Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rachak, a citizen of Morocco, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2002. In 2006, he was charged with possession of marijuana and was placed on probation with supervision under Pennsylvania’s “Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition” program. He did not comply with the conditions of the program and pled guilty to the charge. In 2011, Rachak pled guilty to charges of possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 12 months of probation. The Department of Homeland Security charged Rachak with being removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Rachak then filed a Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act petition attacking his 2011 conviction. For a time, he obtained immigration continuance, but when Rachak’s attorney advised the Immigration Judge that his PCRA petition had been denied at the trial level and was on appeal, the IJ denied further continuances, ordered Rachak removed, and noted that his 2006 conduct rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a) because he had not accrued seven years of continuous residence. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit rejected a petition for review. View "Rachak v. Att'y General of the United States" on Justia Law

In the 1960s Penelec and NYSEG built the Homer City coal-burning power plant in Indiana County, Pennsylvania. The Clean Air Act of 1970 subsequently charged the EPA with setting national maximum permissible levels of common pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)–(b). In 1990 the CAA was amended by Title V, the Operating Permit Program, which requires all major sources of air pollution to obtain operating permits. The Plant’s “grandfathered” status ended in the 1990s, when Penelec and NYSEG made changes to boilers that increased emissions of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Penelec and NYSEG believed the changes were “routine maintenance” and did not apply for a permit. In 1995, Penelec and NYSEG applied for a Title V operating permit; they subsequently sold the Plant to EME, which then sold to OLs, which simultaneously leased it back to EME. By 2004, the Plant had become “one of the largest air pollution sources in the nation,” and was a target of the EPA’s new enforcement initiative. In 2008 the EPA filed suit, alleging that the former owners had modified the Plant without a permit and without installing required emissions controls. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. The relief sought would require distortion of plain statutory text to shore up what the EPA views as an incomplete remedial scheme. View "United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P." on Justia Law

Stinson’s scheme began in 2006 when he founded a fund, Life’s Good, with an alleged purpose to originate mortgage loans. Stinson advertised a “risk free” 16 percent annual return to investors with individual retirement accounts. He hired telemarketers to “cold call” potential investors and later produced a fraudulent prospectus and worked through investment advisors. Stinson did not use investors’ money to make mortgage loans, but diverted it to various personal business ventures that employed his family and friends without requiring them to work. In 2010, the SEC initiated a civil enforcement action. Stinson was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; filing false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1); obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1505; and making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The SEC’s analysis showed that Life’s Good solicited $17.6 million from at least 262 investors and returned approximately $1.9 million. Many individuals lost retirement savings. Stinson entered an open guilty plea. The district court sentenced him to 400 months and ordered restitution of $14,051,246. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the court erroneously applied U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(15)(A), which increases the offense level by two points when “the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions.” The enhancement applies only when financial institutions are the source of a defendant’s gross receipts. View "United States v. Stinson" on Justia Law

In 1988 Trinity acquired South Plant, 53 acres in Greenville, and manufactured railcars there until 2000. Some buildings are now vacant and some are used for storage. Pennsylvania initiated enforcement proceedings concerning release of hazardous substances in 2006, which resulted in Trinity pleading no contest to misdemeanor counts of unlawful conduct. Trinity and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection entered into a consent order; pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act and Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, Trinity agreed to fund and conduct Response Actions under a schedule approved by DEP. Trinity claims to have undertaken preliminary investigation but has yet to perform remediation. Trinity sought contribution from CB&I, the prior owner, which had constructed a facility for manufacturing steel products on the site in 1910 and had operated for 75 years. Trinity alleges that CB&I contaminated sections of South Plant through abrasive blasting, submerging steel plates in acid, and painting. The district court granted CB&I summary judgment on claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the RCRA claim, but agreed with Trinity and the government that CERCLA does not require that a party have settled its liability under CERCLA in particular to be eligible for contribution. View "Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against GenOn, on behalf of a putative class of at least 1,500 individuals who own or inhabit residential property within one mile of GenOn’s 570-megawatt coal-fired electrical generation facility in Springdale, Pennsylvania. The complaint asserted state tort law claims, based on ash and contaminants settling on plaintiffs’ property. The district court dismissed, finding that because the plant was subject to comprehensive regulation under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, it owed no extra duty to the members of the class under state tort law. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the plain language of the Clean Air Act and controlling Supreme Court precedent indicate that state common law actions are not preempted. View "Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, Genon Power Midwest, L.P." on Justia Law

On behalf of themselves and former and current bus drivers and trolley operators (collectively, the Operators) employed by SEPTA, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the plaintiffs filed a purported class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, to recover unpaid wages and overtime compensation for work performed during morning “pre-trip” inspections required before the start of each daily run. The district court dismissed on the ground that the FLSA claim required the interpretation of provisions of collective bargaining agreements between SEPTA and the unions representing the Operators and was, therefore, subject to those agreements’ grievance and arbitration provisions. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the FLSA claim does not require the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements; the Operators based their claims solely on their statutory, rather than their contractual, rights to recovery, View "Bell v. SE PA Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

Al-Sharif is a lawful U.S. permanent resident. He and others arranged to connect callers in Israel to callers in countries with no direct phone service to Israel, for a fee, by routing the calls through a New Jersy apartment. Al-Sharif rented the apartment and set up phone service using a false name and Social Security number. He later abandoned the apartment without leaving a forwarding address or paying the phone bill. As a result, in 1993 Al-Sharif pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, with a stipulation that his fraud caused loss to the victim of between $120,000 and $200,000. He was sentenced to six months’ home confinement and five years’ probation, and was ordered to pay $128,838 in restitution to the phone company. In 2004, Al-Sharif applied to become a naturalized citizen and truthfully disclosed his conviction. His application was denied by USCIS, which treated the conviction as for an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), which precluded him, under 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(8), from demonstrating “good moral character,” as required for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1427(a)(3). The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Al-Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated landowners who used agents in an effort to lease oil and gas rights in Mercer County. When the transactions did not go as planned, plaintiffs sued an oil and gas company, Halcon, alleging breach of agreement and the duty of fair dealing. After Halcon claimed that the agents were “necessary parties,” plaintiffs decided to file direct claims against the agents, which destroyed diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs intended to pursue all of their claims in state court. Halcon argued that it did not oppose joining agents, agreed that the all claims would benefit from being heard in a single proceeding, but asserted that the case should proceed in federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), (d)(2)(A), (d)(5)(B), because discovery had begun and there were ongoing ADR activities. The district court dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs filed in state court, with some changes. Halcon then removed the state court action to the same federal district court, which again remanded, citing the “home state” exception to subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing CAFA’s “local controversy” exception because the case relates to Pennsylvania owners and their land. View "Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Props., Inc." on Justia Law

Verde, a native of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. After several DUI convictions, he was sentenced to more than two years in prison. In 1998, Verde was charged with removability as an “aggravated felon.” He appeared before an immigration judge with seven other Mexican nationals, was deported, returned, and was removed for a second time in 2000. In 2011 the removal order was reinstated and he was charged with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The government dropped that charge and allowed him to plead guilty to use of a false Social Security number, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B). He was sentenced to time served and supervised release. Verde filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to be reinstated as a permanent resident or to be granted cancellation of removal, arguing that his initial removal was a gross miscarriage of justice because of procedural shortcomings and that, because the Supreme Court has decided that a DUI conviction is not an aggravated felony, his conviction was not a valid basis for original removal. The district court dismissed Verde’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1101, eliminated habeas relief in district courts for aliens challenging orders of removal. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Verde-Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen of the United States" on Justia Law

Quinn, charged with aiding and abetting Johnson in an armed bank robbery, claimed that when he drove Johnson to the bank, he did not know that Johnson intended to rob a bank teller at gunpoint. Johnson, who was awaiting sentencing, refused to testify. The district court refused Quinn’s request to immunize Johnson so he could testify. His statement to police that Quinn was not aware of the planned robbery was excluded as hearsay. Quinn was convicted and sentence to 147 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by postponing sentencing to induce Johnson not to testify. Quinn also argued that the court erred by not exercising its authority to immunize Johnson’s testimony. Rejecting that claim, the court stated that courts lack that authority, as immunity is a statutory creation reserved to the Executive Branch. If the accused can show a due process violation, a court has authority to vacate a conviction. View "United States v. Quinn" on Justia Law