Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Daughter, born in June 2004, suffered medical problems that stunted her growth. In October 2005, Mother took Daughter to Dr. Lindblad, who diagnosed failure to thrive. She was treated inpatient for six days and gained 50 grams per day, a gain normal for a child of Daughter’s age and condition. After returning to Mother’s care, Daughter gained only four grams per day. Lindblad again prescribed inpatient treatment and, in April 2006, concluded that Daughter’s condition was psychosocial; he feared that Daughter was neglected and noted concern about Munchausen by proxy. He spoke to a child welfare caseworker, who was already investigating the situation. A judge ordered Daughter removed to her father’s home, with Mother to have only supervised visitation. Caseworkers thought it unnecessary to hold the hearing that Pennsylvania law would require were Daughter taken into state custody. Mother received no explanation of how to arrange for a hearing. After Daughter was removed, discrepancies in her recorded weights were discovered. Mother’s habeas petition, filed 40 days after removal, was rejected. Mother and father later agreed to share custody. The district court rejected Mother’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on procedural due process claims. View "B. S. v. Somerset Cnty." on Justia Law

Castro, a high-ranking Philadelphia Police official, was indicted for extortion involving violence. He was convicted of making a false statement to federal agents (18 U.S.C. 1001) and acquitted of conspiracy to commit extortion (18 U.S.C. 894). The jury hung on remaining counts. To avoid retrial, Castro pled guilty to conspiracy to commit extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951); the plea agreement contained an appellate waiver. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 18 months for false statements and 60 months for conspiracy. Castro appealed, arguing that, because the money came from the FBI as part of a sting operation, he told the literal truth when he denied having received money from the alleged victim. He also argued that the court lacked authority to deny the government’s motion for a decrease in his offense level under the sentencing guidelines and that, in imposing a sentence 19 months higher than the guidelines range, the court failed to adequately account for his record of good works. The Third Circuit vacated the false statements conviction, holding that application of the waiver against the sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument would, in these unusual circumstances, work a miscarriage of justice and that there was no evidence that Castro made a false statement. View "Unted States v. Castro" on Justia Law

Mala entered Crown Bay Marina, tied the boat to a fueling station and began filling his tank with an automatic gas pump. Before walking to the register to buy oil, Mala asked an attendant to watch his boat. When Mala returned, the tank was overflowing and fuel was spilling into the boat and the water. The attendant shut off the pump and acknowledged that it was malfunctioning. Mala began cleaning up; the attendant provided soap and water. Mala departed; the engine caught fire and exploded. Mala was thrown into the water and was severely burned. Mala sued, claiming negligent training and supervision and negligent maintenance. At the time Mala was imprisoned; he has filed at least 20 pro se lawsuits. The district court concluded that his history of filing frivolous lawsuits precluded in forma pauperis status, 28 U.S.C. 1915; rejected Mala’s jury demand; dismissed certain defendants; held a bench trial at which Mala represented himself; and ruled in favor of Crown Bay, although an advisory jury returned a verdict of $460,000 for Mala. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court should have provided additional assistance, wrongfully denied a jury trial, and improperly ruled on post-trial motions. View "Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillip and Defoe worked together at an oil refinery in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Phillip was driving a company-owned vehicle near the refinery when it struck Defoe. While recovering, Defoe filed a claim and received benefits under the Virgin Islands Workers’ Compensation Act, 24 V.I. Code 250. He also sued Phillip for negligence in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, which granted summary judgment for Phillip, holding that the Act prevents injured employees from suing their coworkers. The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands reversed, declaring that it was not bound by Third Circuit pre-2007 decisions on Virgin Islands law. Phillips sought certiorari to the Third Circuit, which upheld the decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, stating that that court “is on the road to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938),” which requires federal courts to defer to local courts on issues of local law. The court held that it will defer to the Supreme Court on questions of local law, subject to a manifest-error standard of review, including with respect to its pre-2007 precedents; the court did not manifestly err in rejecting that precedent. View "Defoe v. Phillip" on Justia Law

Tucker was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and related drug and firearms offenses. He pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He represented himself at the plea and sentencing hearings, with standby counsel. The government asserted that Tucker was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) based on three prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses.” Tucker conceded a 1995 violent felony but argued that two state drug convictions did not qualify. The government asserted that both convictions involved cocaine, and, under Pennsylvania law, carried a maximum sentence of 10 years. Tucker argued that neither conviction had required a finding as to the particular drug and that the government could not show that either conviction was for an offense carrying a maximum sentence of 10 years or more. The government introduced the certified court record for one conviction and, for the other, charging documents, jury instructions, and transcripts of the post-trial sentencing hearing and a pre-trial charging conference. The district court found that both convictions were for cocaine and and sentenced Tucker to 15 years. The Third Circuit vacated. None of the documents submitted “actually required” finding conspiracy to sell cocaine in order to convict. View "Unted States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs are five individuals with mental retardation who are institutionalized in intermediate care facilities (ICFs/MR) operated by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare; they allege violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act by failing “to offer and provide the opportunity to receive services in integrated, community settings that are most appropriate settings to meet their needs. Plaintiffs claimed that there are approximately 1,272 individuals who reside in five ICFs/MR. The district court certified the class, denied a motion to dismiss, denied a motion to intervene brought by nine institutionalized individuals who oppose community placement, and granted final approval to a settlement agreement. The Third Circuit vacated in part, holding that the court abused its discretion by denying intervention as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) in the remedy stage of this litigation as well as with respect to final approval of the settlement agreement. The intervenors may also challenge certification of the class. View "Benjamin v. PA Dep't of Pub. Welfare" on Justia Law

Southwest sells title reports to consumer lenders, containing information available in public records. Southwest’s reports include the owner’s name and address, marital status, and amounts of outstanding mortgages, liens or judgments against the property. Reports do not include social security numbers, payment history, previous addresses, employment information, birthdate, or outstanding account balances, as would typically appear in a credit report prepared by credit reporting agencies. Unlike a credit reporting company, Southwest endeavors to include only unsatisfied liens encumbering the property. Fuges had a $35,000 line of credit from PNC, secured by her home. In 2008, she applied for payment protection insurance; PNC ordered a credit report from a credit reporting agency and a property report from Southwest, which was arguably inaccurate concerning tax delinquency and a judgment lien. PNC initially denied her application, but later granted her request. Fuges filed a putative class action against Southwest, alleging violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681-1681x. The district court dismissed many claims because she had not taken actions required by FCRA, then entered summary judgment for Southwest, reasoning that no reasonable jury could find willful violation of FCRA, because Southwest reasonably interpreted the statute as inapplicable. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Fuges v. SW Fin. Serv., Ltd." on Justia Law

Nicole, age 15, sent a text message to a friend stating that she planned to commit suicide by ingesting ibuprofen pills. The friend called 911 and soon Officer Marshall of the Wright Township Police Department arrived at the residence, with two other officers and emergency medical personnel. When questioned by her parents, Nicole admitted that she had planned to commit suicide, but said that she had changed her mind and had not ingested any pills. Officer Marshall stated that Nicole had to go to the hospital. Her parents disagreed, but Marshall informed them that he would charge them with assisted manslaughter if something happened to Nicole because they did not send Nicole to the hospital. They relented. They initially refused to accompany her, stating that they felt unable to travel because they had taken prescription medication earlier that evening. Mrs. James eventually agreed to go to the hospital with her daughter, but later brought suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court dismissed claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, but did not grant Marshall qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. Mrs. James was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "James v. City of Wilkes Barre " on Justia Law

Lin, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, entered the U.S. illegally in 2004. In 2008, he was served with a Notice to Appear and conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), but petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Lin asserted that he fled China to escape religious persecution because of his Christianity. He claims that he was detained for five days, and that he was interrogated about his church, severely beaten, and deprived of water and sleep. The IJ denied Lin relief and ordered him removed, based on Lin’s failure to seek asylum within one year of his arrival, and on an adverse credibility determination. Lin asked the BIA to reopen proceedings, claiming to have previously unavailable evidence showing that he is now wanted for arrest in China for his religious practices. Lin did not explain how he obtained this new documentation, nor did he note any efforts to authenticate it. Lin also failed to file a new application for asylum. The BIA held that Lin did not satisfy his burden of showing prima facie eligibility for relief and denied his motion to reopen. The Third Circuit denied his appeal. View "Lin v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

The nursing care facility faced financial difficulties and ceased to admit new patients; it filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2005. The Bankruptcy Court appointed a Committee of Unsecured Creditors, approved closure, and authorized the Committee to commence adversary proceedings against officers and directors. The Committee did so, alleging breach of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, based on the business judgment rule and the doctrine of in pari delicto. On remand, the court scheduled a jury trial. Before pretrial conference, the parties identified 400 proposed exhibits. The Committee intended to call up to 51 witnesses; defendants intended to call up to 34 witnesses. Descriptions of intended testimony were similar. Frustrated with the failure to “streamline [the] case,” the court limited each side’s witness testimony to 7.5 hours and limited opening and closing statements. Defendants sought to appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) and a writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal because the district court did not certify that the time-limit order “involve[d] a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” and denied mandamus, holding that direct appeal was an adequate means of challenge. View "In Re: Baldwin" on Justia Law