Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The NLRB Regional Director brought charges of unfair labor practices against Somerset Valley. While administrative proceedings were pending, the NLRB brought a petition under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), seeking to prevent Somerset Valley from engaging in behavior that violates the Act and to reinstate certain employees. The district court enjoined Somerset Valley from interfering with its employees associating with the labor union and required reinstatement of two discharged employees. The court refused to order Somerset Valley to reinstate two other employees or to order rescission of notices of discipline filed against certain employees. Before the merits of the parties’ cross-appeals were briefed, the NLRB issued a decision that rendered the temporary injunctive relief moot. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal and remanded with instructions to vacate the prior order. Neither party has relinquished its challenge to that order; vacating the order protects the parties from any adverse legal consequences of that unreviewed opinion. View "Lightner v. 1621 Route 22 West Operating Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued their employer on behalf of themselves and “similarly situated” individuals, alleging that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, by failing to ensure that they were paid for time worked during meal breaks. Notice was directed to potential collective-action members, and individuals opted into the lawsuit. FLSA collective actions are subject to “opt-ins,” unlike class actions under FRCP 23, under which those not wishing to be included must “opt out” after the class is certified. After preliminary discovery, the district court dismissed the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice; at the request of the remaining plaintiffs, the court dismissed remaining claims with prejudice to enable appellate review. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the named plaintiffs lack final orders appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Plaintiffs attempted to short-circuit the procedure for appealing an interlocutory order that is separate from, and unrelated to, the merits of the case. They could have obtained review of the decertification order by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of their individual or could have asked the trial court to certify their interlocutory orders for appeal. View "Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Medical Ctr." on Justia Law

On behalf of themselves and former and current bus drivers and trolley operators (collectively, the Operators) employed by SEPTA, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the plaintiffs filed a purported class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, to recover unpaid wages and overtime compensation for work performed during morning “pre-trip” inspections required before the start of each daily run. The district court dismissed on the ground that the FLSA claim required the interpretation of provisions of collective bargaining agreements between SEPTA and the unions representing the Operators and was, therefore, subject to those agreements’ grievance and arbitration provisions. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the FLSA claim does not require the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements; the Operators based their claims solely on their statutory, rather than their contractual, rights to recovery, View "Bell v. SE PA Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

After leaving coal mining, Eckman sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901, in 1985. An ALJ awarded benefits in 1993; the Benefits Review Board affirmed the decision. Marmon paid benefits to Eckman until his 2002 death; his widow, Ethel, sought benefits as a dependent survivor. An ALJ denied the claim in 2005, finding that although Eckman had pneumoconiosis, Ethel failed to prove that his death was due to the disease. The Board affirmed. After Congress enacted the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, and amended the BLBA, Ethel filed a new claim. A Department of Labor district director awarded benefits. An ALJ upheld the award, finding that Ethel satisfied the familial relationship and dependency criteria for survivors under the BLBA and that, based on Eckman’s lifetime disability award and the filing date of Ethel’s claim, Ethel was entitled to benefits under section 932(l), as amended by the ACA. The Board affirmed. The Third Circuit denied the coal company’s petition for review, noting that in Ethel’s second claim, the cause of death was not at issue, her entitlement to benefits turned primarily on an administrative fact: whether her husband had been awarded benefits. View "Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir. Office of Workers Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers stopped and frisked men they believed to be engaged in an illegal drug transaction. One of the men, Artis, accused the officers of stealing money. When the officers returned to headquarters, they learned that a complaint had been made to the Internal Affairs Bureau, and were taken to an office. They did not feel free to leave.They were joined by other superior officers and instructed to stay in the office and not use their cell phones. The officers obeyed instructions to remove their jackets and to pull out their pockets, pull up their pant legs and pull down their socks, and open their wallets, because they feared discipline and possible loss of employment. Internal Affairs officers questioned them for 15-20 minutes, then spoke to Artis, then stated that they believed Artis and told the officers that they were not needed for anything further. When they opened their lockers, it appeared that they had been searched. About 14 months later, the officers sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed. When police administrators undertake employment-related, non-criminal detentions, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure; the searches were reasonable. View "Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

The NLRB certified a union and ordered an election. The union won a majority. The company refused to bargain. The union claimed unfair labor practices. A three-member NLRB delegee group granted the union summary judgment. The NLRB is composed of up to five members, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, 29 U.S.C. 153(a) and may delegate its authority to any group of three or more members. Delegee groups must maintain a membership of three.The company unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the group’s order was not issued until it was mailed, by which time one member had resigned and the panel had only two members. The company then argued that the reconsideration order group was improperly constituted because one panelist was a recess appointee whose term concluded at the end of the Senate‘s 2011 session, which, it contended, was 13 days before the order issued. The NLRB denied the second motion. The company next argued that the group that issued the second order included two members that were invalidly appointed under the Recess Appointments Clause while the Senate was not in recess, reasoning that if the Senate‘s session ended when it began using pro forma sessions, the term of one member had expired; if the session did not end then, the president‘s recess appointments were invalidly made while the Senate was not in recess. The NLRB denied the motion. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the Recess of the Senate in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only intersession breaks; the panel lacked the requisite number of members because one panel member was invalidly appointed during an intrasession break. View "New Vista Nursing & Rehab. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In the 1960s, the founder’s sons (plaintiff and his brothers) joined the business, later incorporated as MBP. The business grew to have annual sales of $60 million. Plaintiff served as vice-president, secretary, and a member of the board of directors, and was a shareholder. Plaintiff had a “spiritual awakening” in 1995. He claims that the change resulted in antagonism toward him. Plaintiff delivered a eulogy at his father’s 2009 funeral, which upset family members. Days later, plaintiff received notice of termination of his employment and that various benefits would cease. The letter explained that “[y]our share of any draws from the corporation or other entities will continue to be distributed to you.” Plaintiff continued on the board of directors until August, 2009, when the shareholders did not re-elect him. Plaintiff filed charges of religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and of hostile work environment. The district court dismissed, finding that he was not an employee under Title VII and did not establish existence of a hostile work environment. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that it was clear that plaintiff was entitled to participate in development and governance of the business. View "Mariotti. v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Cambria County owned and operated Laurel Crest Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, which was subject to Pennsylvania labor law. In 2010 Grane bought Laurel Crest, and established a new entity, Cambria Care, to serve as its operator. Because Grane and Cambria are private employers, labor relations at the facility became subject to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151. Prior to the transfer, most Laurel Crest employees applied to work at Cambria Care, and the majority were hired. Grane, however, did not hire four of the five Local 1305 officers or an employee who had participated in the union’s public activities opposing the sale. Grane and Cambria Care refused to recognize or bargain with the unions. The National Labor Relations Board found that the companies violated NLRA provisions prohibiting employers from refusing to bargain collectively with their employees‘ representatives and from not hiring applicants based on their union membership or activity. The Third Circuit granted the Board‘s petition for enforcement. View "Grane Health Care v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Union submitted three grievances on behalf of Company employee and Union member Lubik, alleging that the company violated a past practice by failing to schedule Lubik, a maintenance clerk, for Saturday overtime when the maintenance department was scheduled to work. After the Arbitrator sustained the three grievances and ordered the company to pay Lubik back wages for the missed overtime. The district court vacated the award because it concluded that the award did not draw its essence from the Collective Bargaining Agreement, determining that the plain language of the CBA unambiguously‖ gave the company the exclusive right to schedule its workforce. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered enforcement of the arbitration award. View "Akers Nat'l Roll Co. v. United Steel, Paper & Forest,Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

Wiest worked in Tyco’s accounting department for 31 years, until his termination in 2010. Beginning in 2007, Wiest refused to process reimbursement claims that he believed were unlawful or constituted “parties” at resorts. Wiest sued Tyco and its officers and directors under the whistleblower protection provisions in Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1514A, and under Pennsylvania law. The district court dismissed the federal whistleblower claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that the court erred in requiring that Wiest allege that his communications to his supervisors “definitively and specifically relate to” an existing violation of a particular anti-fraud law, as opposed to expressing a reasonable belief that corporate managers are taking actions that could run afoul of a particular anti-fraud law. View "Wiest v. Lynch" on Justia Law