Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Homeland Security Agent Kuc posed as a Pennsylvania drug trafficker, communicating by phone with men called Cejas and Juan, who used telephone numbers with Mexican country codes. They sent two kilograms of methamphetamine to a Springfield, Pennsylvania mailbox. Kuc received the methamphetamine on May 29, 2015, and deposited $2,000 in an agreed-upon bank account the following day in Philadelphia. On June 3, Kuc traveled to Los Angeles and spoke to Cejas, who stated that he would direct his local contact to contact Kuc. Kuc received a phone call from Renteria. The two planned to exchange methamphetamine and heroin for $146,500, which included $28,000 owed for the Pennsylvania methamphetamine shipment. The next day, the men met at a Huntington Beach restaurant. Kuc saw the drugs and gave other agents a prearranged signal, Renteria was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and one kilogram or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, and was sentenced to 153 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was not a proper venue because it was not reasonably foreseeable that conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy would have occurred there; that the court gave incorrect jury instructions concerning venue; and that the court erred in its sentencing calculation. The court declined to adopt the “reasonable foreseeability” test; Renteria’s activities constituted overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, sufficient to establish venue under section 3237(a). View "United States v. Renteria" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, convicted of drug offenses between 1997 and 2007, applied to Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) for jobs that involved operating vehicles. Each filled out a form disclosing his criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to obtain a background check. SEPTA denied them employment. SEPTA did not send Plaintiffs copies of their background checks before it decided not to hire them, nor did it send them notices of their rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which required SEPTA to send both before it denied them employment, 15 U.S.C. 1681b(b)(3). Plaintiffs filed a putative class action, which the district court dismissed for lack of standing, reasoning there was only a “bare procedural violation,” not a concrete injury in fact because Plaintiffs alleged that SEPTA denied them jobs based on their criminal history, which Plaintiffs disclosed before the background checks. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim based on failure to provide notice of FCRA rights. Plaintiffs became aware of their FCRA rights and were able to file this lawsuit within the prescribed limitations period, so they were not injured. The court reversed the dismissal of the claim based on failure to provide copies of the consumer reports. That right exists whether the report is accurate or not; FCRA clearly expresses Congress’s “intent to make [the] injury redressable.” View "Long v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

Lupu refinanced his home loan and mortgage with Loan City, which transferred both to IndyMac, then they went to Fannie Mae, next to OneWest, and finally to the current holder, Ocwen. After defaulting, Lupu sued to void the instruments evidencing his debt, challenging the use of the MERS System, a private mortgage registry that allows its members to avoid county-level public recordation when transferring mortgage interests. MERS is named as the mortgagee, as its members’ nominee, so members can transfer mortgage interests among themselves without recording. The system is generally in accord with Pennsylvania law. At one point, Lupu alleged forgery, The district court dismissed his action. A Stewart Title policy insured Loan City, its successors, and assignees, requiring Stewart to pay costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in defense of the title or the lien, but not “those causes of action which allege matters not insured against.” Steward denied Ocwen's request for defense coverage, except with respect to the forgery claim, stating “Lupu’s arguments concerned the securitization of the note secured by the insured mortgage and the validity of assignments of the insured mortgage rather than the execution and witnessing of the insured mortgage.” The Third Circuit ruled in favor of Stewart, predicting that state courts would not apply the “complete defense" rule, whereby a single covered claim triggers an obligation for the title insurer to defend the entire action. The court applied Pennsylvania’s rule that potentially covered claims are identified by “comparing the four corners of the insurance contract to the four corners of the complaint.” View "Lupu v. Loan City LLC" on Justia Law

David was married to Belford, 2001-2006; they had four children. After an award of joint custody, David and his mother (Lenore) kidnapped the children and absconded to Central America. David was eventually returned to the U.S., convicted, and incarcerated. At his direction, his family engaged in a years-long conspiracy to harass Belford, including the publication of videos and other social media postings that accused Belford of criminal conduct; surveillance; and letter-writing campaigns. David’s parental rights and the familial rights of Lenore, his father (Thomas), and his sister (Amy) were terminated. The harassment continued. David filed a petition to reduce his back payments of child support in Delaware Family Court. Although he resided in Texas and could participate by phone, David, Lenore, and Thomas drove to Delaware, with an assault rifle, handguns, military-style knives, thousands of rounds of ammunition, restraints, body armor, binoculars, an electric shock device, gas cans, a shovel, photographs of Belford’s children and residence, and notes about Belford’s neighbors. Thomas and David entered the New Castle County Courthouse lobby, where Thomas shot and killed Belden and her friend, injured two police officers, and then shot himself in the head. David, Lenore, and Amy were convicted of combinations of: conspiracy to commit interstate stalking and cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(1) and 18 U.S.C. 371; interstate stalking; and interstate and cyberstalking resulting in death, with Thomas as an unindicted co-conspirator. The district court sentenced each to life imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the lack of a specific unanimity instruction, the constitutionality of the statutes under which they were convicted, and their sentences. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Brown, a federal prisoner. filed his “Kemmerer” complaint, alleging that prison officials had injured him by placing him in restraints; he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which waives fees if the prisoner demonstrates that he cannot afford the fees. Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the “three strikes rule,” a prisoner cannot proceed IFP if he has on three or more prior occasions, brought an action that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Brown later filed his “Sage” complaint, alleging that prison employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health issues. Brown again sought to proceed IFP. Brown subsequently filed an explanation that he had been informed that he had three strikes and would invoke section 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception. The court denied Brown’s motion in Sage, concluding that he did not qualify for the exception, and vacated its Kemmerer IFP decision. Brown then filed his third Bivens action, claiming that a prison physician assistant denied him treatment for burns after he spilled hot water on himself. The court again held he did not meet the exception and dismissed the case. In consolidated appeals, the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that it must use its own precedent to evaluate whether prior cases are strikes, rather than that of the Circuit from which the potential strikes emanated. Brown's third "strike" did not qualify because the case was closed for failure to state a claim without having actually been filed in the district court. View "Brown v. Sage" on Justia Law

Tima, a citizen of Cameroon, entered the U.S. in 1989 on a nonimmigrant student visa. To stay past his student-eligibility period, he entered into a sham marriage. Tima pleaded guilty to a felony charge of making false statements, admitting to the sham. The government did not promptly issue a notice to appear. In 1997, Tima married a now-naturalized citizen. They have three children, all U.S. citizens. The government issued Tima a notice to appear in 2003. An IJ sustained charges of marriage fraud (8 U.S.C.1227(a)(1)(G)(ii)), termination of conditional-permanent-resident status (1227(a)(1)(D)(i)), and a moral-turpitude conviction (1227(a)(2)(A)(i)) and ruled that the fraud waiver, under which the Attorney General may waive a removal charge that is based on inadmissibility for misrepresenting a material fact to gain admission, could extend to the marriage-fraud charge but not to the other charges. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied Tima’s petition for review. If the Attorney General grants a fraud waiver, the Act automatically extends that waiver to other removal provisions based on “grounds of inadmissibility directly resulting from such fraud or misrepresentation” (1227(a)(1)(H)), but a removal charge based on a post-admission crime is not based on a “ground of inadmissibility.” View "Tima v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Estrada filed a purported class action on behalf of: “All persons who purchased [Johnson & Johnson] Baby Powder in California and states with laws that do not conflict with the laws asserted here.” The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that a plaintiff—who has entirely consumed a product that has functioned for her as expected— has not suffered an economic injury solely because she now sincerely wishes that she had not purchased that product. Buyer’s remorse, without more, is not a cognizable injury under Article III. The court noted that Estrada did not allege that a product has caused her physical injury, nor does she allege even an increased risk of developing cancer; she makes no claim of emotional injury, nor did she describe a defective product. She bought the product regularly for decades and completely consumed what she purchased. Her theory of recovery is simply that she suffered an economic injury by purchasing improperly marketed Baby Powder and that, had she been properly informed that using Baby Powder could lead to an increased risk of developing ovarian cancer, she would not have purchased it. View "Estrada v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

A shooting death occurred during a 2000 fight between the victim, Preston, and Preston’s brother Leonard. Leonard took the stand at his own trial and was convicted of third-degree murder. Preston was later convicted and is serving a 20-40-year sentence for third-degree murder. Preston sought habeas relief based on an alleged violation of his Confrontation Clause rights. Faced with Leonard's invocation of the Fifth Amendment (his appeal was pending) the trial court had allowed the Commonwealth to use Leonard’s police statement and his prior testimony. The prosecutor read aloud portions of those statements, occasionally stopping to ask Leonard if he remembered making them. Leonard largely replied “no comment.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Preston’s petition. While the use of the prior statements against Preston violated the Confrontation Clause, Preston’s Confrontation Clause claim was procedurally defaulted. Rejecting Preston’s argument that counsel’s failure to raise an objection at trial provided cause to excuse the procedural default, the court stated that Preston failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective under the two-pronged "Strickland" test. Preston cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure, which was objectively unreasonable, given the cumulative evidence against him. Even absent Leonard’s testimony, the jury would have concluded that Leonard was the shooter. View "Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought to prevent the expansion of Transco’s interstate natural gas pipeline facilities, arguing that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) violated the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717–717z and environmental protection statutes, by arbitrarily approving Transco’s proposed project. Petitioners also argued that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) violated state law by improperly issuing permits required under federal law before commencement of construction activities and by denying the petitioners’ request for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the permits, based only on the NJDEP’s allegedly incorrect belief that the New Jersey regulations establishing the availability of such hearings were preempted by federal law. The Third Circuit concluded that the challenges to FERC’s orders lacked merit because no discharge-creating activity can commence without New Jersey independently awarding Transco with a Section 401 permit; no activities that may result in a discharge can follow as a logical result of just FERC’s issuance of the certificate. FERC adequately addressed the need for the project and its cumulative impacts, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act. The court remanded to NJDEP. NJDEP misunderstood the scope of the NGA’s assignment of jurisdiction to the federal Courts of Appeals, rendering unreasonable the sole basis for its denial of the petitioners’ request for a hearing--preemption. View "Township of Bordentown v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Vorchheimer suffers from pulmonary hypertension and other disabilities and must use a rolling walker to get around. She owned a condominium in The Philadelphian and had a reserved parking space in front of the building. Vorchheimer used her walker to get from her condo to the lobby and then used her cane from the lobby to her car. She could neither lift her walker, nor fold it, nor put it into her car, so she began leaving her walker in the lobby. The building managers refused to allow her to continue to do so, but offered her alternatives that involved having staff members take and store the walker or storing the walker in the building’s indoor garage. She sued under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), claiming that her preferred accommodation was necessary to equally enjoy her home. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint, holding that she had not plausibly pleaded necessity. For a housing accommodation to be “necessary” under the Act, it must be required for that person to achieve equal housing opportunity, taking into account available alternatives. Leaving the walker in the lobby was her preference but given the four alternatives offered she did not plausibly plead that it was necessary. View "Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Association" on Justia Law