Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At age 14 Schonewolf began smoking marijuana. By age 15 she left home and dropped out of school. Schonewolf developed a drinking problem and attempted suicide several times before being diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Schonewolf’s use of opiates began with prescription painkillers following a car accident; after her doctor’s retirement, she used heroin to satisfy her addiction. In 2010, Schonewolf was arrested with 12 pounds of methamphetamine in her car, which she was transporting for her father. Schonewolf pled guilty and was sentenced to time served, plus 60 months’ supervised release. Schonewolf began using heroin again and was caught attempting to purchase the drug, resulting in Pennsylvania misdemeanor charges and a violation of supervised release. Her probation officer withdrew the violation petition because Schonewolf was in a detox program. Schonewolf suffered an overdose and left treatment. At her revocation hearing, the government indicated that Schonewolf was again in treatment. The court sentenced Schonewolf to one day in prison, followed by her pre-existing term of supervised release. Schonewolf was later found to be selling heroin, pled guilty, and is currently serving a state sentence. Schonewolf’s probation officer filed another violation petition. The Guidelines range for Schonewolf’s sentence was 24-30 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Schonewolf to 40 months, consecutive to her state sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court based the sentence on Schonewolf’s need for drug rehabilitation, in violation of the Sentencing Reform Act and the Supreme Court’s 2011 "Tapia" ruling. Schonewolf’s sentence was based on past lenity. A court does not violate the Act or Tapia merely by mentioning the need for rehabilitation. View "United States v. Schonewolf" on Justia Law

An anonymous source called 911 to report a Hispanic male pointing a gun at juveniles outside a vacant Philadelphia flower shop. The suspect was reportedly wearing a gray shirt, gray pants, and a bucket hat. Office Mulqueeney, who had worked that area for 13 years and knew about the drug and firearm activity prevalent there, was dispatched. He approached De Castro and his neighbor, who were speaking outside of the vacant flower shop. De Castro was wearing a light gray bucket hat, a gray striped shirt, and gray camouflage pants. Mulqueeney asked De Castro to remove his hands from his pockets. De Castro complied, revealing a pistol grip protruding from his pants pocket. Mulqueeney asked De Castro to raise his hands and removed a loaded firearm from De Castro’s pocket. De Castro had neither identification or a permit to carry the firearm but had a passport from the Dominican Republic. Mulqueeney handcuffed and frisked De Castro, finding a loaded magazine. De Castro was convicted as an alien in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(A), following the denial of his motion to suppress all statements and physical evidence. The Third Circuit affirmed. Mulqueeney’s request that De Castro remove his hands from his pockets did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Mulqueeney “neither ordered nor repeatedly asked De Castro to comply" but used a conversational tone to communicate his request from a distance of at least five feet, with his weapon holstered and without physical touching; a reasonable person would have felt free to decline Mulqueeney’s lone request. View "United States v. De Castro" on Justia Law

In 2003, Richardson and his son burgled two empty homes and fled from police. During a high-speed car chase, he rammed into a police car and crashed into a utility pole. He was convicted of burglary, criminal conspiracy, theft, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and flight from a police officer. Mid-sentencing, Richardson decided that he was dissatisfied with his lawyer and sought to fire him. The sentencing judge treated Richardson’s request as waiving his right to counsel but did not, as the Sixth Amendment requires, question Richardson to ensure that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. Richardson’s post-sentencing and state-habeas lawyers both overlooked this error. The Third Circuit remanded to the district court to grant habeas corpus relief and order a new sentencing hearing. In Pennsylvania state court, the post-sentencing-motions stage is a critical stage at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. Richardson was denied that right because his post-sentencing lawyer was ineffective. The line dividing trial from appeal falls naturally at the notice of appeal. Post-sentencing motions precede the notice of appeal, so they fall on the trial side of the line; when a state-habeas lawyer fails to raise a post-sentencing lawyer’s ineffectiveness, the prisoner may raise that issue for the first time in his federal habeas petition. Richardson’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is meritorious. View "Richardson v. Superintendent Coal Township SCI" on Justia Law

Sauers and his wife were driving southbound on Route 209 in Nesquehoning, Pennsylvania. Officer Homanko was on patrol, traveling in the same direction when he observed a summary traffic offense committed by a Dodge in the northbound lane. Homanko turned around to pursue the Dodge. He radioed police in the neighboring borough to request that officers there pull the Dodge over when it reached their jurisdiction. Homanko then began a chase at speeds of over 100 miles-per-hour. Several people observed him driving recklessly. Homanko lost control while negotiating a curve. His car spun around, crossed the centerline into southbound traffic, and crashed into Sauers’s car. The accident seriously injured Sauers and killed his wife. Homanko subsequently pled guilty to vehicular homicide, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of reckless or grossly negligent driving, and reckless endangerment. Sauers – individually and as administrator of his wife’s estate – filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing a “state-created danger” theory of liability. The Third Circuit vacated the denial of Homanko’s motion for dismissal based on qualified immunity; it was not clearly established at the time of the crash that Homanko’s conduct, as alleged in the complaint, could give rise to constitutional liability under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court commented, however, that it hoped to establish clear law with its decision. View "Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning" on Justia Law

The families live close to the Willow Grove Naval Air and Air Reserve Station in Horsham Township and the Naval Air Development Center in Warminster Township, which are contaminated with perfluorinated compounds (PFCs), including perfluorooctanoic acid. The families filed suits under the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. 6020.101-.1305, seeking orders requiring the Navy to pay for medical monitoring and to conduct a health assessment or health effects study that would include blood testing for themselves and others exposed to the hazardous substances released at the contaminated facilities. The district court concluded that the claims fell within the ambit of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601- 9675, and were challenges under that Act to ongoing cleanup efforts at the facilities. The court decided that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the cases. The Third Circuit affirmed in part; the claim for a health assessment or health effects study is barred because it challenges ongoing cleanup efforts. The court vacated in part, finding that the medical monitoring claim is not a challenge under CERCLA and is not barred by sovereign immunity. View "Giovanni v. United States Department of Navy" on Justia Law

Abdullah pled guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court concluded that he was subject to a sentencing enhancement for being a career offender under USSG 4B1.1, based in part on Abdullah’s 2015 conviction for third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under New Jersey Statutes 2C:12- 1(b)(2). Abdullah argued that the conviction was not for a “crime of violence.” The Third Circuit affirmed his 176-month sentence. New Jersey’s aggravated assault statute is divisible and it is possible to identify the specific subsection under which Abdullah was convicted; that specific aggravated assault offense categorically qualify as a predicate crime of violence under the guidelines. View "United States v. Abdullah" on Justia Law

Saravia is a citizen of El Salvador. When Saravia was five, his mother left for the U.S. for economic reasons. In 2005, members of MS-13 began trying to recruit Saravia. He refused; they beat and threatened him with the murder of his family if his father reported the gang to the police. His father to send Saravia and Saravia’s younger sister to live with their mother in New Jersey. They entered without inspection in 2006. Saravia claims that MS-13 subsequently killed two of his cousins and attacked his father. In 2015, Saravia was arrested for aggravated assault, simple assault on a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest by physical force or violence, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon. Saravia testified that, while he was in police custody, MS-13 called his mother and threatened to kill him if he returned to El Salvador. During his probation, Saravia was arrested for driving under the influence. Saravia was denied asylum and withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ found Saravia credible but determined that Saravia failed to corroborate his claim. The Board affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated, based on the Board’s failure to follow precedent holding that an IJ must “give the applicant notice of what corroboration will be expected and an opportunity to present an explanation if the applicant cannot produce such corroboration.” View "Saravia v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Biear, a federal prisoner, mailed Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A), requests to eight components of the Department of Justice, seeking: “Any and all documents and electronic media assembled during any investigation (or review) containing the name James S. Biear (aka J. Steven Biear and James C. Biear), DOB [REDACTED], SSN: [REDACTED].” The Criminal Division replied by requiring him to certify his identity and submit additional information regarding the records. Biear completed the certification of his identity but did not further detail his request. The Criminal Division then denied Biear’s request; the Office of Information Policy affirmed. The FBI initially denied Biear’s request because the records were in an active investigative file, exempt from disclosure. After Biear filed suit, the FBI produced some documents in full and some with redactions; others were withheld as duplicative or containing exempt information that could not be reasonably segregated from nonexempt information. The Third Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that Biear exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his Criminal Division request; Biear’s request was sufficiently specific. His challenge to the FBI’s response was not mooted by the FBI’s subsequent production of documents. The court should have continued to exercise jurisdiction over Biear’s claim regarding the sufficiency of the FBI’s response. View "Biear v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The contracts between the Drivers and Joseph Cory, a motor carrier business, purported to establish that the Drivers would work as independent contractors. The Drivers claim the realities of the relationship made them employees under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115/1–115/15. The contracts expressly permitted Joseph Cory to take “chargebacks” for any expense or liability that the Drivers had agreed to bear, including costs for “insurance, any related insurance claims, truck rentals, . . . uniforms,” and “damaged goods,” from the Drivers’ paychecks without obtaining contemporaneous consent. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Joseph Cory’s motion to dismiss the Drivers’ suit. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501–06, does not preempt the IWPCA. Wage laws like the IWPCA are traditional state regulations and part of the backdrop that all business owners must face. IWPCA does not single out trucking firms and its impact is too tenuous, remote, and peripheral to fall within the scope of the FAAAA preemption clause. IWPCA’s limited regulation of ministerial aspects of the manner in which employees are paid does not have a significant impact on carrier rates, routes, or services of a motor carrier and does not frustrate the FAAAA’s deregulatory objectives. View "Lupian v. Joseph Cory Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

Personnel at a Virgin Islands airport smuggled cocaine onto flights bound for the U.S. mainland. Noel, a ground services supervisor at St. Thomas’s Airport, and three other employees were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and related possession offenses. The jury convicted Noel on all charges. The court sentenced him to 151 months’ imprisonment. More than a year later, Noel moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence of juror misconduct. The district court denied the motion without a hearing. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Noel’s arguments that the district court’s limitation on the cross-examination of his codefendants violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; that the district court abused its discretion in denying his new trial motion without an evidentiary hearing; and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Even assuming the limitation “significantly inhibited” Noel’s exercise of his right to probe the codefendants’ “motivation in testifying,” it is not clear that the barred line of inquiry might have given the jury a “significantly different impression of credibility.” Before his trial began, Noel was aware that the court had impaneled a security officer working on a contract basis for the U.S. Marshals Service; he produced no evidence that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety occurred to justify a new trial. View "United States v. Noel" on Justia Law