v. Daniels" on Justia Law

In 2006, Geness lived at McVey's Uniontown Pennsylvania assisted living facility for intellectually disabled people. Another resident, Fiffik, fell from the porch, sustaining serious injuries. Fiffik was discharged from the hospital that day but returned that evening. His condition deteriorated, resulting in his death weeks later. Three contemporaneous records from the day of the incident indicated that Fiffik merely fell in an accident. Despite these reports by Fiffik and his wife, once Fiffik was on life support, his daughter reported that her father might have been shoved. Officer Cox conducted a one-day investigation, speaking to Fiffik’s daughter, hospital personnel, and McVey. With a possible lawsuit looming, McVey reported for the first time that immediately before Fiffik’s fall he heard Geness scream “shut up” and then saw Geness walk quickly to his bedroom. Cox reported that after Geness signed a Miranda waiver, he provided a confession closely tracking McVey’s account. Geness was charged with murder. Cox claims he subsequently did not have an active role in the prosecution. Between Fayette County Prison and a locked-down mental institution, Geness remained incarcerated for nine years without further investigation, a habeas hearing, or a trial. Charges were eventually dropped. Geness sued, claiming reckless investigation, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, 42 U.S.C. 1983, due process violations, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C 12131. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of several section 1983 claims as time-barred, but reversed for Geness to amend his complaint and for reinstitution of his due process and ADA claims against the Commonwealth. View "Geness v. Cox" on Justia Law

After a 2001 joint trial with co-defendants, Eley and Eiland, a jury convicted Mitchell of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery for the shooting death of a Harrisburg taxi driver. He is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. Mitchell and Eley had unsuccessfully moved to have their cases severed. After unsuccessful state court proceedings, Mitchell sought federal habeas relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), arguing that the admission of testimony by jailhouse informants concerning Eiland’s out-of-court statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The district court concluded that Eiland’s statements to the informants were nontestimonial under Supreme Court precedent (Crawford (2004)) so their admission did not violate his rights even though he could not cross-examine Eiland. Mitchell argued that the Supreme Court decided Crawford after the last state court proceeding dealing with the Sixth Amendment issue so that Crawford principles were not “clearly established” at the time. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Mitchell, by focusing narrowly on the “clearly established Federal law” language of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and by relying on the law in effect at the time of his proceedings, misstates the standard applicable to habeas corpus review of a state court conviction. Relief is available “only on the ground that [a prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Mitchell is not in custody pursuant to what is now recognized as a Sixth Amendment violation. View "Mitchell v. Superintendent Dallas SCI" on Justia Law

Mayo is currently serving a 23-year term of imprisonment for a 2001 conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) recidivist enhancement provision, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), having committed three prior offenses in Pennsylvania that the court treated as violent felonies under ACCA: aggravated assault, in 1993, and two robberies, in 1993 and 1994. Mayo argued that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding, invalidating ACCA’s residual clause, his sentence is now unconstitutional because none of his prior convictions were for crimes that qualify as a “violent felony” as defined in ACCA. The district court rejected Mayo’s claim for post-conviction relief. The Third Circuit vacated. The aggravated assault conviction was under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2702(a)(1), which prohibits “attempt[ing] to cause serious bodily injury to another, or caus[ing] such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” As Pennsylvania interprets section 2702(a)(1), it does not necessarily involve the element of physical force required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ACCA. At least one of the convictions that the court relied on to enhance Mayo’s sentence does not qualify as a violent felony. View "United States v. Mayo" on Justia Law

Viviani left Stone Mansion with Hoey. Their vehicle crashed, killing Viviani and seriously injuring Hoey. Hoey sued Viviani’s estate, which tendered the defense to Encompass, which paid Hoey $600,000. Hoey released her claims. Encompass sued Mansion, alleging: it stands in the shoes of the insured estate; Mansion served Viviani alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated; under Pennsylvania’s Dram Shop law, a business that serves alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person is legally responsible for any damage that person might cause; and under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA).In email correspondence, Mansion’s counsel informed Encompass that “I will be authorized to accept service.” Encompass sent counsel a copy of the filed complaint and an acceptance form via email. Counsel replied, “I will hold the acceptance ... [for] the docket n[umber].” That same day, Encompass provided the docket number. Mansion later claimed that, because it had not been properly served, it could remove the case to federal court. Encompass sought remand. The court concluded that the forum defendant rule precludes removal only if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state and that counsel did not accept service. The court then dismissed: The Dram Shop law indicates that a licensee is liable only to third persons (Hoey), for damages inflicted upon the third person (off premises) by the licensee's customer when the licensee furnishes that customer with alcohol when he was visibly intoxicated. … Encompass is acting as if it were Viviani in order to recover under [UCATA]. Because there is no potential cognizable Dram Shop claim between Viviani/Encompass and Mansion, there is no contribution claim.The Third Circuit upheld removal of the case, rejecting an argument that it is “inconceivable” that Congress intended the rule to permit an in-state defendant to remove an action by delaying service of process. Stone Mansion’s conduct did not preclude removal. The court reversed the dismissal. Encompass does not argue that it is entitled to recovery in tort against Stone Mansion but presents a distinct claim for contribution under the UCATA. Pennsylvania’s Dram Shop law does not prohibit this manner of recovery. View "Encompass Insurance Co v. Stone Mansion Restaurant Inc" on Justia Law

Kane went to the hospital and reported that she may have been the victim of a sexual assault. Coraopolis Police Officer Barger interviewed Kane there. Kane says Barger told her to bring the clothes she wore during the alleged incident to the police station. The next day, Kane, with a friend, took her clothes to the station. Contrary to department policy, Barger met alone with Kane in a back room and used his personal cell phone to photograph Kane’s body. Barger pulled Kane’s shorts down to photograph a bruise on her right buttock. Kane says she “felt something touch her butt crack which caused her to jump.” Again, without asking Kane to do so, Barger pulled Kane’s tank top down to expose a bruise on her chest. Kane says that Barger repeatedly asked about her breasts, vagina, and buttocks. Despite Kane’s consistent denials, Barger’s relentless questioning led Kane to expose her vagina. Barger failed to document the clothing evidence. When Kane reported Barger’s actions, he gave inconsistent accounts, initially denying photographing Kane at all. Kane alleges that Barger violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. The district court granted Barger summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Kane supports an inference that Barger acted for personal gratification rather than investigative ends, Barger’s conduct shocks the conscience and the right to bodily integrity was clearly established. View "Kane v. Barger" on Justia Law

The Levins allege that HRRG violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692- 1692p by leaving telephone voice messages that did not use its true name, did not meaningfully disclose its identity, and used false representations and deceptive means to attempt to collect a debt or obtain information about a consumer. They complained that messages in which HRRG went by the name of “ARS” were insufficient to identify it as HRRG or even as “ARS ACCOUNT RESOLUTION SERVICES,” which is HRRG's alternative business name. The Third Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of the complaint, finding that the Levinses stated a plausible claim that HRRG violated section 1692e(14)’s “true name” provision, but have not stated plausible claims under 1692d(6) or 1692e(10). ARS is neither HRRG’s full business name, the name under which it usually transacts business, nor a commonly used acronym of its registered name. With respect to section 1692d(6), the court stated that the messages provided enough information about the caller’s identity for the least sophisticated debtor to know that the call was from a debt collector and was an attempt to collect a debt. Nothing in the messages rises to the level of being materially deceptive, misleading, or false under section 1692e(10). View "Levins v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Before trial on a 77-count indictment that charged Appellants with operating a ticket-fixing scheme in the Philadelphia Traffic Court, the district court denied a motion to dismiss charges of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1349), mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343). A private citizen and the Traffic Court administrator subsequently pleaded guilty to all counts, then appealed whether the indictment properly alleged mail fraud and wire fraud. Three Traffic Court Judges proceeded to a joint trial and were acquitted of fraud and conspiracy but convicted of perjury for statements they made before the Grand Jury. They disputed the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the prosecutor’s questions were vague and that their answers were literally true; claimed that the jury was prejudiced by evidence on the fraud and conspiracy counts; and argued that the court erred by ruling that certain evidence was inadmissible. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions. The Indictment sufficiently alleged that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud the Commonwealth and the city of money in costs and fees; it explicitly states that the scheme deprived the city and the Commonwealth of money, and describes the object of the scheme as obviating judgments of guilt that imposed the fines and costs. View "United States v. Hird" on Justia Law

Philadelphia police officers shot and killed Purnell, who died intestate. Purnell’s minor daughter is the sole beneficiary of the estate. Murray, Purnell’s mother, hired an attorney and obtained letters of administration to act on behalf of her son’s estate. Murray filed a lawsuit on behalf of the estate alleging excessive force against the city and the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment but allowed her claims against the officers to proceed to a jury trial. The officers' defense was that they had used deadly force in self-defense. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the officers. Murray filed a pro se notice of appeal. The Third Circuit ordered the pro bono appointment of amicus curiae to address whether Murray may proceed pro se on behalf of Purnell’s estate. Under 28 U.S.C. 1654, “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” in the federal courts. Although an individual may represent herself pro se, a non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal court. The Third Circuit then dismissed Murray’s appeal: a non-attorney who is not a beneficiary of the estate may not conduct a case pro se on behalf of the estate. View "Murray v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In 2003, Plaintiffs purchased Cane Bay Beach Bar, on St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. In 2005, they sued Defendants for breach of contract related to the sale of that business. Plaintiffs resided in the Virgin Islands from the time they filed their suit until 2012, when they moved to the U.S. mainland. Upon learning that Plaintiffs were no longer Virgin Islands residents, Defendants sought an order requiring Plaintiffs to post a security bond for potential costs under Virgin Islands Code title 5, section 547. 4. The Superior Court subsequently dismissed the suit for failure to post the bond. The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands reinstated the suit, finding that the Code provision violated the Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Third Circuit dismissed a petition for certiorari review for lack of jurisdiction. In 2012, 126 Stat. 1606 (H.R. 6116) revoked certiorari authority for all “cases commenced on or after” December 28, 2012. Reversing a prior decision, the court concluded that H.R. 6116's effective date applies to the date an appeal from a final decision of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court is filed and not to the date a suit was filed in the Superior Court. The petition in this matter was filed after that effective date. View "Vooys v. Bentley" on Justia Law