Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, to “preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering cost-effective options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology,” Delaware granted the Court of Chancery power to arbitrate business disputes. That Court then created an arbitration process as an alternative to trial for certain disputes, 10 DEL. CODE tit. 10, 349; Del. Ch. R. 96-98. To qualify for arbitration, at least one party must be a business entity formed or organized under Delaware law, and neither can be a consumer. Arbitration is limited to monetary disputes that involve an amount of at least one million dollars. The fee for filing is $12,000, and the arbitration costs $6,000 per day after the first day. Arbitration begins approximately 90 days after the petition is filed. The statute and rules bar public access. Arbitration petitions are confidential and are not included in the public docketing system. Attendance at proceedings is limited to parties and their representatives, and all materials and communications produced during the arbitration are protected from disclosure in judicial or administrative proceedings. The Coalition challenged the confidentiality provisions. The district court found that Delaware’s proceedings were essentially civil trials that must be open to the public, under the First Amendment. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Delaware Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine" on Justia Law

In 2009-2010, Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey had a wave of pharmacy burglaries, many of which affected Rite Aid pharmacies. The FBI joined the investigation. A suspect emerged: an electrician, Harry Katzin, had recently been caught burglarizing a Rite Aid pharmacy; his brothers also had criminal histories that included burglary and theft. Over the following months, the Katzins were repeatedly seen outside pharmacies where phone lines had been cut. After consulting with the U.S. Attorney, but without obtaining a warrant, the FBI affixed a “slap-on” GPS tracker to the exterior of Harry’s van. Within days, state troopers stopped the van on a Pennsylvania highway. Local police notified the troopers that the Rite Aid closest to where the van had been parked had been burglarized. Inside the van, troopers found the Katzin brothers. From outside of the van, the troopers could see pill bottles and Rite Aid storage bins. The police impounded the van and arrested the Katzin brothers. The district court suppressed the evidence found in the van. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that police must obtain a warrant prior to a GPS search and that the conduct in this case cannot be excused based on good faith. All three brothers had standing to challenge evidence recovered from Harry’s van. View "United States v. Katzin" on Justia Law

In 2004 Manuel pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and was sentenced to prison followed by a three-year term of supervised release. After his release from prison, Manuel repeatedly violated the conditions of his supervised release. At a parole revocation hearing in 2012, Manuel informed the district court that he wished to proceed pro se. The court engaged in a colloquy with Manuel and inquired into Manuel’s educational background, warned him of the dangers in representing himself, and asked several questions about the reason for Manuel’s desire to proceed pro se, before ultimately granting the request. Manuel presented witnesses at an adjourned revocation hearing, but the court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to two consecutive 16-month terms of imprisonment. The Third Court affirmed. In the context of a hearing regarding revocation of supervised release, the appropriate test is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived representation by counsel. The totality of the circumstances showed that Manuel made a knowing and voluntary decision to represent himself. View "United States v. Manuel" on Justia Law

A search of Ward’s possessions at Dulles Airport uncovered child pornography. After Ward’s arrest, agents searched his office at the Wharton Business School and found photographs and videos of Ward engaged in sex acts with minors (J.D. and R.D.). The pictures were taken in Brazil, where the boys lived. Ward’s email included communications with the boys. in which Ward requested that the boys engage in sex with other men chosen by Ward. Ward paid J.D.’s family. Attempting to acquire a visa for J.D. to visit the U.S., Ward made false statements. He was charged in Pennsylvania and Virginia federal courts, unsuccessfully attempted to consolidate the cases, pleaded guilty, and received a sentence of 15 years in Virginia. In Pennsylvania he pleaded guilty to shipping child pornography in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), false statements to a federal officials, 18 U.S.C. 1001, and inducing a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). While an appeal was pending, Ward maintained contact with J.D. and R.D., attempted to establish a relationship with their children, and attempted to use his attorneys to contact his victims for non-legal reasons. Ward indicated that he wished to make a statement at his resentencing hearing. The court insisted that his allocution be delivered under oath. Ward spoke about his contrition, his interest in rehabilitation, his struggle in accepting his homosexuality, his diagnosis of leukemia, and his hope that he would not die in prison. The court sentenced him to 300 months, with a fine of $250,000, explaining that the fine was within the advisory range and that the amount was a reasonable figure which Ward could pay. The court also ordered that Ward have no contact with minors, especially his victims’ children. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Simons filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, identifying a nonpriority credit-card debt to FIA. FIA retained Weinstein, which sent the Simons a letter and notice through their bankruptcy counsel, stating that FIA was an adversary proceeding under 11 U.S.C. 523 to challenge dischargeability, but offering to forego the proceeding if the Simons stipulated that the debt was nondischargeable or agreed to a reduced amount. The letter stated that a Rule 2004 examination had been scheduled, but that Weinstein was open to settlement; it mentioned the possibility of rescheduling and set out information about challenging the debt. The subpoena certificate, signed by a Weinstein attorney, stated that a copy was mailed to the Simons’ home and their attorney’s office. The Simons allege that Weinstein did not actually send it to their home. Their counsel received copies. The Simons moved to quash, alleging violations of Bankruptcy Rule 9016 and Civil Rule 45 subpoena requirements, and filed an adversary proceeding asserting Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims based on the letter. The Bankruptcy Court quashed the notices, but ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the FDCPA claims. The Simons then sued FIA and Weinstein in the district court, which dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of 15 U.S.C 1692e(5) and (13) claims for allegedly failing to identify the recording method in the Rule 2004 examination and by issuing the subpoenas from a district other than where the examinations were to be held. The court also affirmed dismissal of a 1692e(11) claim because its mini-Miranda requirement conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code automatic stay. The court reversed dismissal of claims based failing to serve the subpoenas directly on the individuals and failing to include the text of Civil Rule 45(c)–(d) in the subpoenas. View "Simon v. FIA Card Servs., NA" on Justia Law

Doreen Proctor’s body was found beside a Pennsylvania country road in 1992, shot in the head and chest, badly beaten, and stabbed repeatedly. She had been scheduled to testify that day as a witness against Tyler, the defendant’s brother, in state court, as a confidential informant in making four controlled buys of cocaine from Tyler and from three other individuals: Evans, Hodge, and Brooks. She had testified against the four at their preliminary hearing and her testimony at Hodge’s trial resulted in a conviction. After Proctor’s death, the remaining trials were halted. Defendant was acquitted of murdering Proctor, but convicted of witness intimidation and served a term in state prison. After his release, federal prosecutors charged him with witness tampering by murder and by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 1512. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed. In 2009 the defendant filed a pro se motion, arguing that two recent Supreme Court decisions limited the scope of the witness tampering statute and rendered the acts for which he was convicted non-criminal. The district court denied relief. The Third Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to give defendant an opportunity to present evidence of actual evidence. View "United States v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Alabama, that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Three individuals, each serving a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for offenses committed as juveniles, sought authorization to file successive habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and 2255 to raise Miller claims. The parties agreed that Miller states a new rule of constitutional law, but Pennsylvania (the state in which two petitioners were convicted) argued that Miller was not retroactive; the federal prosecutor claimed that Miller was retroactive but that the other petitioner’s sentence satisfied the new Miller rule. The Third Circuit found that the petitioners had made a prima facie showing that Miller is retroactive and authorized successive habeas petitions. View "In re: Grant" on Justia Law

Taveras, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1978, at age one year. He has left the country only at age five and at age 13. In 2009, he married a U.S. citizen. He is the father of two U.S. citizens. Several other relatives are U.S. citizens. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal in 2003 based upon his 1999 New York conviction for possession of crack cocaine, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Taveras sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a), applicable to certain permanent residents who can demonstrate lengthy physical presence and substantial ties in the U.S., and have not committed an aggravated felony. The Immigration Judge terminated the proceedings. In 2010, DHS instituted a second removal proceeding, based on 2006 and 2008 convictions for petit larceny, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (commission of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude). Taveras sought adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), and waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The IJ granted the applications, reasoning that Taveras had received a “waiver” of the 1999 drug conviction such that he could no longer be found inadmissible for that offense or ineligible for waiver. The BIA found Taveras ineligible to adjust his status and receive a waiver, stating that waiver of inadmissibility or deportability waives only the ground charged, but not the underlying basis for removability. The Third Circuit denied Taveras’s petition, upholding the order of removal. View "Fernandez v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Investigation of Rabbi Fish began when Dwek, charged with bank fraud, informed law enforcement that several New York and New Jersey rabbis were laundering money through tax-exempt Jewish charities called gemachs. In a sting operation, Dwek approached Fish about laundering the claimed proceeds of fraudulent schemes. The “proceeds” were actually provided by the government. Fish participated in 12 money laundering transactions involving more than $900,000. Dwek would deliver bank checks made out to gemachs and rabbis and would receive cash in exchange, less a commission of about 10 percent. Fish gave Dwek SIM cards for his cell phone and warned Dwek to sweep his car and phones for detection devices and to use code when speaking to associates. In recordings made by Dwek, Fish stated that he had several money laundering connections, knew how much cash certain individuals had available at specified times, had met the “main guy” running the network, and that the cash came from the diamond and jewelry business. Fish pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The parties agreed that Fish’s total offense level would be at least 21; the government reserved the right to argue for a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2S1.1(b)(3) for sophisticated money laundering. The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Fish to 46 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Fish" on Justia Law

Frank Papotto was playing golf with co-workers and drank about four to five beers. Papotto dropped his cell phone and fell out of the golf cart while reaching for it. He suffered a head injury and died five hours later. A toxicology screen conducted posthumously revealed a blood-alcohol level of 0.115 %. The New Jersey state standard for intoxication is 0.08, putting Papotto over the legal limit for operating a motor vehicle. His widow sought payment of benefits from Hartford under Papotto’s accidental death and dismemberment policy. The policy explicitly excludes losses “sustained while Intoxicated.” Hartford’s Plan Administrator denied payment of benefits because the deceased had consumed alcohol prior to his death. The district court concluded that the policy implicitly required a causal connection between intoxication and the loss, and remanded to the Plan Administrator. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the remand order is not immediately appealable as a final judgment. View "Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co." on Justia Law