Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Net Pay managed clients’ payrolls and handled their employment taxes pursuant to a “Payroll Services Agreement,” which required clients to provide their employee payroll information and gave clients the option of authorizing Net Pay to transfer funds from their bank accounts into Net Pay’s account and to remit those funds to the clients’ employees, the IRS, and other taxing authorities. The Agreement established an independent contractor relationship between Net Pay and its clients. About three months before it filed its Chapter 7 petition, Net Pay transferred $32,297 on behalf of Altus; $5,338 on behalf of HealthCare Systems; $1,143 on behalf of Project Services; $352.84 for an unknown client; and $281.13 for another unknown client. The next day, Net Pay informed its clients that it was ceasing operations. The trustee for Net Pay sought to recover the five payments, arguing that they were avoidable preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547(b). The district court concluded that four of the transfers were not subject to recovery, being below the minimum amount established by law ($5,850), and that distinct transfers may be aggregated only if “‘transactionally related’ to the same debt.” Because the IRS applied the entire $32,297 toward Altus’s trust fund tax obligations, the court held that the payment was not avoidable. The Third Circuit affirmed. Net Pay lacked an equitable interest in the Altus funds by operation of 26 U.S.C. 7501(a). View "In Re: Net Pay Solutions Inc" on Justia Law

Giant Eagle, a chain of supermarkets, pharmacies, gas stations, and convenience stores, uses the accrual method of accounting. Its customer-loyalty “fuelperks!” program links customers’ rewards at the pump to prior grocery purchases; “discounts expire on the last day of the month, 3 months after they are earned.” On its 2006 and 2007 corporate income tax returns, Giant Eagle claimed a deduction for the discounts its customers had accumulated but, at year’s end, had not yet applied to fuel purchases. Giant Eagle computed the deduction by ascertaining the face value of the discounts, multiplying that by the historical redemption rate of discounts in their expiring month, and multiplying that product by the average number of gallons purchased in a discounted fuel sale. The IRS disallowed the deductions, which totaled $3,358,226 and $313,490. The Tax Court upheld the denial. The Third Circuit reversed. Accrual method taxpayers are expressly permitted to deduct expenses before they are paid, if “all events have occurred which determine the fact of liability and the amount of such liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy.” In the realm of recurring expenses, an anticipated liability may be deemed “incurred” even if the predicate costs are not themselves incurred during the year a deduction is claimed. View "Giant Eagle Inc v. Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law

Davis and his wife purchased a Philadelphia rental property in 1997 1997. A longtime member of the U.S. Army Reserve, Davis was called to active duty in 2004. A few months later, the Davises transferred the property to Global LLC, owned and managed by Davis, to “insulate themselves from liability” because “his wife was unable to manage the property.” In 2009, Davis and Global asked the Philadelphia Department of Revenue to reduce Global’s property tax debt, citing the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. 3901, which limits interest imposed on a servicemember’s delinquent property taxes during active duty to a rate of six percent and forbids additional penalties. The Department denied this request, stating that the SCRA does not apply to a business owned by a servicemember and that Davis should file an abatement petition with the Philadelphia Tax Review Board. The Review Board denied that petition. Two years later the city initiated foreclosure proceedings; the state court entered judgment in the city’s favor. Davis and Global filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. SCRA extends only to servicemembers; a corporation is not a “servicemember” under the statute. View "Davis v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

St. Peter’s, a non-profit healthcare entity, runs a hospital, and employs over 2,800 people. It is not a church, but has ties to a New Jersey Roman Catholic Diocese. The Bishop appoints most members of its Board of Governors and retains veto authority over Board actions. The hospital has daily Mass and Catholic devotional pictures and statues throughout the building. In 1974, St. Peter’s established a non-contributory defined benefit retirement plan; operated the plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); and represented that it was complying with ERISA. In 2006 St. Peter’s filed an IRS application, seeking a church plan exemption from ERISA, 26 U.S.C. 414(e); 29 U.S.C. 1002(33), continuing to pay ERISA-mandated insurance premiums while the application was pending. In 2013, Kaplan, who worked for St. Peter’s until 1999, filed a putative class action alleging that St. Peter’s did not provide ERISA-compliant summary plan descriptions or pension benefits statements, and that, as of 2011, the plan was underfunded by more than $70 million. While the lawsuit was pending, St. Peter’s received an IRS private letter ruling. affirming the plan’s status as an exempt church plan for tax purposes. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, concluding that St. Peter’s could not establish an exempt church plan because it is not a church. View "Kaplan v. Saint Peter's Healthcare Sys." on Justia Law

The IRS received information from French authorities concerning United States persons with undisclosed bank accounts at HSBC and issued summonses to the Chabots requesting that they appear to give testimony and produce documents about their foreign bank accounts for the period from January 1, 2006, to December 31, 2009. The Chabots’ attorney notified the IRS that the Chabots would not appear, were asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and would not produce the requested documents. The IRS amended the two summonses, limiting their scope to only those documents required to be maintained under 31 C.F.R. 1010.420. The Chabots continued to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege, and the IRS filed a petition to enforce the amended summonses.The Chabots appealed the district court's grant of the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that six other circuits have held that these records fall within the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. View "United States v. Chabot" on Justia Law

Between 2007 and 2012, Fountain, an IRS employee, helped orchestrate several schemes that involved filing false tax returns, claiming refunds under the Telephone ExciseTax Refund,the First Time Homebuyer Credit, or the American Opportunity Tax Credit. Fountain employed her knowledge of IRS fraud detection to avoid detection. Fountain and Ishmael enlisted people, including Johnson, to recruit claimants to provide their personal information in exchange for part of a cash refund. A jury convicted Fountain, Ishmael, and Johnson on multiple counts of conspiracy and filing false claims to the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 286, 287. Fountain was also convicted of Hobbs Act extortion and making or presenting false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); 26 U.S.C. 7206. Additionally, Johnson was convicted of filing false claims while on pretrial release. The court sentenced Fountain to 228 months in prison and ordered her to pay $1,740,221 in restitution; sentenced Ishmael to 144 months and $1,750,809 in restitution; and sentenced Johnson to 216 months in prison and to pay $1,248,592 in restitution. Each sentence fell within the Guidelines range after various enhancements were applied. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Fountain" on Justia Law

Between 2008 and 2011, Viacom Inc. paid three senior executives more than $100 million in bonus or incentive compensation. Compensation exceeding $1 million paid by a corporation to senior executives is not normally deductible under federal tax law, but a corporate taxpayer may deduct an executive’s otherwise nondeductible compensation over $1 million if an independent committee its board of directors approves the compensation on the basis of objective performance standards and the compensation is “approved by a majority of the vote in a separate shareholder vote” before being paid. In 2007, a majority of Viacom’s voting shareholders approved such a plan. Shareholder Freedman sued, claiming that Viacom’s Board failed to comply with the terms of the Plan and that, instead of using quantitative performance measures, the Board partially based its awards on qualitative, subjective factors, destroying the basis for their tax deductibility. Freedman claimed that this caused the Board to award executives more than $36 million of excess compensation. The plan was reauthorized in 2012. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. With respect to his derivative claim, Freedman did not make a pre-suit demand to the Board or present sufficient allegations explaining why a demand would have been futile. With respect to his direct claim regarding participation by stockholders without voting rights, federal law does not confer voting rights on shareholders not otherwise authorized to vote or affect Delaware law permit ting corporations to issue shares without voting rights. View "Freedman v. Redstone" on Justia Law

Sir John Thouron died in 2007 at the age of 99, leaving a substantial estate. Thouron’s grandchildren are his only heirs. His named executor retained Smith, an experienced tax attorney. The Estate’s tax return and payment were due November 6, 2007. On that date, the Estate requested an extension of time and made a payment of $6.5 million, much less than it would ultimately owe. The Estate timely filed its return in May 2008 and requested an extension of time to pay. It made no election to defer taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6166, it had conclusively determined it did not qualify. The provision allows qualifying estates to elect to pay tax liability in installments over several years. The IRS denied as untimely the Estate’s request for an extension and notified the Estate that it was imposing a failure-to-pay penalty. The Estate unsuccessfully appealed administratively. The Estate then filed an appropriate form and paid all outstanding amounts, including a penalty of $999,072, plus accrued interest, then filed a request with the IRS for a refund. After not receiving a response from the IRS, the Estate filed a complaint, alleging that its failure to pay resulted from reasonable cause, reliance on Smith’s advice, and not willful neglect and was not subject to penalty. The district court granted the government summary judgment, holding that under Supreme Court precedent the Estate could not show reasonable cause. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the precedent did not apply to reliance on expert advice.View "Estate of Thouron v. United States" on Justia Law

New Jersey and Pennsylvania municipalities sued the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) (collectively, the Enterprises). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are federally-chartered but privately owned corporations that issue publicly traded securities, created by Congress to establish and stabilize secondary markets for residential mortgages, 12 U.S.C. 1716; 12 U.S.C. 1451. Fannie and Freddie purchase mortgages from third-party lenders, pooling them together and selling securities backed by those mortgages. In the wake of the housing market collapse of 2008, Fannie and Freddie owned many defaulted and overvalued subprime mortgages. They went bankrupt, and Congress created the FHFA to act as conservator for Fannie and Freddie. Congress exempted the Enterprises from all state and local taxation, with an exception for taxes on real property. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments that the Enterprises were not exempt from paying state and local real estate transfer taxes. The district courts dismissed. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. View "Delaware Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

In 1997, the trusts acquired all shares of AIS with an aggregate basis of $5,612,555. In 1999, the trusts formed Wind River Corporation and contributed their AIS shares in exchange for all Wind River shares. Wind River designated itself a subchapter S Corporation. In 2003, Wind River elected to treat AIS as a qualified subchapter S subsidiary. Before that election, the trusts’ aggregate adjusted basis in Wind River was $15,246,099. After the Qsub election, the trusts increased their bases in that stock to $242,481,544. The trusts sold their Wind River interests to Fox. After transaction costs, the sale yielded $230,111,857 in cash and securities in exchange for the Wind River stock. The trusts claimed a loss of $12,247,229: the difference between the amount actually received for the sale and the new basis in the Wind River stock. The trusts shareholders’ 2003 tax returns showed that capital loss. The IRS determined that a capital gain of approximately $214 million had been realized from the sale to Fox, for a cumulative tax deficiency of $33,747,858. Deficiency notices stated “the Qsub election and the resulting deemed I.R.C. 332 liquidation did not give rise to an item of income under I.R.C. 1366(a)(1)(A); therefore, [the Trusts] could not increase the basis of their [Wind River] stock under I.R.C. 1367(a)(1)(A).” The Tax Court found the increase in basis and declared loss to be improper. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Ball v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law