Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action challenging 62 Pa. Stat. 1414, which was enacted to regulate special needs trusts. The comprehensive Medicaid eligibility rules enacted by Congress generally mandate that trusts be counted as assets of those seeking Medicaid, but exempt special needs trusts, which are intended to provide disabled individuals with necessities and comforts not covered by Medicaid. Plaintiffs allege Section 1414 is preempted by 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4). The district court held that all but one of the challenged provisions of Section 1414 was preempted, finding that plaintiffs had a private right of action under both Section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause. The court also held that Section 1414 was severable, certified a class, and appointed class counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the case is justiciable and that plaintiffs have a private right of action. Section 1414's 50% repayment provision, "special needs" provision, expenditure provision, and age restriction are all preempted by federal law. The enforcement provision of Section 1414, however, when used to enforce provisions not otherwise preempted, is a reasonable exercise of the Commonwealth's retained authority to regulate trusts. View "Lewis v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Cardona was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) & 846; conspiring to possess with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) & 846; possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B); and possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 480 months and eventually was referred to the special management unit, which limits contact with other prisoners and access to personal property. An inmate is allowed to reintegrate, by demonstrating potential for positive interaction. Between his sentencing and SMU referral, Cardona filed multiple lawsuits challenging his conviction and conditions of confinement. He believes that SMU referral was punishment for the litigation, although the notice referred to narcotics-related infractions. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the SMU did not affect the fact or duration of incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Cardona must file a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents to seek redress. View "Cardona v. Bledsoe" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thompson was indicted on two counts, and pled guilty to one, of distributing fewer than five grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)). Because he had two prior felony convictions, he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Had Thompson not been classified as a career offender, his Guidelines range would have been 46 to 57 months, but he was sentenced to 151 months, the bottom of the range for career offenders. After the United States Sentencing Commission issued a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses, Thompson moved to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). He conceded that Third Circuit precedent (United States v. Mateo, 2009) foreclosed his argument, and the district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that Mateo remains valid in light of Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011). View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant communicated with a detective who was posing as a 15-year-old girl on a social networking website. In response to defendant's question, the detective stated that she was 15 years old. Defendant raised sexual topics during communications online and by cellular telephone, masturbated in front of "Ashley" on his webcam, and discussed arrangements to meet in person, including whether he should buy condoms. He was arrested at the place arranged for the meeting. Convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), he was sentenced to 121 months' imprisonment and 25 years of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenged to the sufficiency of the evidence that defendant believed he was communicating with a minor and an argument that the government's remark that defense counsel would "certainly present evidence" violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The district court properly calculated the sentencing range, based on masturbation constituting "sexual contact" for the purpose of the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). View "United States v. Pawlowski" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendants, then 18 and 16 years old, accompanied by a group of other young Shenandoah residents began partying and drinking, then encountered Ramirez and became engaged in an argument with him that involved racial slurs. The incident escalated to the savage beating of Ramirez, who died two days later as a result of injuries he sustained. They were acquitted of all but minor state charges and each served six months. Following public outcry, they were convicted of criminal violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3631, which penalizes actions taken against an individual on account of his race, color or national origin, and with the specific intent to intimidate the victim or others like him from exercising their right to housing free of discrimination. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to a jury instruction that the government was not required to prove that issues of race and occupancy were the only motivations in beating Ramirez. The court also rejected claims that double jeopardy barred the federal trial and that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction under 3631. View "United States v. Piekarsky" on Justia Law

In 2004 defendant was convicted of crimes related to possession with intent to distribute narcotics and possession of two handguns. At the initial sentencing, the district court granted a new trial with respect to four counts. The Third Circuit reversed and limited remand to re-sentencing only. The district court sua sponte found certain counts of conviction multiplicitous and vacated another count on the basis that its own jury charge was plainly erroneous. The Third Circuit vacated, again reinstating all counts of conviction, remanded for resentencing, and directed reassignment of the case to a different district court judge. View "United States v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former federal prosecutor and prominent defense attorney, was indicted on charges including violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Reasoning that the RICO charges were inappropriate in light of the disparate nature of the substantive crimes that served as racketeering predicates, the district court dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed. On remand, the government filed a 33-count superseding indictment charging RICO violations, witness tampering (including facilitation of murder), participation in a cocaine-trafficking conspiracy, and tax evasion. The district court ordered the murder counts severed and tried them first, prohibiting the government from introducing evidence of two other witness-murder plots. The jury was unable to reach a verdict. After the jury was dismissed, the government, anticipating retrial, asked whether the court would adhere to its earlier evidentiary rulings. “Absolutely,” was the response, though the court noted that the government would be permitted to try to convince it otherwise. The Third Circuit vacated the ruling excluding evidence of the other plots and remanded for reassignment; the court’s statements before and after the earlier appeal indicate that its "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." View "United States v. Bergrin" on Justia Law

Title insurance purchasers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers, claimed that insurers collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the Sherman Act. Title insurers in Delaware are required to file their insurance rates with the state Department of Insurance, Del. Code tit. 18, 2504(a). Insurers may comply with the state’s rate filing requirements through a licensed rating organization. Defendants, title insurers, are members of and file their rates through the Delaware Title Insurance Rating Bureau, which is licensed by the DOI; the statutory scheme authorizes cooperative action. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint is barred by the filed-rate doctrine (which precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with federal or state agencies), lack of standing, and federal antitrust liability exemptions. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "McCray v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Title insurance purchasers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers, claimed that insurers collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust Act. In New Jersey, the Department of Banking and Insurance approves and regulates title insurance rates, N.J. Stat. Ann. 17:1C-19(a)(1). Insurers may collectively file rates for approval through a licensed rating organization, thereby authorizing cooperative action. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint is barred by the filed-rate doctrine (which precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with federal or state agencies), lack of standing, and federal and state antitrust liability exemptions. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Swick v. Censtar Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Roman Catholic Archdiocese, incorporated in New York, has its principal place of business in New York City. Church of the Nativity is a New York City parish under the Archdiocese. Marist Brothers, a religious order, serves at Church of the Nativity. Mt. St. Michael’s is a private religious high school in New York City. From 1977, when Elliott was eight years old, through 1983, Galligan, a brother of the Marist Order, taught at Mt. St. Michael’s and performed services at the Church. Galligan allegedly abused Elliott, a citizen of New Jersey, at locations in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, and Delaware, when the two travelled together. Elliott filed suit in the Superior Court of Delaware. Defendants removed to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The district court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over two of the institutional defendants and that the statutes of limitations (Delaware Child Victim's Act) barred claims against all institutional defendants. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal. The district court failed to state that it had determined that there was no just reason for delay, so the order did not properly certify the judgment under Rule 54(b). View "Elliott v. Archdiocese of NY" on Justia Law