Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The school district hired Connelly as a teacher. Connelly had nine years of teaching experience, all in Maryland. Because Connelly acquired his teaching experience outside Pennsylvania, the district credited him with only one year. Other new teachers with like experience acquired within Pennsylvania (but not in the district) received at least partial credit for each year they had taught. Connelly’s initial annual salary was $38,023, which was substantially less than the $49,476 Connelly alleged he would have received with full credit for his experience. Connelly‘s initial salary determination continued to adversely affect his pay. In 2011 Connelly filed suit, asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983: that failure to fully credit his out-of-state teaching experience violated his right to interstate travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and denied him equal protection of the law. The district court dismissed, holding that the classification alleged is based on location of teaching experience, not residency. The Third Circuit affirmed, applying rational basis review. A school district may rationally place a premium on teachers who have more experience working within the Pennsylvania school system in order to achieve the legitimate goal of an efficient and effective public education system. View "Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Ethypharm, a French corporation, contracted with Reliant, an American company. Ethypharm would manufacture and provide its drug (Antara®); Reliant would obtain approval and market the drug. Reliant sought FDA approval under 21 U.S.C. 505(b)(2), using data from an approved, fenofibrate drug, TriCor®, developed by Fournier and distributed in the U.S. by Abbott. Antara received approval. Reliant began marketing and sought a declaration of non-infringement or unenforceability of Abbott’s patents. Abbott counterclaimed. In 2006, the companies settled: Abbott and Fournier would license the patents to Reliant and Reliant would pay royaltys. The agreement prohibited Reliant from assigning its rights to or partnering with specific companies. Reliant sold its rights to Oscient, which was not a prohibited purchaser. Losing market share to generic fenofibrate, Oscient discontinued promotion of Antara and filed for bankruptcy. Ethypharm sued Abbott, alleging antitrust and sham litigation under 15 U.S.C. 1, asserting that the settlement agreement was designed to ensure that Antara would be marketed by a company with “limited resources and a relatively small sales force,” so that it could not effectively compete with TriCor and that the royalty payment weakened Antara’s profitability. The district court granted Abbott summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that Ethypharm lacked standing under the Sherman Act. View "Ethypharm SA France v. Abbott Labs" on Justia Law

Zimmerman was riding his motorcycle on an evening in 2008 and approached a railroad crossing. It was dark and a building obscured the tracks. When he was less than 76 feet away, he noticed a train approaching. He tried to stop, but his front brake locked and he flew over the handlebars, colliding with a locomotive and leaving him partially paralyzed. He sued Norfolk, asserting state tort claims. The district court entered summary judgment for the railroad, citing preemption by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20106. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to a claim that the railroad was negligent per se for violating requirements in 23 C.F.R. 646.214(b), which states that crossings with limited sight distance and high train speeds must have adequate warning devices, defined by statute as automatic gates and flashing lights. The court reversed with respect to claims that the railroad negligently failed to warn him of the approaching train; negligently maintained the crossing devices, particularly a sign that warned of the approaching crossing that was covered by tree branches, pavement markings that no longer existed, and crossbucks had been allowed to fall into disrepair; and failed to provide adequate sight distance. View "Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp." on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony tying him to the crime. The testimony of Robles, Johnson’s friend, that Johnson had confessed guilt to him, was pivotal. Johnson filed multiple petitions under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, unsuccessfully claiming violations of Brady v. Maryland. He then unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed, noting that it was not until discovery in Johnson’s federal habeas case that previously undisclosed evidence was uncovered, showing that, at the time Robles testified, he was under investigation for his role in a shooting, an assault, and multiple shots-fired incidents. Robles, who was never charged with any crimes despite repeated dealings with police in investigations involving guns and drugs, supplied police with information concerning an unrelated crime when his own involvement in an assault came under investigation. The jury never heard the impeachment evidence because when Johnson sought discovery of information concerning any criminal activity of Robles, charged or uncharged, the District Attorney who prosecuted Johnson represented to the state court that it had no information or police reports naming Robles as a suspect. View "Johnson v. Folino" on Justia Law

Jenkins was convicted of drug-related offenses. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review. Jenkins timely filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, which the trial court denied. He timely filed notice of appeal, but the superior court granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw and affirmed denial of his petition on November 10, 2009. On December 2, 2009, Jenkins filed a pro se pleading with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entitled, “Motion to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, and for the Appointment of Counsel.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court notified the Superior Court that Jenkins had filed a petition for allowance of appeal, but, on December 16, issued notice, stating that his pleading failed to comply with certain Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure unrelated to timing. Jenkins perfected his pleading on December 29, but, on April 27, 2010, the Supreme Court denied his pleading without opinion. On May 7, 2010, Jenkins filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court, sua sponte, raised the issue of timeliness and ultimately dismissed as untimely. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Jenkins is eligible for statutory tolling of AEDPA’s limitation period. View "Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands" on Justia Law

PG sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of 25 Pa. Stat. 3060(d), a portion of the Pennsylvania Election Code mandating that all persons, except election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, persons in the course of voting, persons lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace and police officers, when permitted by the provisions of this act, must remain at least ten (10) feet distant from the polling place during the progress of the voting. PG claimed that the statute infringed on its First Amendment “right to access and gather news at polling places” and that selective enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. There is no protected First Amendment right of access to a polling place for news-gathering purposes and there was no evidence of “invidious intent” or intentional discrimination. View "PG Publ'g Co. v. Aichele" on Justia Law

Diallo was arrested and pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing 15 or more counterfeit credit cards with the intent to defraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3). At his sentencing hearing, the government argued that although the actual loss attributed to Diallo’s conduct amounted to $160,000, he should be assessed a 16-level enhancement for an intended loss amount of over $1 million but not more than $2.5 million, which was based on the Secret Service agents’ determination of the aggregate credit limit of all of the compromised credit card numbers, and a four-level enhancement for over 50 victims, based on the number of financial institutions that had issued the credit cards numbers. The district court accepted the government’s arguments on intended loss and the number of victims, resulting in a total offense level of 27 and a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment and ultimately sentenced Diallo to a bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated. For purpose of Section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, the intended loss of a credit card fraud is not, in every case, the credit card’s credit limit. View "United States v. Diallo" on Justia Law

In 1987, Waterfront purchased 5.3 acres in Philadelphia’s Central Riverfront District, zoned G-2 industrial. In exchange for rezoning to C-4 commercial, for a mixed-use, high-rise project, Waterfront agreed to restrictive covenants. When financing became possible in 2005, Waterfront obtained a permit for demolishing existing structures and constructing a 28-story apartment tower and entered into a financing agreement with a construction start date of February 2006. Waterfront had to postpone construction. In March 2006, the city extended to the site a zoning overlay with a height restriction of 65 feet and a width restriction of 70 feet. Waterfront alleged mistake; that the area councilman admitted that inclusion of the site was a mistake; and that Mayor Street stated that he would not have signed it had he known that the height restriction applied to the site. Waterfront unsuccessfully sought repeal, but never applied for a permit under the ordinance and did not seek a variance. Waterfront filed suit. In 2010 the city rescinded application of the height restriction. The district court held that the rescission mooted federal constitutional claims, denied Waterfront’s motion to amend to attack the width restriction, and granted the city summary judgment on all other claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In 1996, Mandel was hired by M&Q. She claims that, throughout her employment, she was sexually harassed and discriminated against by male managers, supervisors, and owners. In 2007, during a meeting, a manager became angry, repeatedly called Mandel a “bitch,” and screamed “shut the fuck up.” As a result, Mandel resigned; she then accepted another position. In her resignation, Mandel did not complain of harassment or discrimination, apparently concerned she would be denied her vacation time. Although Mandel complained about being told to make coffee, she did not complain about other alleged incidents. Mandel testified that she understood policies in the employee handbook but felt uncomfortable going to the named managers. Mandel occasionally used profanity and sent emails containing sexual humor, but was never disciplined. The EEOC dismissed her request for charges. Mandel sued, alleging discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation (42 U.S.C. 2000e), violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted M&Q summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the retaliation, PHRA, and Title VII sex discrimination claims, but reversed on the hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims.View "Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp" on Justia Law

Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and 500 grams or more of powder cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846). The district court sentenced her to 12 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Because Huff had spent more than a year in prison awaiting trial, supervised release began in July 2008. In August 2010, the probation office informed the court that Huff had violated conditions of supervised release. Huff waived a hearing and agreed to home detention for three months. In April 2011, the probation office filed a second report after Huff was charged with driving under the influence, endangering the welfare of children, improper vehicle child restraint, public drunkenness, and failure to stop at a red light and stated that Huff had been non-compliant with other terms of supervision. The court sentenced her to 10 months’ incarceration with no subsequent supervised release. Huff filed notice of appeal in December 2011, but was released from custody in August 2012. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. A litigant who is unconditionally released from custody must show that she will suffer collateral consequences from the supervised release revocation to present a live case or controversy. View "United States v. Huff" on Justia Law