Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Until January, 2010, Cambria County owned the nursing- rehabilitation center, subject to the Pennsylvania State Public Employee Relations Act, 43 P.S. 1101.301(1). Employees were in a union; the most recent CBA ended in December, 2008. The facility was purchased by a private company, which retained most, but not all, of the employees. Some union officials were not retained. The company refused to recognize the union. The regional office of the NLRB issued a complaint, asserting unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3), and (5) and obtained a temporary injunction requiring the company to bargain with the union, but not requiring reinstatement of the union officials. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the interim bargaining order and remanded with respect to the employees. The district court erred in abandoning a two-prong approach to Section 10(j) petitions for temporary relief in unfair labor practice situations, which requires "reasonable cause" to believe that the alleged unfair labor practice was committed and relief that is "just and proper."View "Chester v. Grane Healthcare Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white male, applied for the position of Housing Development Analyst in Newark. He was rejected because he lived in Rutherford; Newark has a residency requirement for non-uniformed employees. Plaintiff claimed the rule had a disparate impact on white, non-Hispanics because Newark's population does not reflect the racial make-up of the relevant labor market in the surrounding area. In a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1),the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city. The Third Circuit reversed. Factual issues exist as to how to define the appropriate relevant labor market. Even if the city of Newark itself is the relevant labor market, the court erred in its statistical analysis and applied an incorrect standard when analyzing the business necessity defense.

A registered nurse initiated a collective action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207 and 216(b), when they implemented a policy subjecting the pay of certain employees to an automatic meal break deduction whether or not they performed compensable work during breaks. Defendants made an offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 in the amount of "$7,500.00 in alleged unpaid wages, plus attorneys' fees, costs and expenses as determined by the Court." The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed, first noting that the FLSA does not contain conditional class certification language. The court nonetheless applied the "relation back doctrine," which allows a district court to retain jurisdiction over a matter that would appear moot after expiration of a named plaintiff's individual claims, to prevent use of a Rule 68 offer as a "sword."

Defendant began working for plaintiff in 2006 and entered into agreements that contained restrictive covenants and an arbitration provision. In 2009 defendant left the company and allegedly began acting in violation of the covenants. The company filed suit, but did not mention the arbitration clause. The district court denied the company's request for a preliminary injunction; months later, it denied the company's motion to stay pending arbitration and enjoined arbitration. The company made the demand under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2, more than 10 months after it initiated suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. The company waived the right to enforce the arbitration agreement. The existence of a contractual "no waiver" provision did not require a court to disregard the company's conduct; its failure to notify defendant of its intent to seek arbitration substantively prejudiced defendant's approach to the case. In addition to substantive legal prejudice, defendant spent considerable time and money to educate his attorney in preparation for a trial.

A Caucasian former police officer claimed that disciplinary action against him and his 1999 termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, because it was retaliation for his opposition to the city's racially discriminatory treatment of minority officers. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The Third Circuit affirmed, using the analysis from the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Staub v. Proctor Hospital. Once plaintiff established a prima facie case that his termination was motivated by his supervisor's retaliatory animus, it was the city's burden to come forward with evidence that it terminated plaintiff for reasons unrelated to the supervisor's original biased action in preferring charges against plaintiff. The jury was properly instructed that it was plaintiff's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was terminated after engaging in protected activity and that there was a causal connection between the termination and the protected activity.

The Township filed disciplinary charges against an officer, which were suspended pending state investigation, and placed him on paid leave. The state and county declined to investigate. The Township reinstituted charges. Before his hearing, the officer filed suit claiming violation of due process rights by publicizing charges and failing to provide a hearing before suspension; violation of the First Amendment by retaliating for requesting a hearing. The court granted summary judgment to the Township on due process claims, but denied summary judgment on the First Amendment claim. After a hearing, the board fired the officer. Because the officer waited until just before trial, the district court denied a motion to amend. He filed a new complaint, alleging retaliatory termination. The jury found for defendants on the First Amendment claims. The court dismissed the second suit, citing res judicata. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Res judicata does not bar claims predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial complaint. The court properly instructed jurors that the township should prevail if it showed that it would have reached the same decision absent protected conduct. The officer's interest in a hearing before suspension with pay was outweighed by the township's interest in maintaining the integrity of its police force.

In 1999 the company discharged a forklift driver and a warehouseman. An ALJ ordered reinstatement and payment for their losses, concluding that they had been subject to surveillance and discharged discriminatorily on account of their involvement in a union. The NLRB affirmed and, in 2001, the Third Circuit entered an order of enforcement. The workers did not seek reinstatement or testify concerning at a hearing on calculation of backpay. The ALJ recommended the amounts of back pay in 2002 and, in 2007, the NLRB remanded, holding that the company produced evidence of substantially equivalent jobs in the area, but that general counsel, for the employees, had not met its burden of production as to the employees' reasonable diligence to mitigate. After taking evidence on that issue, the ALJ reinstated the awards of $26,447.90 and $14,646.79. The Board affirmed. The Third Circuit entered an order to enforce the award, which was supported by substantial evidence of diligence in searching for interim employment.

The governor terminated two public employees. The district court ordered reinstatement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. After examining the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the court determined that the employees were "career service," not exempt employees, but were not "regular" employees and, therefore, did not have a protected property interest in their jobs.

A police officer was suspended for his handling of another officer's complaint against superior officers in violation of policies governing use of the computer system. A union grievance resulted in an award of back pay and benefits to the date of the award. The Office of the Inspector General issued a report several months after the incident and scheduled a hearing, which resulted in termination. After filing another union grievance, the officer was reinstated without back pay. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, first holding that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity. Under Pennsylvania law, the officer had a protected property interest in his job and, absent extraordinary circumstances, was entitled to a pre-suspension hearing, but that right was not clearly established. Prior case law could have been interpreted as indicating that the post-suspension union grievance hearing was adequate. The notice of the termination hearing was adequate, despite not identifying the specific rules allegedly violated.

The U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board affirmed a miner's award of disability benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-945. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The claim was not barred by a provision requiring filing within three years after a medical determination of total disability due to pneumoconiosis. Noting the remedial intent of the statute, the court held that denial of benefits in 1989, based on a finding that a doctor's opinion was a misdiagnosis, reset the clock. The hearing officer did not act on a âsilent presumption,â but properly evaluated doctors' reports and detailed evidence, including physical exams, pulmonary function and blood gas tests, and analyses of other possible causes, such as smoking, to support his conclusion that the miner had a chronic lung disease arising out of his exposure to coal dust from mine employment.