Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005 Weatherspoon was charged with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute over 50 grams of cocaine base. In 2006 he pled guilty and was sentenced to 120 months, under a binding plea agreement. A few years later, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued a retroactive amendment which reduced Weatherspoon's Guidelines range. In 2011, the Third Circuit rejected Weatherspoon's first motion for a sentence reduction because he was sentenced pursuant to a binding plea agreement. The district court denied a subsequent motion, based on an argument that he is nevertheless eligible for a reduction because under the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011), the sentence contained in his plea agreement was based on‖ the Sentencing Guidelines. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

Begin pled guilty on charges related to his use of the internet and a cellular phone to send sexual messages and photographs to a minor in order to persuade her to have sex with him and was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, a 30-month upward departure from the top of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Begin argued that his sentence was unreasonable based on the asserted disparity between his sentence for attempting to induce statutory rape and the lower maximum sentences for actually committing statutory rape under state and federal law. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of that argument. The claim has colorable legal merit, so that, upon appropriate findings of fact, the district court would be within its discretion to accept the argument and to factor it into the ultimate sentence. View "United States v. Begin" on Justia Law

There are four direct purchasers of heavy duty truck transmissions in North America. Truck buyers dealing with those direct purchasers can select many of the components for their trucks, including transmissions, from catalogues called data books. Data book positioning is significant to likelihood that a buyer will choose a particular component. Eaton is a monopolist in the market for such transmissions. ZF-Meritor entered the market in 1989; otherwise no significant external supplier has entered the market in 20 years. ZF-Meritor sued Eaton, alleging anticompetitive practices embodied in long-term agreements between Eaton and every direct purchaser, including provisions relating to data books. A jury found Sherman Act and Clayton Act violations. The district court reasoned that notwithstanding Eaton‘s above-cost prices, there was sufficient evidence to establish long-term de facto exclusive dealing arrangements, which foreclosed a substantial share of the market and harmed competition. The Third Circuit affirmed. The claims are not subject to the price-cost test, but must be analyzed as de facto exclusive dealing claims under the rule of reason. There was sufficient evidence that Eaton engaged in anticompetitive conduct and of resulting antitrust injury. The court vacated an injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief. View "ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp." on Justia Law

In 1989, Copenhefer was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, attempted robbery, attempted theft by extortion, and terroristic threats. As to the murder conviction, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, making a death sentence mandatory. The court imposed the death sentence and consecutive sentences totaling 20 to 40 years on remaining counts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. A trial court denied a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act; the Supreme Court again affirmed. In 1999, Copenhefer filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted habeas relief from the death sentence on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it was required to find that Copenhefer’s lack of a prior criminal record constituted a mitigating circumstance. The Third Circuit reversed, reinstating the original sentence. The court rejected additional claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the Commonwealth’s theory that the victim lingered before dying and that the Commonwealth exercised peremptory strikes to remove female jurors. View "Copenhefer v. Horn" on Justia Law

Bistrian, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, filed 108-page complaint with 114 pages of exhibits, alleging that, while he was awaiting sentencing on wire-fraud charges, prison investigators used him to intercept notes being passed among other inmates, and then failed to protect him after they flubbed the operation and the inmates discovered his involvement. When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, Bistrian contends he repeatedly requested help, but no preventive measures were taken. Later, one of the inmates against whom Bistrian had cooperated, along with others, beat him while they were together in a locked recreation pen. A few months later, an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon attacked Bistrian in the recreation pen. Bistrian also claimed that certain of the 447 days he spent in segregation violated his substantive due process, procedural due process, and free speech rights. After the district court ruled on motions, six counts survived against 28 defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. Counts that survived include: deliberate indifference to medical needs; substantive due process violations by failure to protect and by punitive detention; procedural due process; and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. View "Bistrian v. Levi" on Justia Law

Garrus was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 2001. At sentencing, the judge increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9714, the “three strikes” law. To do so, the judge made a finding that Garrus had previously been convicted of burglarizing an occupied building, when, in fact, he had only pled guilty to, and been convicted of, second degree burglary (which, under Pennsylvania law, necessarily requires that the burglarized building was unoccupied). In a habeas petition, Garrus argued that this judicial fact-finding violated the Supreme Court's 2000 holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, requiring that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court denied the petition on the basis that the highest state court determination upholding the sentence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Third Circuit reversed. The state court determination upholding Garrus‟s sentence was objectively unreasonable. View "Garrus v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Ware and Stratton, convicted of offenses involving crack cocaine, moved for reductions in their sentences following a retroactive amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines applicable to crack cocaine offenses. Ware’s conviction included counts of conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of crack with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. Ware was found to be responsible for 1.17 grams of crack. Stratton was convicted on counts including distribution of crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. He was found responsible for 5.9 grams of crack. Stratton was granted a downward departure based on over-representation of criminal history. Ware’s sentence was reduced from 128 months to 84 months, but a different judge denied Stratton’s motion to reduce his sentence from 188 months. The Third Circuit reversed as to Ware and affirmed as to Stratton. The Sentencing Guidelines amendments at issue do not apply to defendants who, like Ware and Stratton, were originally sentenced on the basis of variances (Ware) or departures (Stratton) from a guideline range not affected by the amendments. View "United States v. Ware" on Justia Law

While conducting an undercover online investigation of peer-to-peer file sharing networks, officer Erdely was able to connect to a computer sharing child pornography files. Erdely obtained a court order to identify the IP address that had shared the files. The address was registered to Cunningham’s deceased mother. During a search, the only working computer was found in Cunningham’s bedroom. Cunningham admitted to searching for and downloading child pornography. At trial, the district court allowed the government, over Cunningham’s objection, to show the jury videos containing seven different video clips totaling approximately two minutes as a sample of the child pornography that gave rise to the charges. Cunningham was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment and 20 years’ supervised release following his conviction for receipt and distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. The district court abused its discretion, not only by failing to review the videos prior to admitting them but also by allowing all of those videos to be shown to the jury, because the highly inflammatory nature of two of them clearly and substantially outweighed their probative value pertaining to the crimes charged. The errors were not harmless. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Atlantic, a New Jersey pipe foundry, and four of its managers were convicted of conspiring to commit environmental pollution and worker safety violations, attempting to cover up or impede federal investigation of those violations, and violations of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251) and the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7413(c)). Defendants illegally pumped contaminated water into storm drains that drained into the Delaware River; unlawfully burned 50-gallon drums of paint waste in a cupola and emitted the fumes into the air; and attempted to cover up work-related accidents at its facility, one of which resulted in the death of an employee who was run-over by a forklift. The district court imposed sentences of 70, 41, 30 and six months’ imprisonment on the managers and applied the Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. 3571(c)(1), rather than the CWA and CAA, and fined Atlantic the maximum penalty of $500,000 per violation on conspiracy, four counts of obstruction, eight CWA counts, and one CAA count for a total fine of $8 million. It also sentenced Atlantic to 4 years’ probation, with a court-ordered monitor to ensure regulatory compliance. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the sentences. View "United States v. Maury" on Justia Law

Following his convictions for wire fraud and failure to appear at trial, the district court ordered Craig to pay $12,411 in restitution and a $300 special assessment. The government sought to satisfy the order from $16,342 it had seized previously from Craig. Craig filed a motion (FRCP 41(g)) for return of the remaining $3,631. The government argued that the balance should be applied to an unsatisfied restitution order entered by another court. The court denied the motion. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the court lacked authority to order the transfer of funds to another district. The district court returned the money, but denied Craig’s request for interest. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 2465: does not entitle a convicted criminal to interest on an award of excess funds returned to him after he satisfies a restitution order. View "Unted States v. Craig" on Justia Law