Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former assistant branch manager at Enterprise, filed a nationwide class action, claiming that Enterprise violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), by failing to pay required overtime wages. The district court held that the parent company, which is the sole stockholder of 38 domestic subsidiaries, was not a “joint employer,” and granted summary judgment in favor of the parent company. The Third Circuit affirmed after examining a number of factors concerning the relationship between the parent company and the direct employer. View "In Re: Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig." on Justia Law

In lieu of providing employees with a paycheck, attorney Maynard paid cash, requiring that employees endorse an unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment. After receiving a cash remuneration in 1996, one employee refused to endorse the paycheck. Maynard firex her for noncompliance. At a hearing before the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, the employee testified that she needed a signed paycheck to apply for government financial assistance. She had never shared this information with Maynard before the hearing. The district court held that Maynard's order was unreasonable and that the resulting termination was in violation of the VI Wrongful Discharge Act, which permits termination of an employee who wilfully and intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, and instructions of the employer, and awarded back pay. The Third Circuit reversed. The lower court erred by considering the employee's individual needs in determining reasonableness of the order. View "Maynard v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a maintenance director, had a stroke and began leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 612(a)(1) in January 2008. He received disability benefits from Unum. The doctor cleared him to return to work starting on May 1, with conditions that he not work more than four hours per day or lift loads in excess of 20 pounds. The administrator notified plaintiff that part-time work was not available. The doctor cleared him to work full-time, but did not change the lifting restriction. On April 20, the employer terminated plaintiff's employment and notified him that he would not be rehired with lifting restrictions. Until July 2008, when the restrictions were lifted, he received benefits from Unum. The district court rejected claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and the FMLA. The Third Circuit affirmed. The FMLA does not require an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to facilitate return to an equivalent position following leave. Entitlement to restoration requires that the employee be able to perform essential job functions without accommodation. Having represented to Unum that he was disabled, plaintiff was estopped from claiming that he was able to perform all essential functions. View "Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC" on Justia Law

Assistant managers at Rite Aid stores in Maryland and Ohio joined a nationwide opt-in action in a Pennsylvania federal court, seeking back pay for misclassification of assistant managers as overtime-exempt (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b)). One of them (Fisher) then initiated an F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3) class action lawsuit in the District of Maryland, seeking damages for alleged misclassification under Maryland laws. Following dismissal without prejudice under the "first-filed" rule, Fisher refiled in Pennsylvania, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Another plaintiff initiated a class action in the District of Northern Ohio seeking damages for alleged misclassification under the Ohio Act, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The case was transferred to Pennsylvania based on the forum selection clause in the employment contract. The Pennsylvania district court dismissed, holding that state law is not preempted, but that Rule 23 opt-out class actions based on state laws paralleling the FLSA are incompatible with the opt-in procedure under the FLSA, which was designed to prevent litigation through representative action. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to preemption, but reversed with respect to inherent incompatibility. View "Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action against their former employer, Siemens, and its retirement plans, claiming violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in refusing to provide permanent job separation (PJS) pension benefits when Siemens terminated their employment. The Third Circuit reversed in part and directed entry of judgment in favor of Siemens on all issues. By their plain terms, the Siemens plans do not provide for PJS benefits. Siemens did not establish an ERISA section 204 "transition" plan by virtue of 13-day arrangement in 1998 that was part of Siemens' purchase of a business unit from Westinghouse, nor was Siemens obligated to provide PJS benefits under section 208, based on the purchase from Westinghouse. View "Shaver v. Siemens Corp." on Justia Law

In 1988, plaintiff began working for Lawrence County; her supervisor was Mancino. Plaintiff has health problems and missed work frequently. According to plaintiff, Mancino expressed dissatisfaction with her absences and, in 2004, put her on a six-month probationary period. Mancino claims that he did not have authority to terminate plaintiff, but that his supervisor authorized him to do so after the probationary period. The district court dismissed some claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Const. Stat. 951, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The county settled the Rehabilitation Act claim and plaintiff conceded the PHRA claim against Mancino. On the FMLA claim against Mancino, the district court held that, while the FMLA permits individual liability against supervisors at public agencies, an individual supervisor is an "employer" for FMLA purposes only if he has sufficient control over conditions and terms of employment. Because Mancino lacked final authority to fire plaintiff, he did not have sufficient control. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that a rational jury could find that Mancino had sufficient control to qualify as an employer under the FMLA. View "Haybarger v. Mancino" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board determined that five assistant residential program managers at a facility that provides residential and other services to at-risk juveniles were not "supervisors" (29 U.S.C. 2(3), 152(3)) and could participate in a unionizing vote. The Third Circuit upheld the determination. The employer did not establish that the five were directly responsible for supervision of others or exercise independent judgment.View "Mars Home For Youth v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a bookkeeper, part-time receptionist, and house-cleaner, developed reflexive sympathetic dystrophy after she fell. After reducing her hours, she stopped working in April 2008. Her application for disability benefits and SSI was denied in June 2008. In June 2009, she had a hearing before an ALJ, who denied her applications, finding that she was not disabled because she had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with certain limitations and that jobs meeting those criteria were available. Eight months later, the Appeals Council denied review. The district court held that the ALJ's RFC determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the ALJ adequately explained the decision and properly relied on a 2008 report by the state agency medical consultant. View "Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

An employee, injured on the job, returned to work and presented a specialist's note, restricting her lifting. After five days her supervisor told her that her restrictions made it impossible for her to work and advised her to seek permanent disability. She submitted copies of additional doctors' notes in an effort to be reinstated, but the company concluded that the notes contained conflicting dates, contradictory answers on whether the medical condition was work related, ambiguities about the employee's ability to lift, and illegible content. The employee did not respond to requests for clarification, but filed a Workers' Compensation lawsuit and contacted the EEOC. She then filed suit, and, during discovery, turned over new copies of the notes. After plaintiff failed to produce originals at trial, there was conflicting testimony about the existence and location of originals. The district court declared a mistrial. Plaintiff sent the original notes to the court five days later. The court dismissed the case with prejudice, based on spoliation of evidence. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. It is not clear that plaintiff intentionally withheld the documents or that the company suffered severe harm. View "Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

The municipalities that make up the fire protection district had populations that were 69.6% Hispanic, 22.9% white, and 3.4% African-American. In 2008, the district employed 302 firefighters: 240 whites, 58 Hispanics, and two African-Americans. When this litigation began, the district sought to fill 35 to 40 new firefighter positions. Six Hispanic applicants earned passing scores on the firefighter exam and satisfied a residency requirement. Based on their scores they ranked 21, 25, 26, 45, 49, and 70 on the residents-only list. They would rank much lower if non-residents were included on the same list. The NAACP successfully sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that the residency requirement was invalid as having a disparate impact on African-American applicants. The fire district and the Hispanic applicants appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting the district's claims of concerns about impact on Hispanic applicants.View "Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue" on Justia Law