Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, and was sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment, plus three years of supervised release. She began supervised release in 2007, but violated conditions. After first modifying the conditions, the district court revoked supervised release. She served about three months, was again released, and again violated conditions. The court modified the conditions to include four months of home detention with electronic monitoring. Violations continued; the court again revoked supervised release and sentenced her to 19 months' imprisonment and supervised release, with six months to be served in a halfway house, and six to be served under home detention. She violated again conditions. The district court concluded that the maximum term was not reduced by the aggregate length of previously-served revocation imprisonment and imposed what it viewed as the statutory maximum: 24 months' imprisonment, without supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the combined 25-month sentence of incarceration and home detention exceeded the 24-month maximum prison term under 18 U.S.C. 3583. Defendant argued that home detention counts as imprisonment, because 3583(e)(4) states that home detention "may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration." View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In lieu of providing employees with a paycheck, attorney Maynard paid cash, requiring that employees endorse an unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment. After receiving a cash remuneration in 1996, one employee refused to endorse the paycheck. Maynard firex her for noncompliance. At a hearing before the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, the employee testified that she needed a signed paycheck to apply for government financial assistance. She had never shared this information with Maynard before the hearing. The district court held that Maynard's order was unreasonable and that the resulting termination was in violation of the VI Wrongful Discharge Act, which permits termination of an employee who wilfully and intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, and instructions of the employer, and awarded back pay. The Third Circuit reversed. The lower court erred by considering the employee's individual needs in determining reasonableness of the order. View "Maynard v. Rivera" on Justia Law

After an error resulted in omission of a will's residual clause, litigation between the decedent's son and a charitable trust settled with the son receiving $5,600,000 and property and the trust receiving $11,721,141. The Estate filed a claim for federal estate tax charitable deduction. The IRS disallowed the deduction, finding that the contribution was made by the son via the settlement. The district court granted the Estate summary judgment, but found the government's position substantially justified and did not award fees or costs. The Third Circuit affirmed. The award for prevailing parties under 26 U.S.C. 7430 incorporates the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), under which recovery of fees is barred if a party’s net worth exceeds the statutory amount. Parties seeking to recover under either the prevailing party provision or the qualified offer provision must satisfy the net worth requirements. Although the trust satisfied the net worth requirements as a tax-exempt charitable organization with fewer than 500 employees, the court rejected an argument that it was the real party in interest. View "Estate of Palumbo v. United States" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the Third Circuit addressed the FRCP 17 obligation to appoint counsel in cases involving parties who appear to be incompetent. The court held that the court abused its discretion in not appointing a representative for a prisoner for his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), asserting deliberate indifference to medical needs. After multiple extensions, the inmate explained that he was in a psychiatric facility for four months. The judge denied further extensions and requests to appoint counsel. Meanwhile, he pled guilty to threats against the President and mailing threatening communications. A psychiatrist concluded that the inmate suffered delusional disorder, that some of his conduct is beyond his control, and that he has limited cognitive abilities. The court granted a motion to withdraw the plea, finding the inmate mentally incompetent. In the civil case, the judge, aware of the criminal proceedings, noted his concerns about mental competence, but again denied a motion to appoint counsel, stating that "it is unlikely that counsel could be found." The district court dismissed his case. In the other case, the court remanded for a determination of Rule 17 obligations. View "Powell v. Dr. Symons" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a maintenance director, had a stroke and began leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 612(a)(1) in January 2008. He received disability benefits from Unum. The doctor cleared him to return to work starting on May 1, with conditions that he not work more than four hours per day or lift loads in excess of 20 pounds. The administrator notified plaintiff that part-time work was not available. The doctor cleared him to work full-time, but did not change the lifting restriction. On April 20, the employer terminated plaintiff's employment and notified him that he would not be rehired with lifting restrictions. Until July 2008, when the restrictions were lifted, he received benefits from Unum. The district court rejected claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and the FMLA. The Third Circuit affirmed. The FMLA does not require an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to facilitate return to an equivalent position following leave. Entitlement to restoration requires that the employee be able to perform essential job functions without accommodation. Having represented to Unum that he was disabled, plaintiff was estopped from claiming that he was able to perform all essential functions. View "Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC" on Justia Law

Assistant managers at Rite Aid stores in Maryland and Ohio joined a nationwide opt-in action in a Pennsylvania federal court, seeking back pay for misclassification of assistant managers as overtime-exempt (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b)). One of them (Fisher) then initiated an F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3) class action lawsuit in the District of Maryland, seeking damages for alleged misclassification under Maryland laws. Following dismissal without prejudice under the "first-filed" rule, Fisher refiled in Pennsylvania, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Another plaintiff initiated a class action in the District of Northern Ohio seeking damages for alleged misclassification under the Ohio Act, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The case was transferred to Pennsylvania based on the forum selection clause in the employment contract. The Pennsylvania district court dismissed, holding that state law is not preempted, but that Rule 23 opt-out class actions based on state laws paralleling the FLSA are incompatible with the opt-in procedure under the FLSA, which was designed to prevent litigation through representative action. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to preemption, but reversed with respect to inherent incompatibility. View "Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Secretary of Labor filed suit for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that defendants had established a health benefit plan that was a multi-employer welfare arrangement governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Defendants had retained, as compensation, a substantial portion of payments made by businesses to enroll their employees. The complaint alleged improper diversion of funds and that defendants were required by ERISA to use the assets only for the defraying reasonable plan expenses for the benefit of plan participants. The district court ruled in favor of defendants. The Third Circuit vacated, characterizing the scheme appearing to be "an aggressively marketed, but inadequately funded health benefit plan masquerading as an ERISA-exempt plan in order to evade the solvency controls imposed by state insurance regulation."View "Sec'y of Labor v. Doyle" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two crimes involving sexual exploitation of minors. After the plea agreement was signed, the probation office recommended a five-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.5(b), which applies to defendants who "engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct." The agreement referred to other USSG provisions, but not to criminal history enhancements. Defendant conceded the applicability of the enhancement in the district court, which imposed a sentence of 216 months. The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting an argument that the government breached the plea agreement by requesting the enhancement and a request for resentencing to a range of 108 to 135 months' imprisonment.View "United States v. Dahmen" on Justia Law

Serving a life sentence for murder, petitioner exhausted state appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Third Circuit affirmed. The petition was not timely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Allegedly "new," exculpatory evidence of witness tampering and the identity of the "actual shooter" was known to petitioner in 1994. Petitioner did not establish his diligence or extraordinarily burdensome circumstances and the evidence did not establish actual innocence. View "Sistrunk v. Rozum" on Justia Law

When William and Adele divorced in 2008, she waived her right to proceeds from his 401(k) plan, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. He did not replace her as named beneficiary before he died intestate, nine months later. Because of a 2009 Supreme Court case, Kennedy v. Plan Administrator, 555 U.S. 285, the plan was obligated to pay the proceeds to Adele in accordance with plan documents regardless of the waiver. The district court held that estate could not attempt to recover the funds by bringing suit directly against Adele to enforce her waiver. The Third circuit reversed in part. Permitting suits against beneficiaries after benefits have been paid does not implicate any concern of expeditious payment or undermine any core objective of ERISA. View "Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma Inc." on Justia Law