Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Tahjair Dorsey, who was convicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dorsey had previously pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm without a license, a felony under Pennsylvania law. He was paroled in June 2021. In August 2021, during an investigation into suspected gang activity, Dorsey was observed leaving a residence under surveillance and was apprehended after fleeing a vehicle stop. A stolen handgun was recovered nearby, and Dorsey's DNA was found on it. He was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.Dorsey pleaded guilty but later appealed his conviction, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment. However, he had not raised this objection at any stage of the District Court proceedings. The District Court sentenced Dorsey to time served and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case for plain error. The court referred to its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that disarming an individual with a single, almost-thirty-year-old criminal conviction for food stamp fraud was not consistent with the Second Amendment. The court found that Dorsey could not show that he was similarly situated to the appellant in Range for Second Amendment purposes. The court noted that Dorsey's prior conviction was for a state firearm law violation, was more recent, and he was on state parole at the time of the offense. The court concluded that any Second Amendment error inherent in Dorsey’s conviction was not plain and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "USA v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

The case involves Carlos Inestroza-Tosta, a native and citizen of Honduras, who illegally entered the United States multiple times and was removed on each occasion. After his third illegal entry, he was apprehended following an arrest for aggravated assault. His prior order of removal was reinstated, but he claimed a fear of returning to Honduras and sought withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. His requests were denied by the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), leading to his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The BIA dismissed Inestroza-Tosta's appeal, affirming the IJ's denial of his motion for administrative closure and his applications for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA held that Inestroza-Tosta had not established that any harm he experienced or feared was connected to a protected ground, and his proposed particular social group, "gang violence recipients," was not recognized by law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 30-day deadline for a would-be immigrant to seek judicial review of a "final order of removal" is nonjurisdictional. The court also held that an order of removal is not final until a decision has been made on the alien’s request for withholding of removal. Applying these conclusions to this case, the court ruled that Inestroza-Tosta timely sought review of the BIA’s denial of his requests for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. However, his petition failed on the merits. Although he suffered persecution in the past, he could not demonstrate a clear probability of future harm based on a protected status or trait. Therefore, while his petition for review was timely, it was denied. View "Inestroza-Tosta v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

James Chandler was convicted for twice robbing on-duty United States Postal Service employees using a fake gun, and in one instance, kidnapping his victim. The District Court enhanced Chandler's sentence for using the replica gun in the robberies and the kidnapping, and for the kidnapping being motivated, at least in part, by the mail carrier being a government employee.Chandler appealed the application of these two enhancements, arguing that the judge erred in holding that a replica of a gun constitutes a dangerous weapon, and further erred in holding that his kidnapping of the second mail carrier was motivated by her status as a government employee. He also appealed his conviction for armed robbery, rather than unarmed robbery, again arguing that a replica firearm is not a dangerous weapon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals found that the term "dangerous weapon" is genuinely ambiguous and can include a replica firearm. The Court also found that the District Court did not err in accepting Chandler's guilty plea to armed robbery. Finally, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that Chandler was motivated to kidnap the mail carrier because she was a government employee. View "USA v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-verbal student, Alexandre Le Pape, and his family who repeatedly requested that the Lower Merion School District change his educational program to include a new communication protocol known as "Spelling to Communicate" (S2C). The school district denied these requests, leading to Alexandre's withdrawal from public education. The family filed an administrative special education due process complaint against the school district, alleging that the district failed to protect Alexandre's rights and denied him a Free Accessible Public Education (FAPE) under various laws. An administrative hearing officer ruled against the family on all claims, leading them to file a suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.The District Court granted the school district's motions for summary judgment on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim and judgment on the administrative record for the denial-of-FAPE claims. The Le Papes appealed the court's decision, arguing that the court granted judgment without applying the summary judgment standard to which they were entitled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the school district on the Le Papes' ADA discrimination claim and judgment on the administrative record for their discrimination claims under both the ADA and Section 504. The court clarified that a denial-of-FAPE claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) can be resolved through an administrative appeal, but ADA and Section 504 discrimination claims seeking compensatory damages, even if on the same facts, should be resolved through summary judgment and, possibly, trial. View "Le Pape v. Lower Merion School District" on Justia Law

A student, Brooklyn, and her parent, Gabrielle M., filed a complaint against the Upper Darby School District, alleging that the district failed to provide Brooklyn with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The family claimed that the district had not fulfilled its "Child Find" obligation to identify Brooklyn as eligible for services under Section 504 until fourth grade, despite requests for a comprehensive evaluation as early as kindergarten. The family also argued that the district's 504 plan for Brooklyn was inadequate.The case was first heard by a special education hearing officer, who ruled that the district had denied Brooklyn a FAPE by providing an inadequate 504 plan, but had not violated its Child Find obligation. The family then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the hearing officer's decision and granted judgment on the administrative record to the School District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with the District Court's decision, stating that the court had erred in not separately analyzing the Child Find claim under Section 504, despite the broader definition of disability under Section 504 compared to the IDEA. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's decision and remanded the case for further analysis of the Child Find claim under Section 504. View "B. M. v. Upper Darby School District" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the tragic death of Tyler Gergler, a recruit in the Marine Corps' Delayed Entry Program. Gergler died in a car accident while driving to a Marine Corps event, despite being ill. His parents, Raynu Clark and Jason R. Gergler, alleged that Sergeant Mitchell Castner, Gergler's recruiter, negligently pressured their son to drive to the event despite his illness, which led to the fatal accident. They argued that since Castner's actions were within the scope of his Marine Corps employment, the Government was liable for their son's death.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The Government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the United States has sovereign immunity for discretionary acts of government agents. They contended that when Castner pressured Gergler to drive, he was acting as Gergler's recruiter, a discretionary function, and thus, sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit. The District Court agreed with the Government's argument and dismissed the case on the grounds that Castner had discretion and was exercising that discretion.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, ruling that the United States and its agents enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. The court found that Castner had discretion to urge Gergler to attend the event and that his function of preparing Marine recruits for training was discretionary. The court also rejected the parents' arguments that Castner's conduct was so egregious that it goes beyond policy consideration and that a narrow carve-out for easy precautions should apply. The court concluded that the United States is immune from suit when its agents commit alleged torts within the discretion accorded by their job function, and Sergeant Castner's actions were within his discretionary function of preparing Marine recruits for training. View "Clark v. Secretary United States Navy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Tiffany Smith, who filed a voluntary petition for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding in May 2019. Smith owned a two-unit rental property in Newark, New Jersey, secured by a mortgage held by Freedom Mortgage Corporation. Smith filed a Chapter 13 payment plan in the Bankruptcy Court, which included a motion to partially void Freedom’s mortgage lien on the property and to reclassify Freedom’s underlying claim as partially secured and partially unsecured. Freedom objected to the plan, particularly the cramdown of its secured claim, the property's listed valuation, the property's rents being applied to reduce its secured claim, and the feasibility of the overall plan.The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing to address Freedom’s objections. During the hearing, Freedom clarified that it was not disputing the listed value of the property. The parties resolved their differences and filed a consent order, in which they agreed to the terms. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the First Modified Plan, which reflected the terms of the Consent Order.Smith later filed a third modified plan, seeking to extend the payment term due to delinquent tenants and pandemic-related eviction moratoriums. Freedom objected to the Third Modified Plan, arguing among other things, that the plan was not feasible. The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing and concluded that the objections raised by Freedom were precluded by res judicata. The Bankruptcy Court then confirmed the Third Modified Plan in a written order. Freedom appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s order to the District Court, which affirmed it. Freedom then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that res judicata precluded Freedom’s objections to Smith’s use of rental income to pay its secured claim, to the valuation of the property, and to the plan’s stepped-up payment schedule. The Court also concluded that the Bankruptcy Court did not clearly err when it determined the Third Modified Plan to be feasible. View "In re: Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves two American Airlines pilots, James P. Scanlan and Carla Riner, who sued their employer for failing to pay them and provide certain benefits while they were on short-term military leave. They claimed that the airline violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which provides employees on military leave the right to receive the same employment benefits as other similarly situated employees. They also claimed that the airline breached their profit-sharing plan by failing to account for imputed earnings during periods of military leave.The District Court granted summary judgment for the airline on all claims. It held that the pilots could not prevail on their USERRA claims because short-term military leave is not comparable to jury-duty or bereavement leave when comparing duration, frequency, control, and purpose. It also concluded that, under Texas law, the profit-sharing plan unambiguously excludes imputed income from periods of military leave.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for the airline on the breach of contract claim. However, it reversed the judgment for the airline on the USERRA claims, stating that a reasonable jury could find that short-term military leave is comparable to jury-duty leave or bereavement leave based on the three factors mentioned in the implementing regulation, and any other factors it may consider. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the USERRA claims. View "Scanlan v. American Airlines Group Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jonathan Goerig, who was found parked in a high-school parking lot. A police officer, acting on a tip, approached Goerig and began questioning him. The officer noticed Goerig's shorts were pulled down and his suspicious responses led the officer to order him out of his truck. Evidence found in the truck revealed that Goerig planned to meet a minor for sex.Prior to the current review, the District Court had denied Goerig's motion to suppress the evidence found in his truck, his statements to the arresting officers, and all evidence recovered from his phone and iCloud account. The court held that the officer had not seized Goerig until he told him to get out of the truck and by then, he had reasonable suspicion. It also ruled that police had validly seized all the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. The court held that the police officer did not seize Goerig until he ordered him to step out of the truck. Until then, the officer was just asking him questions. The court also held that by the time the officer ordered Goerig out of the truck, he had reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. The court further held that the arrest was proper and that the police validly searched and seized all the evidence. The court concluded that the Terry stop, arrest, and searches and seizures were proper, and thus affirmed the District Court's judgment. View "USA v. Goerig" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Nancy Mator and Robert Mator, who are participants in the Wesco Distribution, Inc. Retirement Savings Plan. They sued Wesco Distribution, Inc., its fiduciaries, and the Plan, alleging that they violated fiduciary duties imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by paying excessive recordkeeping fees and failing to monitor the Plan. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. They argued that the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint, which alleged that Wesco breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA by causing the Plan to pay excessive recordkeeping fees, offering retail-class shares of mutual funds, and failing to monitor those responsible for the Plan.The Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs. It found that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court noted that the plaintiffs provided specific plan comparators and plausibly alleged that the services purchased were sufficiently similar to render the comparisons valid. The Court also found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged a fiduciary breach based on the Plan’s offerings of retail-class mutual fund shares.The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mator v. Wesco Distribution Inc" on Justia Law