Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Denny, an inmate at the Fairton, New Jersey, Federal Correctional Institution, was punished with 60 days of disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit after a “shank” was found in a vent between the cell he shared with another inmate and another cell. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Denny possessed weapons in violation of a prison regulation. Denny sought a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241 arguing that prison officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court sua sponte dismissed the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the affirmative responsibility, of which the inmates were on notice, that they were to keep their “area” free from contraband. The mere discovery of contraband in a shared cell constitutes “some evidence” that each prisoner in that cell possessed the contraband. View "Denny v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Wilson pleaded guilty to drug charges. The plea agreement included a waiver of his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his conviction and sentence except if the government appealed, the sentence exceeded statutory limits, or the sentence unreasonably exceeded the sentencing guideline range determined by the district court. Wilson was sentenced to 65 months’ imprisonment with six years of supervised release. The Third Circuit enforced the waiver and affirmed the sentence. In 2011, Wilson was released from prison and began supervised release. Three months later, his Probation Officer sought to modify the terms and conditions of his supervised release to include participation in a mental health program. The district court held a hearing and took testimony about a number of bizarre incidents and about Wilson’s grandiose ideas and acts of unconventional behavior. Wilson also testified. The court ordered that Wilson’s conditions of supervised release be modified to add the condition that he undergo a mental health assessment and, if necessary, participate in an approved mental health treatment program. The Third Circuit affirmed after finding that appeal was not barred by the waiver. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Interstate requested approval for nine outdoor advertising signs along U.S. Interstate-295, a major transportation corridor. The township then adopted an ordinance prohibiting billboards. The district court dismissed a constitutional challenge. The Third Circuit affirmed. A reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that there was an insufficient basis for the township’s conclusion that its billboard ban would directly advance its stated goal of improving the aesthetics of the community. The fact that Interstate will not be able to reach the distinct audience of travelers that it desires to target does not mean that adequate alternative means of communication do not exist. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that complete billboard bans may be the only reasonable means by which a legislature can advance its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. View "Interstate Outdoor Advertising, L.P. v. Zoning Bd., Twp of Mount Laurel" on Justia Law

In 2007, Tellado heard a Spanish-language radio advertisement for mortgage refinancing, called the number, and spoke in Spanish to arrange refinancing of an existing mortgage. Bloom, a closing agent acting as a representative of IndyMac, conducted the closing at the Tellados’ home. The loan documents, including the notice of the right to cancel, were in English. Oral communications between Bloom and the Tellados, were conducted through the Tellados’ daughter, who served as an interpreter for verbal instructions and Bloom’s explanations of the loan documents. IndyMac subsequently failed and was placed in FDIC receivership. In 2009, the Tellados sent a notice of cancellation under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-7. The district court held that IndyMac had failed to provide proper notice and that the three-day cancellation period had never begun; it ordered refund to the Tellados of all payments, termination of the security interest, and payment of a $10,000 penalty. The Third Circuit reversed; the claim is precluded by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D) because the claim is predicated upon an act or omission of IndyMac. Tellados failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under FIRREA. View "Tellado v. Indymac Mortg. Serv." on Justia Law

The Condominium Association’s declaration required Bayside to provide fresh water and wastewater treatment to the Association and made all of the water facilities common property of the Association. Bayside contracted with TSG to construct and operate a system to fulfill its obligations. TSG charged Bayside $0.02 per gallon. By 2005, Bayside owed millions of dollars to creditors including TSG and the Association. Bayside assigned its rights to TSG, permitting TSG to charge $0.05 per gallon. To secure the Association’s consent Bayside and TSG threatened to cease providing services even though it was not feasible to obtain those services elsewhere. The Association’s Board consented and signed a Water Supply Agreement, which provided that Bayside owned the water facilities and contained an arbitration clause. After not receiving payments under the WSA, TSG temporarily stopped producing potable water for the Association, which then filed suit, asserting criminal extortion under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act; breach of obligations under the Declaration; and ownership of the water treatment systems. The district court ordered arbitration. The Third Circuit affirmed in part but vacated in part. The Association raised a bona fide question as to whether its Board had authority to enter into the WSA, a question that requires judicial determination. View "SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort Inc." on Justia Law

The Sherzers obtained two loans secured by mortgages on their home: one for $705,000 and one for $171,000. The lender, Homestar, later assigned both to HSBC. Less than three years after the closing date the Sherzers wrote a letter to Homestar and HSBC, asserting that Homestar had failed to provide all disclosures required by Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 TILA. The letter claimed that these failures were material violations and that the Sherzers were exercising their right to rescind the loan agreements. HSBC agreed to rescind the smaller loan. The Sherzers filed suit, more than three years after their closing date, seeking a declaration of rescission. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely. The Third Circuit reversed. An obligor's right to rescind a loan pursuant to TILA "expire[s] three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first,"Hardiman 15 U.S.C. 1635(f). An obligor must send valid written notice of rescission before the three years expire; the statute says nothing about filing a suit within that three-year period. View "Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs." on Justia Law

Opponents sought to enjoin enforcement of N.J. STAT. ANN. 2 2C:58-2(a)(7) and 2C:58-3(i), the One Gun Law, as preempted by 15 U.S.C. 5001(g)(ii), which provides that no state shall prohibit sale (other than to minors) of traditional B-B, paint ball, or pellet-firing air guns that expel a projectile through the force of air pressure. The One Gun Law prohibits the purchase or sale of more than one handgun per person per month, including B-B and air guns. They also claimed that implementation of the Law violates the Due Process Clause because exemptions for certain groups, such as collectors of handguns and competitive shooters are essentially illusory. In order to purchase more than one handgun per month under an exemption, the applicant must list, on a state-provided application form, the particular handguns, by serial number, that she wishes to purchase, so that a collector must convince the seller to take a gun off the market while the application is processed. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Law is not so onerous as to be a de facto prohibition. Even if objectors have a property interest, they did not demonstrate a deprivation of that interest. View "Ass'n NJ Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law

Between 1994 and 1997 Wyeth’s predecessor sold fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, prescription weight loss drugs. After the drugs were linked to valvular heart disease and an FDA public health advisory, Wyeth withdrew the drugs from the market in 1997. Thousands of individuals filed suit; the cases were consolidated. In 1999, Wyeth entered into a Settlement Agreement; in 2000, the court certified the class, approved the Agreement, and retained jurisdiction. The Agreement enjoins class members from suing Wyeth for diet drug-related injuries, but allows class members to sue Wyeth if they can demonstrate that they developed PPH (a condition that deprives the lungs of oxygen) at a specified level through the use of the diet drugs. In 2011, Cauthen sued, alleging that she developed PPH. She produced a pulmonary consultation prepared by Fortin, a cardiologist. Because Cauthen’s report showed that lung capacity of less than 60 percent of predicted at rest, Wyeth sought to enjoin the state court lawsuit for failing to satisfy the precondition provided by the Agreement. Dr. Fortin asserted that comparing individual lung capacity with average capacity of persons having a similar demographic profile is not determinative in diagnosing PPH. The district court enjoined the suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "In Re: Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig." on Justia Law

In 1996 mother reported to police that, during a visit to her father’s apartment, their 12-year-old (Linda) alleged that father made sexual advances. Mother obtained an order of protection after he twice failed to appear. The county agency classified father as an “indicated” child abuse perpetrator on Pennsylvania’s child abuse registry. Father was charged with indecent exposure and endangering a child’s welfare. He pled guilty to harassment; the remaining charges were dismissed. In subsequent years, Linda denied the incident. Mother and father resumed living together and were allowed, by the agency, to have related children in their home. After mother obtained custody of their grandchild, the agency removed all children from the home, based on father’s listing. By the time father attempted to appeal in 2007, the agency had destroyed its 1996 records. The listing was expunged in 2010. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the agency’s position with respect to the listing did not “shock the conscience” and that there was no showing of a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process nor evidence that the agency employs a policy or has a custom of conducting desultory investigations. View "Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks" on Justia Law

First Korean Church alleged that the township violated its First Amendment right to religious freedom, its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and its rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 by preventing First Korean from using its property as a church and seminary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the township. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "First Korean Church of NY, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd." on Justia Law