Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Each defendant was convicted of a cocaine base (crack) related offense. The government moved for a downward departure due to substantial assistance by each. The district court granted the departure and sentenced the defendant below the statutory mandatory minimum. Shortly thereafter, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) became law, and the United States Sentencing Commission approved Amendment 750, a retroactive amendment, which lowered the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses. Defendants moved to further reduce their sentences. Although the qualifying amount of cocaine base necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence has been increased, the government argued that the duration of the statutorily required minimum sentence has not changed so that the defendants are still subject to the mandatory minimum sentence. The district courts denied defendants’ motions. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that defendants, who are convicted of crack cocaine offenses and whose original sentences were below the mandatory minimum applicable to them because of substantial assistance to the government, are not barred for policy reasons from seeking a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). View "United States v. Savani" on Justia Law

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, immigration officials “shall take into custody any‖ deportable alien who has committed various crimes” when the alien is released from detention for those crimes, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1). The Act requires officials to hold such aliens without any possibility of release while awaiting removal. Sylvain, a citizen of Haiti, entered the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1988. He has been convicted of more than 10 drug-related crimes and served a three-year prison sentence for making and selling cocaine. He was convicted for unlawfully possessing a weapon and for criminal mischief. Sylvain was last arrested in 2007 for possessing drugs. He pled guilty and received a conditional discharge. Under New York law, a conditional discharge does not require imprisonment or probation. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials arrested him in 2011, concluding that he was deportable and subject to mandatory detention, although he was last in custody four years earlier. The district court granted his petition for habeas corpus, finding that mandatory detention did not apply. Sylvain received a hearing, paid bond, and is not in custody. His next removal hearing is in 2014. The Third Circuit reversed; mandatory detention does not require immediate detention. View "Sylvain v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Vento co-founded a technology company, OSI. When OSI was sold, the Ventos, their daughters, and Vento-controlled entities realized $180 million in capital gains for the 2001 tax year. The Ventos previously lived in and still maintain homes in the U.S., but first visited the Virgin Islands in 2001 and bought a residence there. Residents of the Virgin Islands pay income taxes to the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue (VIBIR) rather than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). All of the Ventos filed 2001 income tax returns with the VIBIR. The United States claims that they should have filed those returns with the IRS and assessed deficiencies and penalties that totaled over $9 million more than those assessed by the VIBIR. The district court found that the Ventos were not bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands as of December 31, 2001. The Third Circuit reversed in part, concluding that the parents were bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands, but that the daughters, who were not dependents, were not. View "Vento v. Dir. of VI Bureau of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

From 1990 to 1995, Thomas directed an enterprise that transported marijuana from California to Pennsylvania. Thomas’ wife was murdered in 1995. He fled to Jamaica. In 1998, he was indicted on 33 counts, based on his marijuana enterprise. In 2001, Thomas was arrested in the United Kingdom. He contested a provisional extradition warrant until 2005. He was convicted and sentenced to 420 months imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed on direct appeal and, in 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. As a federal prisoner, Thomas could move to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence within one year from denial of certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f), but during that period, Thomas was temporarily in state custody, convicted of murdering his wife. Three weeks before the section 2255 deadline, he moved (pro se) for an extension of time. The district court denied the motion. Thomas appealed, but never filed an actual 2255 motion. He sought a certificate of appealability (COA), restating that he had been in state custody without access to legal materials, and asserted “a Batson challenge … Prosecutorial Misconduct for knowingly withholding material evidence of Petitioner’s innocence … and Jury Misconduct.” The Third Circuit granted a COA, finding that the issues were worthy of review. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In 2000, cab driver DeJesus suffered multiple fatal gunshot wounds during a robbery while his taxi was parked at a Harrisburg intersection. After a joint trial with Eiland and Mitchell Court, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Eley of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Eley was unsuccessful in direct appeal and seeking post-conviction relief in state courts. The district court denied his petition for habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that his non-testifying co-defendants’ confessions were admitted against him in violation of the Confrontation Clause under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The court rejected an argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions in violation of the Due Process Clause. View "Eley v. Erickson" on Justia Law

In 2000 Ross was convicted of first degree murder in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Ross was unable to obtain a state appellate court review due to extraordinary circumstances attributable to his attorney’s extreme neglect of his case, including missing deadlines for filing document, failure to communicate with Ross, and the attorney’s misleading statements when he did communicate with Ross. The court denied his motion for appointment of a new attorney. Ross’s mental health issues, limited education, and limited cognitive ability magnified his problems and his status as an inmate placed structural obstacles in his path. Ross subsequently brought this habeas corpus case, charging that because his attorney wrongfully abandoned him, he lost his appellate rights in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d), statute of limitations barred the action as untimely, the district court found that equitable tolling of the running of the statute was warranted because Ross had been diligent in pursuing his state court appellate remedies but that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control frustrated this attempt. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Ross v. Varano" on Justia Law

Cambria County owned and operated Laurel Crest Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, which was subject to Pennsylvania labor law. In 2010 Grane bought Laurel Crest, and established a new entity, Cambria Care, to serve as its operator. Because Grane and Cambria are private employers, labor relations at the facility became subject to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151. Prior to the transfer, most Laurel Crest employees applied to work at Cambria Care, and the majority were hired. Grane, however, did not hire four of the five Local 1305 officers or an employee who had participated in the union’s public activities opposing the sale. Grane and Cambria Care refused to recognize or bargain with the unions. The National Labor Relations Board found that the companies violated NLRA provisions prohibiting employers from refusing to bargain collectively with their employees‘ representatives and from not hiring applicants based on their union membership or activity. The Third Circuit granted the Board‘s petition for enforcement. View "Grane Health Care v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Union submitted three grievances on behalf of Company employee and Union member Lubik, alleging that the company violated a past practice by failing to schedule Lubik, a maintenance clerk, for Saturday overtime when the maintenance department was scheduled to work. After the Arbitrator sustained the three grievances and ordered the company to pay Lubik back wages for the missed overtime. The district court vacated the award because it concluded that the award did not draw its essence from the Collective Bargaining Agreement, determining that the plain language of the CBA unambiguously‖ gave the company the exclusive right to schedule its workforce. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered enforcement of the arbitration award. View "Akers Nat'l Roll Co. v. United Steel, Paper & Forest,Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

The Sponsors formed West Run to construct and manage West Virginia University off-campus housing and retained CBRE to secure financing. CBRE provided prospective lenders with confidential information. Huntington’s predecessor loaned $39.975 million and construction began. A competing project (Copper Beach) was built across the street. West Run learned that Huntington had loaned $20 million for that project; West Run alleged that Huntington divulged to Copper Beach proprietary West Run information provided by CBRE. West Run‘s occupancy dropped from 95 percent to 64 percent. West Run sued, alleging that Huntington had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by financing Copper Beech. Two similar projects, involving the Sponsors, alleged breach of contract based on Huntington‘s failure to provide funds under their construction loan agreements. Huntington claimed that they had sold insufficient units to require Huntington to disburse additional funds under the agreements. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the complaint contained no corroborating facts that confidential information was disclosed and that no contract terms prohibited Huntington from lending to competitors. The court vacated with respect to the other projects for a chance to provide evidence showing that the pre-sale numbers in the original complaint were incorrect. View "W. Run Student Hous. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Former Superior Court Judge Kendall enforced an oral plea agreement that the prosecution had attempted to withdraw; Kendall believed that the defendants could not obtain a fair trial, due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus. Kendall published an opinion chastising the mandamus decision and recusing himself from the case due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Justices cited Kendall for criminal contempt and found him guilty because his opinion, in their view, obstructed the administration of justice and because his recusal was a pretextual effort to avoid complying with the writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the contempt conviction, finding that the First Amendment protects a sitting judge from being criminally punished for his opinion unless that opinion presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing ongoing proceedings. Kendall’s opinion did not pose such a threat. There was insufficient evidence that his recusal was pretextual. View "In Re: Kendall" on Justia Law