Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stouffer was terminated at age 41 after working eight years for the Railroad. He sued, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated (Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621), claiming that the Railroad targeted senior employees with sham workplace violations, forcing them to sign last-chance agreements that waived formal disciplinary proceedings. Stouffer called a superior a “jagoff” under his breath. In a meeting with management and his union representative, Stouffer was told he could either sign a last-chance agreement or go to a hearing and be fired. Stouffer signed a three-year last-chance agreement. Stouffer alleges that he was subsequently subject to micromanagement, surreptitious surveillance, denials of meal periods and headlamp batteries, and improperly-staffed shifts, while younger employees were not similarly treated. In 2018, Stouffer was working on a train driven by a younger driver when it ran through a switch. Stouffer was immediately terminated. The younger driver was not terminated.The district court held that Stouffer had failed to allege facts supporting the existence of a scheme that could constitute a policy hiding age-based discrimination and that Stouffer had not alleged any facts showing that the policy disparately impacted workers over the age of 40. The Third Circuit affirmed, first holding that its review was not precluded by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, because it did not require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Stouffer’s complaint lacks the necessary factual allegations as to statistical disparities. View "Stouffer v. Union Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Post-Gazette began moving to an all-digital format, which led to the termination of two paperhandlers represented by the Union. The layoffs took place during negotiations for a successor to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which, by its terms, had ended on March 31, 2017; 24 Post-Gazette employees were covered by a provision of the expired CBA that had guaranteed those employees five shifts per week “for the balance of the Agreement, ending March 31, 2017[.]” The Union filed a charge of unfair labor practices.The parties cited Supreme Court precedent interpreting the National Labor Relations Act and holding that an employer commits an unfair labor practice if, after the expiration of a CBA, the employer alters the post-expiration status quo during negotiations for a successor CBA without first negotiating with its employees to an overall impasse and that employers are privileged to make non-bargainable entrepreneurial decisions about the scope and direction of their business without bargaining with the union--the employer need only bargain about the “effects” of the decision once made. The Third Circuit remanded. The court applied “ordinary contract principles” to the expired CBA and held that the five-shift guarantee did not become part of the post-expiration status quo. That provision makes plain the guarantee was to end when the CBA expired. Under its own theory of the case, the Post-Gazette was still precluded from implementing the layoffs unless it engaged in adequate effects bargaining. View "PG Publishing Co Inc v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A project labor agreement (PLA) is a collective-bargaining agreement between a project owner, contractors, and unions, setting the terms and conditions of employment for a particular construction project. The terms can include recognizing a union as the workers’ exclusive bargaining representative and paying the workers union wages—even if they are not union members. The plaintiffs claim the project labor agreements violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Sherman Act.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims, citing lack of standing. Concreteness and particularity are two Article III standing requirements but those concrete injuries must also be actual or imminent. The contractor-plaintiffs declared they never have and never will bid on PLA-covered projects, admitting they never experienced and never will experience a compelled association or economic harm. To the extent the contractors’ declarations are a proxy for determining the actuality or imminence of harm to their employees, the contractors indicate they have not and will not bid on PLA-covered projects. The employees did not plead that they did or plan to work on PLA-covered public projects. The mere fact that the contractors claim they are “able and ready” to bid or work on PLA-covered public projects does not cure their failure to bid in the past and admitted refusal to bid. View "Associated Builders & Contractors of Western Pennsylvania v. Community College of Allegheny County" on Justia Law

Following workplace-safety regulations, Precision requires its rig hands to wear flame-retardant coveralls, steel-toed boots, hard hats, safety glasses, gloves, and earplugs. The rig hands, wanting to be paid for the time they spend changing into and out of protective gear and for the time spent walking from the rigs’ changing house to safety-meeting locations, sued Precision under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206, 207.Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers need not pay workers for traveling to and from the actual place where they perform the principal activities for which they are employed or for “activities which are preliminary to or post-liminary to said principal" activities, section 254(a). A “principal activity” is “the productive work that the employee is employed to perform” and all activities that are an "integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.” To be integral, a task must be “intrinsic” to the principal activity; it is indispensable when a worker cannot dispense with doing it “if he is to perform his principal activities.”The district court ruled that the oil-rig hands need not be paid for changing gear. The Third Circuit vacated. To determine whether changing is integral and intrinsic, the district court should consider whether workers have the option to change at home, whether changing is required by law, what kind of gear is required, and whether it is reasonably necessary for doing the work safely and well. View "Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp." on Justia Law

Local 537 scheduled a vote to disaffiliate from UWUA and formed a new union, Independent 537. UWUA learned of the impending vote and declared an emergency trusteeship over Local 537. Ninety percent of Local 537 members who cast ballots voted to disaffiliate and to make Independent their new bargaining representative. UWUA President Langford sent notices of the trusteeship to Local 537’s officers and members, stating that all money, books, and property of the Local must be handed over and that all Local Officers were removed. They did not comply. UWUA sought an injunction. The removed officers entered into a consent order and delivered Local 537’s assets.The NLRB conducted elections and certified Independent 537 as the new bargaining representative. UWUA withdrew its lawsuit, formally lifted the trusteeship, revoked Local 537’s charter, then invoked a section in its constitution permitting forfeiture of assets upon revocation of a local union’s charter and took possession of Local 537’s books, money, and property.Independent 537 sued under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 401, and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 141. The Third Circuit affirmed orders granting Independent 537 equitable distribution of Local 537’s assets but denying attorneys’ fees. UWUA breached the fiduciary duty it owed to former Local 537 members under LMRDA section 501, rendering the forfeiture provision unenforceable. Neither the UWUA constitution nor any statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees for its breach. View "Utility Workers United Association Local 537 v. Utility Workers Union of America AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

The owner and CEO of Southern Pines (Pat) recruited Kairys as Vice President of Sales to grow the company’s cryogenic trucking services. Soon after he started the job, Kairys required hip replacement surgery. Kairys had surgery and missed seven days of work. Southern was self-insured. Kairys’s surgery caused its health insurance costs to rise markedly. According to Kairys, after he returned to work, Pat’s brother (the VP) told him to “lay low” because Pat was upset. Four months later, Pat fired Kairys, claiming that Southern had “maxed out” its sales potential in cryogenic trucking. Weeks later, Souther hired a part-time worker in a hybrid role that included work that had been done by Kairys.Kairys sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and state laws. A jury rejected Kairys’s ADA and ADEA claims and returned an advisory verdict for Southern on the ERISA claim.The district court independently considered the ERISA claim and found that Kairys had proved retaliation for using ERISA-protected benefits and interfered with his right to future benefits. The court awarded Kairys $67,500 in front pay and $111, 981.79 in attorney fees. The Third Circuit affirmed. The judgment for Kairys on the ERISA claim was not inconsistent with the jury’s verdict on the other claims and was supported by sufficient evidence. View "Kairys v. Southern Pines Trucking, Inc" on Justia Law

Appellant, a fired employee, sued his former employer, alleging a pattern or practice of race discrimination against non-South Asians in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The employee had previously attempted to join another class action against the company, but after that case was stayed, he filed this suit – years after his termination. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely. In response, the employee conceded that the relevant statutes of limitations had expired, and instead, he resorted to two forms of tolling: wrong-forum and American Pipe. The district court concluded that American Pipe tolling did not allow the employee to commence a successive class action, and the employee does not contest that ruling. But the district court dismissed the complaint without considering the applicability of wrong-forum tolling.   The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether wrong-forum tolling applies and/or whether Appellant has plausibly pleaded a prima facie pattern-or-practice claim. The court explained a class plaintiff’s burden in making out a prima facie case of discrimination is different from that of an individual plaintiff “in that the former need not initially show discrimination against any particular present or prospective employee,” including himself. As a result, Appellant was not required to plead but for causation on an individual basis to avoid dismissal, given the availability of the pattern-or-practice method of proof at later stages of the case. View "Lee Williams v. Tech Mahindra Americas Inc" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law

Twelve current and former Philadelphia police officers posted highly offensive Facebook messages that glorified violence and denigrated minority groups. The posts became part of an expose by a national online news organization. The officers, who were disciplined or terminated, alleged First Amendment retaliation.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of their suit, noting that it did not condone the officers’ conduct and that the city has an interest in protecting the public’s perception of its officers. There were material factual gaps concerning when certain posts were written and by whom and which posts were the basis of the disciplinary actions. With respect to causation, there was unsubstantiated speculation about the impact of the posts, some of which had been public for years. View "Fenico v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Nitkin, a Nurse Practitioner, worked in an MLH hospital. During team meetings, the Lead Doctor would sometimes discuss inappropriate sexual topics and his substance misuse and would ask team members about their personal lives, including dating and traumatic experiences. Nitkin also recounted that the Lead Doctor made her feel uncomfortable in private; he never propositioned her for a date or stated that he wanted to have sexual relations with her. Nitkin reduced her work hours and reported his conduct. After an investigation, MLH removed the Lead Doctor from his director role and assigned Dr. Tyson. Nitkin still had to work occasionally with the Lead Doctor.Shortly after telling Tyson that she did not want to work with Lead Doctor, Nitkin received a new job offer and decided to resign. Tyson, however, indicated that Nitkin had divulged confidential information by telling him that she filed a complaint against the Lead Doctor, which was a terminable offense. According to Nitkin, she was told that, if she was terminated for violating policies, her new employer would be informed but that she could avoid that outcome by making her resignation effective immediately. Nitkin did so.Nitkin filed suit, alleging hostile work environment on the basis of sex and retaliation, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted MLH summary judgment on Nitkin’s hostile work environment and wrongful termination claims but denied it on her retaliation claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Nitkin did not demonstrate that the harassment was severe or pervasive. View "Nitkin v. Main Line Health" on Justia Law