Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Philadelphia police officers entered a private residence without a warrant because they believed the house to be abandoned. Upon searching the house, they found Harrison sitting in a recliner with a gun, scales, pills, and cocaine base on the table next to him. The police took Harrison into custody, seized the gun, and obtained a warrant to seize the rest of the items. Harrison was charged with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base and moved to suppress the physical evidence. The district court denied the motion; although Harrison, a tenant, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, the police officers were operating under the mistaken but reasonable belief that the house was abandoned. The Third Circuit affirmed. A house can be abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes; the officers did not make a mistake of law. Their mistake of fact was reasonable, based on their observations over several months that the house appeared unfit for human habitation. There was trash strewn about, the lawn was overgrown with weeds, and windows on both levels were either boarded up or exposed. The front door was left open, and the lock may have been broken. View "United States v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Mitchell was convicted on charges related to his possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Mitchell’s motion to strike Juror 97, a police department employee, because the law does not categorically impute bias to coworkers of key witnesses in a trial. Under the circumstances, Mitchell’s right to trial by an impartial jury was protected adequately by inquiry for actual bias, and that inquiry yielded no evidence of actual bias. The court remanded for additional fact-finding with respect to Juror 28, a “close cousin” of the prosecutor. The law presumes bias in jurors who are close relatives of the parties in a case and the court did not elicit sufficient information on the nature of the relationship between the prosecutor and Juror 28. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Debtors took a mortgage and a second mortgage on their residence. They later filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition. They claimed exemptions for their residence, citing 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(1) and 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(5). Amounts claimed on Schedule D and Schedule F were not referenced or listed on Schedule C. There were no objections to exemptions within the within the 30-day limit. After the selling the house, the trustee moved to value the exemption in the former residence at zero or to declare that the exemption did not extend to sales proceeds, because debtors had no equity in their home to which the homestead exemption could attach. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court and ruled in favor of debtors, holding that the trustee’s late objection to claimed exemptions was barred. On remand, in light the Supreme Court in decision Schwab v. Reilly,(2010), the district court held that the trustee has no duty to object to to claimed exemptions within the 30-day limit under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b). The Third Circuit affirmed. The Trustee’s objection was timely and valid. Debtors did not provide sufficient notice through their disclosure in Schedule C that they intended to exempt the property’s full value. View "In Re: Messina" on Justia Law

Lichtenstein began working with UPMC in 2005. Although Lichtenstein received a merit-based raise in October 2007, from October through December, she was tardy six times, absent twice, and requested changes to her schedule several times after the deadline for requesting changes had passed. Lichtenstein was scheduled to work a 16-hour shift on December 1. Co-workers complained that Lichtenstein was planning to call-off because she needed the day off to do school work or attend a concert. Although her supervisor denied a request for the day off, Lichtenstein called off, alleging she was sick. On December 30th, according to time logs, Lichtenstein arrived hours late and departed several hours early. On January 3, 2008 Lichtenstein’s mother was rushed to the hospital after collapsing from a sudden excruciating pain. Lichtenstein followed UPMC procedures for calling off sick. On January 10, Lichtenstein’s employment was terminated. The district court rejected her claim under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The Third Circuit vacated. Genuine factual disputes exist about whether Lichtenstein‘s notice of unforeseeable FMLA leave was adequate, whether her invocation of FMLA rights was a factor precipitating termination, and whether UPMC’s proffered justification for its action was mere pretext for retaliation. View "Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Sweeney owned a transmission shop and referred customers to Tradewell, who owned a nearby car rental business. Sweeney would sometimes simply refer customers to Tradewell or drive them to Tradewell’s business. If employees were available, Tradewell would have them take a car to Sweeney’s shop. Sweeney would sometimes pick up a car from Tradewell and deliver it to the customer and would occasionally use the car for personal errands. This was encouraged by Tradewell, who asked Sweeney to make sure the cars were running properly. In 2004 Sweeney, returning from a personal errand, was injured in an accident while driving a car owned by Tradewell that was intended for delivery to a customer the following morning. Sweeney sought underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to his policy with Liberty. Liberty sought a declaration that Sweeney was not entitled to coverage. On remand, the district court granted Liberty summary judgment, finding that “intended use” and “regular use” provisions did not bar coverage, but Liberty could deny coverage based on the “auto business” provision. The Third Circuit reversed, in favor of Sweeney, noting that Sweeney was on a personal errand, not engaged in “auto business” and did not have unfettered use of the cars. View "Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

From 1996 to 2001, while working as a licensed realtor, Mendoza helped borrowers obtain federally insured mortgages. He was charged with conspiring to fraudulently induce the Federal Housing Authority to insure mortgage loans, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1001. Mendoza’s counsel, Cavanagh, explained that he could avoid prison by pleading guilty, but did not apprise Mendoza that, as an aggravated felony, his crime would lead to mandatory deportation to his home country, Ecuador, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Prior to sentencing Mendoza learned from his Presentence Investigation Report that his conviction might result in removal. The district court sentenced Mendoza to two years’ probation and ordered him to pay $100,000 in restitution. As a condition of his probation, Mendoza was required to cooperate with immigration officials. The government instituted removal proceedings. After completing his sentence, Mendoza moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255, to vacate his sentence and withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Mendoza v. United States" on Justia Law

Based on DNA evidence found on furniture, McBride was charged with the murder of his wife 16 years after her disappearance. He was convicted and exhausted Pennsylvania state court appeals. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting McBride’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to certain references to his silence, in violation of his constitutional right to remain silent. There was at least a reasonable argument that trial counsel’s actions were within the “wide range of professionally competent assistance.” View "McBride v. Superintendant Houtzdale" on Justia Law

Attorneys Post and Reid were retained to defend a medical malpractice action. At trial, plaintiffs introduced evidence suggesting that Post and Reid had engaged in discovery misconduct. Fearing that the jury believed that there had been a “cover-up” involving its lawyers, and concerned with the “substantial potential of uninsured punitive exposure,” the hospital, represented by new counsel, settled the case for $11 million, which represented the full extent of its medical malpractice policy limits. The settlement did not release Post, Reid, the law firm where they began representation of the hospital, or their new firm from liability. The hospital threatened Post with a malpractice suit and sought sanctions. Post eventually brought claims of bad faith and breach of contract against his legal malpractice insurer. The district court awarded $921,862.38 for breach of contract. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer on the bad faith claim and remanded for recalculation of the award, holding that, under the policy, the insurer is responsible for all costs incurred by Post in connection with the hospital’s malpractice claim from October 12, 2005 forward and for all costs incurred by Post to defend the sanctions proceedings from February 8, 2006 forward. View "Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Philadelphia Inquirer (debtors) published print and online articles discussing the CSMI‘s contract management of the Chester Community Charter School. After CSMI filed a defamation action, the Inquirer filed for relief under Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. 101. CSMI alleged that post-petition, debtors published an article that links to and endorses earlier articles and filed the administrative expense requests: $1,800,000 for alleged post-petition defamation and $147,140 in alleged damages for post-petition conduct and prosecution of claims against CSMI. The Bankruptcy Court denied the requests. Debtors conducted an auction of substantially all assets, and the sale was consummated under a plan that provided that the purchaser would assume certain administrative expense claims, not including claims arising from the CSMI’s administrative expense requests. The district court held that an appeal was equitably moot: the plan had been substantially consummated and no stay was sought. The court also stated that merely posting a link to the charter school webpage that contained the original articles was not distinct tortious conduct upon which a defamation claim can be grounded. The Third Circuit affirmed. While the appeal was not equitably moot, CSMI cannot advance a sustainable cause of action to support the requests. View "In Re: Philadelphia Newspapers" on Justia Law

CS manufactures and sells X-ray and metal detection devices for use in public facilities around the world. Tecapro is a private, state-owned company that was formed by the Vietnamese government to advanced technologies into the Vietnamese market. In 2010, Tecapro purchased 28 customized AutoClear X-ray machines from CS for $1,021,156. The contract provides that disputes shall be settled at International Arbitration Center of European countries for claim in the suing party’s country under the rule of the Center. Tecapro initiated arbitration proceedings in Belgium in November 2010. In December 2010, CS notified Tecapro of its intention to commence arbitration proceedings in New Jersey. In January 2011, CS filed its petition to compel arbitration in New Jersey and enjoin Tecapro from proceeding with arbitration in Belgium. The district court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the U.N.Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, that it had personal jurisdiction over Tecapro, and that Tecapro could have sought to arbitrate in Vietnam and CS in New Jersey. The latter is what happened, so “the arbitration shall proceed in New Jersey.” After determining that it had jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, the Third Circuit affirmed. View "Control Screening LLC v. Technological Application & Prod. Co." on Justia Law