Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Montone was an officer with the Jersey City Police Department from 1981 until 2010, when she retired as a sergeant. Plaintiffs are present or former sergeants in the JCPD. The plaintiffs claim that retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights and discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New Jersey state law, was the basis of their failure to be promoted from the rank of sergeant to lieutenant during Healy’s tenure as mayor and Troy’s tenure as police chief. Healy’s mayoral campaign was heated and personal. Plaintiffs claim that all promotions from sergeant to lieutenant were halted by Healy and Troy to penalize Montone for her support of Healy’s opponent. Each plaintiff had passed the civil service examination required to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained concerning defendants’ motivations for their decisions. View "Montone v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

Freeman worked at PPG until his firing in 2008; PGW subsequently assumed PPG’s liabilities. PPG maintains a 40 percent interest in PGW. After losing his job, Freeman, age 60, sued PGW under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The parties entered a binding arbitration agreement, listing three potential arbitrators. Lally-Green, a law school teacher, formerly a state judge, appeared at the top of both lists. Lally-Green acknowledged that she “knew some people at PPG” and had taught a seminar with a PPG attorney. The parties proceeded with Lally-Green as their arbitrator. The proceeding was fair and thorough. Lally-Green concluded that Freeman lost his job because he “had limited recent sales experience ... [and] received average performance ratings in a poorly performing region.” Three months later, Freeman moved to vacate the decision, claiming that Lally-Green had failed to disclose campaign contributions that she had received from PPG and its employees during her campaign for a seat on the state’s highest court. These contributions totaled $4,500. Lally-Green had raised $1.7 million during her unsuccessful campaign. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the law firm representing Freeman had contributed $26,000 to Lally-Green’s campaign. View "Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC" on Justia Law

Knoll filed suit following her termination from the city Parks Department, alleging gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 951. The district court dismissed the gender discrimination claim; the jury returned a verdict in favor of Allentown on the harassment and retaliation claims. Following Knoll’s unsuccessful motions for a new trial and for sanctions, the court concluded that the motions were frivolous but declined to order sanctions. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the court was not required to engage in a six-factor analysis before dismissal of a post-trial motion, based on procedural noncompliance. View "Knoll v. City of Allentown" on Justia Law

Burton founded and ran companies that manufactured and distributed medical device parts. By 2006, the companies employed approximately 140 people and generated annual revenue of $14 million. In 2007, Burton sold to Teleflex and entered into a two-year employment agreement with Teleflex, providing that she could terminate her employment by providing 30 days’ written notice. Teleflex could fire Burton without cause by providing 30 days’ written notice or could fire Burton for cause, upon written notice and an opportunity to cure. Burton, then age 67, became Vice President of New Business Development, supervised by Boarini. The two had a strained relationship. During an argument, Burton asked Boarini whether he wanted her to resign. There is evidence that she stated that she was resigning, stayed out of the office for two days, then left on a previously-scheduled vacation, after which SMD “accepted” her resignation in writing. The district court granted Telefex summary judgment on claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and state law. The Third Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of fact on whether Burton resigned. View "Burton v. Teleflex Inc." on Justia Law

Araujo, who worked for New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, witnessed a fatal accident in 2008, when a construction worker was electrocuted on the job. He reported an emotional injury and was later suspended for violation of a rule relating to the accident. He filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety & Health Administration Office of Whistleblower Protection, which issued findings in favor of Araujo, and ordered NJT to pay $569,587 in damages, to which NJT objected. Araujo then filed suit, alleging that he was disciplined in retaliation for his participation in an activity protected by the Federal Rail Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109, in reporting his injury. The district court found that the discipline was not retaliatory and granted NJT summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that NJT failed to refute Araujo’s assertion that his actions were in line with NJT practice at the time of the accident. View "Araujo v. NJ Transit Rail Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

The school district hired Connelly as a teacher. Connelly had nine years of teaching experience, all in Maryland. Because Connelly acquired his teaching experience outside Pennsylvania, the district credited him with only one year. Other new teachers with like experience acquired within Pennsylvania (but not in the district) received at least partial credit for each year they had taught. Connelly’s initial annual salary was $38,023, which was substantially less than the $49,476 Connelly alleged he would have received with full credit for his experience. Connelly‘s initial salary determination continued to adversely affect his pay. In 2011 Connelly filed suit, asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983: that failure to fully credit his out-of-state teaching experience violated his right to interstate travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and denied him equal protection of the law. The district court dismissed, holding that the classification alleged is based on location of teaching experience, not residency. The Third Circuit affirmed, applying rational basis review. A school district may rationally place a premium on teachers who have more experience working within the Pennsylvania school system in order to achieve the legitimate goal of an efficient and effective public education system. View "Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 1996, Mandel was hired by M&Q. She claims that, throughout her employment, she was sexually harassed and discriminated against by male managers, supervisors, and owners. In 2007, during a meeting, a manager became angry, repeatedly called Mandel a “bitch,” and screamed “shut the fuck up.” As a result, Mandel resigned; she then accepted another position. In her resignation, Mandel did not complain of harassment or discrimination, apparently concerned she would be denied her vacation time. Although Mandel complained about being told to make coffee, she did not complain about other alleged incidents. Mandel testified that she understood policies in the employee handbook but felt uncomfortable going to the named managers. Mandel occasionally used profanity and sent emails containing sexual humor, but was never disciplined. The EEOC dismissed her request for charges. Mandel sued, alleging discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation (42 U.S.C. 2000e), violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted M&Q summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the retaliation, PHRA, and Title VII sex discrimination claims, but reversed on the hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims.View "Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp" on Justia Law

Sandy, hearing and speech impaired, applied to work as a grocery store cashier and stocker. As part of the application, Sandy took a Customer Service Assessment created by Kronos and received a score of 40%. Kroger relied, in part, on the Assessment in deciding not to hire Sandy, who filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a third-party administrative subpoena to Kronos, denied a petition to revoke the subpoena, and, after Kronos failed to provide requested information, filed a motion to enforce the subpoena in district court, which limited the scope of the subpoena. The Third Circuit reversed geographic and temporal restrictions, and restrictions related to job description, and affirmed refusal to allow discovery into racial discrimination. On remand, the district court expanded the scope of its original order, but again limited disclosure of information related to the Kronos tests and foundt entered a modified version of the confidentiality order. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of how specific limitations are tied to Kronos’s justifiable fears regarding disclosure of proprietary information and for individualized determination of whether costs of production under the expanded subpoena are outside the scope of what Kronos can reasonably expect as the cost of doing business. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kronos, Inc" on Justia Law

Wal-Mart cleaning crew members sought compensation for unpaid overtime and certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, civil damages under RICO, and damages for false imprisonment. The workers, illegal immigrants who took jobs with contractors and subcontractors Wal-Mart engaged to clean its stores, alleged: Wal-Mart had hiring and firing authority over them and closely directed their actions such that Wal-Mart was their employer under the FLSA; Wal-Mart took part in a RICO enterprise by transporting and harboring illegal immigrants, encouraging illegal immigration, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and involuntary servitude (18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(F)); Wal-Mart‘s practice of locking some stores at night and on weekends, without always having a manager available with a key, constituted false imprisonment. Over eight years and multiple opinions, the district court rejected final certification of an FLSA class and rejected the RICO and false imprisonment claims on several grounds, and rejected the false imprisonment claim on the merits. The Third Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs were not “similarly situated” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 626(b). View "Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Lichtenstein began working with UPMC in 2005. Although Lichtenstein received a merit-based raise in October 2007, from October through December, she was tardy six times, absent twice, and requested changes to her schedule several times after the deadline for requesting changes had passed. Lichtenstein was scheduled to work a 16-hour shift on December 1. Co-workers complained that Lichtenstein was planning to call-off because she needed the day off to do school work or attend a concert. Although her supervisor denied a request for the day off, Lichtenstein called off, alleging she was sick. On December 30th, according to time logs, Lichtenstein arrived hours late and departed several hours early. On January 3, 2008 Lichtenstein’s mother was rushed to the hospital after collapsing from a sudden excruciating pain. Lichtenstein followed UPMC procedures for calling off sick. On January 10, Lichtenstein’s employment was terminated. The district court rejected her claim under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The Third Circuit vacated. Genuine factual disputes exist about whether Lichtenstein‘s notice of unforeseeable FMLA leave was adequate, whether her invocation of FMLA rights was a factor precipitating termination, and whether UPMC’s proffered justification for its action was mere pretext for retaliation. View "Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr." on Justia Law