Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hanif, a citizen of Guyana, entered the U.S. on a fraudulent visa during the 1980s. After his marriage to a naturalized citizen, Hanif applied for a waiver of his ground of inadmissibility. In 2006 an IJ and adjusted Hanif to Lawful Permanent Resident status. In 2008, Khadoo, a friend, was arrested for possession of a forged instrument. In exchange for reduced charges against Khadoo, Hanif turned over $5,100 in counterfeit bills and offered to cooperate in the counterfeiting investigation. He subsequently fled the country. When Hanif returned, he was arrested and paroled into the U.S. He pled guilty to dealing in counterfeit currency, 18 USC 473. DHS began removal proceedings; he applied for waiver, claiming that removal would cause extreme hardship to his wife and children. An IJ found him ineligible for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), noting a BIA holding that an alien who entered the U.S. without inspection and later obtained LPR status through adjustment has previously been admitted as an LPR, and must satisfy the seven year continuous residence requirement. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the statutory language is unambiguous and requires that the prior admission has been made while the alien was in LPR status. View "Hanif v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Until 2003, Hagans worked as a security guard and as a sanitation worker. At 44 years old, Hagans required open-heart surgery. Hagans claims additional medical problems relating to his cerebrovascular and respiratory systems, hypertension and dysphagia, insomnia, and back pain. He has been diagnosed with depression. Hagans began receiving disability benefits as of January 30, 2003. In September, 2004, pursuant to an updated Residual Function Capacity assessment showing his condition had improved, SSA determined that Hagans was no longer eligible for benefits. The ALJ considered several evaluations of Hagans’s condition, most of which were completed in mid-2004, and found that he was capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity, although he could not perform his past relevant work. The Appeals Council denied review; the district court affirmed. The Third Circuit affirmed, after determining that “relatively high” deference should be afforded to SSA’s Acquiescence Ruling interpreting the cessation provision of 42 U.S.C. 423(f) as referring to the time of the SSA’s initial disability determination. SSA correctly evaluated Hagans’s condition as of the date on which the agency first found that Hagans’s eligibility for disability benefits ceased. Substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Hagans was not fully disabled as of that date. View "Hagans v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Sandy, hearing and speech impaired, applied to work as a grocery store cashier and stocker. As part of the application, Sandy took a Customer Service Assessment created by Kronos and received a score of 40%. Kroger relied, in part, on the Assessment in deciding not to hire Sandy, who filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a third-party administrative subpoena to Kronos, denied a petition to revoke the subpoena, and, after Kronos failed to provide requested information, filed a motion to enforce the subpoena in district court, which limited the scope of the subpoena. The Third Circuit reversed geographic and temporal restrictions, and restrictions related to job description, and affirmed refusal to allow discovery into racial discrimination. On remand, the district court expanded the scope of its original order, but again limited disclosure of information related to the Kronos tests and foundt entered a modified version of the confidentiality order. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of how specific limitations are tied to Kronos’s justifiable fears regarding disclosure of proprietary information and for individualized determination of whether costs of production under the expanded subpoena are outside the scope of what Kronos can reasonably expect as the cost of doing business. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kronos, Inc" on Justia Law

ICE officers entered the home Ramos shared with relatives with an administrative warrant for a sister, with no information about the identity or legal status of other occupants. During the next 15 hours, the agents detained and questioned the occupants, under circumstances that were allegedly extremely stressful. Ramos produced documents showing that he is a citizen of Guatemala; he did not produce any documentation that he was lawfully present in the U.S. The IJ denied a motion to suppress evidence found during the raid, although Ramos was detained without a warrant. Ramos asserted that the agents entered his home without valid consent and in violation of administrative regulations. He sought production of documents related to his search, seizure, and arrest, and ICE procedures. The IJ never ruled on that motion, but found Ramos removable. The BIA dismissed an appeal, declining to address a Fourth Amendment claim and finding that any regulatory violations did not alter the outcome. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The exclusionary rule may apply in cases where constitutional violations by immigration officers are widespread or evidence was obtained as a result of egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence. View "Oliva-Ramos v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

TriCenturion audited Nichole Medical as a Program Safeguard Contractor under the Medicare Integrity Program, 42 U.S.C. 395ddd(a), and concluded that Nichole “might” be improperly billing for medical equipment; that Nichole had received overpayments; and that it had not maintained sufficient medical records to establish reasonableness or medical necessity. TriCenturion directed Nichole’s carrier, HealthNow, to withhold payments. TriCenturion calculated the actual overpayment of several specific claims, used those as a representative sampling, and extrapolated an overpayment amount for all relevant claims. The Attorney General found no evidence of fraud and refused to prosecute; HealthNow stopped withholding payments. TriCenturion instructed HealthNow’s successor to re-institute the offset. Nichole went out of business, but pursued an appeal. An ALJ determined that Nichole was entitled to reimbursement on some, but not all, appealed claims and found that the process for arriving at the extrapolated overpayment was flawed. The Medicare Appeals Council found that all 39 claims had been reopened and reviewed improperly. The district court dismissed Nichole’s suit against TriCenturion, which alleged torts and breach of the statutory duty of care under 42 U.S.C. 1320c-6(b). The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendants are immune from suit as officers or employees of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. View "Nichole Medical Equip & Supply, Inc. v. Tricenturion, Inc." on Justia Law

D.F. was a five-year-old African-American male kindergartener during the 2008-2009 school year, his first in Collingswood. He had previously been educated in the Camden school system, which had identified him as a special needs student and developed an Individualized Education Plan for him. Collingswood adopted the Camden IEP in substantial part, with the consent of D.F.’s mother, A.C. In January 2009, A.C. filed a due process petition alleging violation of D.F’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act; later, she filed a second petition expanding the claims. D.F. and A.C. subsequently moved out of state and the New Jersey Administrative Law Judge dismissed the pending petitions as moot. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the move did not render all claims moot. The ALJ did not make any factual findings that related to the claim for compensatory education for violations of the right to a free and appropriate public education beyond the absence of a one-to-one aide during the September 2008-January 2009 period, nor any related to the summer 2009 compensatory education claim. View "D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Green, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 2002. In 2006, his status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. Weeks later, he was arrested on charges of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute. He pled guilty. In 2008, Green was arrested again on charges of possession and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance and pled guilty. In 2010, DHS charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Green applied for deferred removal under the Convention Against Torture, testifying that he feared that he would be tortured by the Shower Posse, a Jamaican drug gang. He had witnessed the 1998 killing of a police officer and an informant and had identified the shooters. His sister and his brother were subsequently killed; Green himself had been attacked in downtown Kingston. Although the IJ found Green’s testimony credible, she denied his application; he “failed to meet his burden to establish that the Shower Posse would be acting on behalf of the government of Jamaica or that the government of Jamaica would acquiesce in the actions of the Shower Posse,” as required under CAT. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Green v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Newark detectives were watching a building in connection with a crime that occurred at another location, two months earlier. They did not have a description of anyone involved and had no information whatsoever about Navedo. After watching an interaction between Navedo and Pozo, the officers thought that Pozo had a gun. The officers approached and identified themselves and clearly saw that Pozo had a gun. Pozo threw it into his bag and ran. As one officer chased Pozo, Navedo ran up the stairs to his home with another officer pursuing him into the building. As Navedo opened the door to his apartment, he was tackled by the officer, who testified that he handcuffed Navedo, then observed a shotgun, rifles, and ammunition on the floor. The court denied a motion to suppress, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Navedo and that Navedo’s flight elevated the reasonable suspicion to “probable cause for arrest and justified entry” under the theory of hot pursuit. The Third Circuit vacated. The police had no reason to suspect that Navedo was involved in criminal activity, and even if they had appropriately formed such suspicion, they would only have been entitled to detain and investigate, not arrest. View "United States v. Navedo" on Justia Law

In 2003, Berberena pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine; possession of crack with intent to distribute; and possession of powder cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 210-262 months but varied downward to impose a sentence of 150 months. In 2006, Gayle was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; possession of crack with intent to distribute; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court calculated a range of 168-210 months for two counts, but varied downward to 120 months. Because one count carried a mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence, the court sentenced him to 180 months. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act changed the threshold quantities of crack that trigger mandatory minimum sentences. Berberena and Gayle moved for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court applied a policy statement that generally prohibits a reduction below the low end of a prisoner’s new range, even if the prisoner originally received a below-Guidelines sentence. Berberena’s motion was denied. Gayle’s motion was granted in part. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority, violated separation-of-powers principles, and failed to comply with APA notice-and-comment requirements. View "United States v. Gayle" on Justia Law

The Port Authority’s subsidiary, PATH, operates the Grove Street Station in Jersey City. The Station was built in 1910. In 2000 PATH planned to expand the Station to accommodate larger trains and persons with disabilities, a project that would have involved construction of a new entrance and two elevators. After September 11, 2001, and the resulting closure of two stations, ridership increased at the Station. Concerned about congestion and safety, PATH scrapped its renovation plans and undertook a “fast track” project. Construction began in 2002 and concluded in 2005. Plaintiffs alleged that the renovations triggered an obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213, to make the Station accessible to handicapped persons. They also alleged violations under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination and certain state construction code provisions. The district court dismissed, state-law claims on the basis that allowing such claims to proceed would violate the interstate compact between New York and New Jersey that created the Authority, but ordered the Authority to make the east entrance accessible. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the state law claims, but remanded the ADA issue for trial on the issue of feasibility. View "Hip Heightened Indep. & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ" on Justia Law