Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bala, a unionized signal repairman, has worked for PATH since 1990. Signal repairmen of Bala’s seniority get 12.5 paid holidays and 23 paid vacation days per year. Separate from holidays and vacations, Bala took more than 600 sick and personal days through 2008. In 2007, Bala took 82 sick days, compared to the 17 days of sick leave per year typically taken by PATH’s unionized signalmen. PATH warned that if his attendance did not improve formal disciplinary action might be taken. On June 22, 2008, Bala experienced back pain while at home. The next day, Bala’s physician ordered him off work through July. PATH notified Bala of a hearing regarding his absenteeism. After that hearing, PATH suspended Bala for up to six days, without pay. Bala filed a complaint with the U.S. Secretary of Labor, alleging that the suspension was retaliation for taking statutorily protected sick leave, in violation of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20101. The Review Board held that PATH violated the Act, which prohibits railroads from disciplining employees “for following orders or a treatment plan of a treating physician.” The Third Circuit reversed, holding that only physicians’ orders which stem from on-duty injuries are covered. View "Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Co v. Sec'y, Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Ricketti, a podiatrist, hired Plishchuk as an associate. In addition to his own practice, Ricketti treated patients at Restorix wound care center. Ricketti regularly sent Plishchuk to Restorix to treat patients. Ricketti terminated Plishchuk’s employment for allegedly failing to comply with regulatory requirements. Plishchuk continued treating Ricketti’s patients at Restorix. After Plishchuk stopped treating patients, Restorix allegedly prevented Ricketti from practicing there. Ricketti sued Plishchuk, claiming breaches of contract, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the duty of loyalty; tortious interference with economic advantage; and conversion, but did not join Restorix, nor inform the court that they should have been joined. The parties settled. Ricketti filed another suit naming Restorix and its manager, without Plishchuk, alleging the same causes of action and facts. The court dismissed, holding that the entire controversy doctrine barred Ricketti’s second suit. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for evaluation of the party joinder issue under the summary judgment standard. The court should enter judgment for defendants on those grounds only if it finds that this is a successive action, that failure to disclose defendants as potentially liable parties in the Plishchuk action was inexcusable, and that this omission substantially prejudiced defendants. View "Ricketti v. Barry" on Justia Law

When Khazin began working for TD, he signed an employment agreement and agreed to arbitrate all disputes. Khazin was responsible for due diligence on financial products offered by TD . When he discovered that one product was priced in a manner noncompliant with securities regulations, he reported to his supervisor, Demmissie, and recommended changing the price. Demmissie instructed Khazin to analyze the “revenue impact,” which revealed that remedying the violation would save customers $2,000,000, but would cost TD $1,150,000 and negatively impact Demmissie’s divisions. Demmissie allegedly told Khazin not to correct the problem. Demmissie and TD’s human resources department later confronted Khazin about a purported billing irregularity that, he claims, was unrelated to his duties and nonexistent. His employment was terminated. Khazin sued, asserting violation of the Dodd-Frank Act, premised on the allegation that he had been terminated in retaliation for “whistleblowing.” Khazin contended that the Act prevented TD from compelling the arbitration of his whistleblower retaliation claim, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)(2). The district court held that the provision did not prohibit enforcement of arbitration agreements executed before Dodd-Frank was passed. The Third Circuit concluded that Khazin’s whistleblower claim is subject to arbitration because it is not covered by the restrictions. View "Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp" on Justia Law

The H-2B visa program allows U.S. employers to seek admission of foreign workers to perform temporary unskilled non-agricultural work by demonstrating that the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 1182 (a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(II). The employer must obtain certification from the Department of Labor (DOL) that: qualified workers are not available at the “prevailing wage” in the U.S. to perform the employment in question, and the aliens’ employment will not adversely affect wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. DOL has often changed its method for calculating prevailing wages without giving notice or an opportunity to comment and without explanation. Opponents challenged 20 C.F.R. 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance, which authorized use of privately-funded surveys to set the prevailing wage for certain occupations. A district court ruled in favor of the opponents. Following notice and comment, DOL announced the 2011 Wage Rule, but has continued to use the 2009 Guidance, having postponed the 2011 Rule’s effective date because it was subject to congressional appropriations riders precluding its implementation. The district court dismissed a challenge. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the case was ripe and that the 2009 Guidance was arbitrary and violated the APA. View "Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajad v. Perez" on Justia Law

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

Gonzalez sued his former employer, the Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor, a bi-state instrumentality of New Jersey and New York that was created in 1953 to investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity in the Port of New York-New Jersey. He sought to enjoin disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Commission as a violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the First Amendment. The Commission had determined that Gonzalez, an employee (detective) since 1999 had made false statement in an affidavit concerning another employee’s discrimination suit. The district court denied Gonzalez’s motion and ultimately stayed and administratively terminated the suit, finding that the Younger abstention doctrine precluded federal interference with the ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, clarifying the abstention inquiry and defining the outer boundaries of the abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the decision to abstain was appropriate under the Sprint decision. View "Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of NY Harbor" on Justia Law

Ross joined Continental, a South Carolina tire manufacturer in 2008 and, in 2011, became District Manager. He reported to Gilhuly and worked from his Philadelphia home, independently setting his travel schedule and work priorities. Ross was responsible for a major customer, Reliable Tire. Gilhuly began receiving negative comments from Reliable’s owner, Betz, regarding Ross. Betz asked that Ross be taken off of Reliable’s account. Gilhuly was also unhappy with Ross’s presentations at meetings. In 2011, Gilhuly reported Ross’s deficiencies to the Human Resources Department, and began developing a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Ross prepared a six-month plan of action that acknowledged his deficiencies. Less than a month after the PIP was implemented, Ross forwarded a letter from his doctor, indicating that he had been diagnosed with prostate cancer. Ross was granted Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, leave, during which he received regular compensation and benefits. His PIP remained “pending.” A month after Ross returned from leave, Gilhuly sent him a memo, acknowledging that progress had been made and extending the PIP for 60 days. Ross filed suit against Gilhuly and Continental, alleging interference with his FMLA rights and retaliation. While the suit was pending, Gilhuly sent a memo, indicating that Ross was still not meeting expectations, with 12 pages of explanation. Continental terminated Ross’s employment. The district court rejected his suit on summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that Ross received all to which he was entitled under the FMLA, and suffered no adverse employment consequences for doing so.View "Ross v. Gilhuly" on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement provides that Teaneck police officers work regularly recurring work periods so that they work an average of 39.25 hours per week over the course of a calendar year. Officers work under either a "Six and Three" plan (six eight-hour tours over six consecutive days, then three consecutive days off) or a "Five and Two" plan (five eight-hour tours over five consecutive days with two consecutive days off). If an officer performs work in excess of normal hours in any tour of duty, that work is considered overtime which is compensated at a rate of time and one-half; overtime pay accrues in blocks based on the amount of time worked after a regular tour. The CBA provides for "muster time," 10 minutes before and 10 minutes at the end of their tours, so that for each eight-hour tour, officers may work eight hours and 20 minutes. On any given day, officers may work less than that depending on the length of the post-tour muster; officers are still given credit for the full eight hours and 20 minutes. There is no policy requiring that uniformed officers don or doff their uniform at Police Headquarters. Officers claimed violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, by failing to pay proper overtime; provide compensation for muster time; and provide compensation for time spent putting on and taking off uniforms. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed.View "Rosano v. Township of Teaneck" on Justia Law

In 2008, Budhun was hired by BHP. About 60 percent of her job was typing. She had received a final warning for tardiness, making her ineligible for transfer within the organization. Budhun took four weeks of Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2691, leave early in 2010. Budhun broke a bone in her hand in July 2010, unrelated to her job. Budhun returned some FMLA paperwork 10 days later, attaching a doctor's note, dated August 10, and stating that she could return to work on August 16, “No restrictions in splint.” Budhun returned to work, submitted the leave form, and stated that certification would arrive from the doctor in several days. There was a dispute about whether she could return to work if she could not type at full speed; the doctor’s statement was unclear. BHP extended FMLA leave until September 23, when her FMLA leave was exhausted, and approved non-FMLA leave through November 9. When she did not return after FMLA leave, BHP offered her position to another. Budhun was not eligible to transfer to another position. She was on leave, with benefits, through November 9, when BHP considered her to have voluntarily resigned. Budhun sued, alleging FMLA interference and retaliation. The court entered summary judgment for BHP, stating that Budhun suffered no adverse employment action because she was medically unable to return to work after her FMLA leave, and that Budhun could not establish any nexus between her termination and her FMLA leave, having been terminated months later. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the adverse employment action occurred when Budhun was replaced. View "Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The cases on appeal are among several similar actions brought by a single law firm alleging systemic underpayment in the healthcare industry in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, Pennsylvania law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001,and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961. Nurses and other patient-care professionals, on behalf of a putative class, claimed that their employers maintained unlawful timekeeping and pay policies: under the “Meal Break Deduction Policy,” the timekeeping system automatically deducted 30 minutes of pay daily for meal breaks without ensuring that the employees actually received a break; under the “Unpaid Pre- and Post-Schedule Work Policy,” the employees were prohibited from recording time worked outside of their scheduled shifts; under the “Unpaid Training Policy,” employees were not paid for time spent at “compensable” training sessions. The district court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The overtime claim was factually inadequate: the plaintiffs “failed to allege a single specific instance in which a named Plaintiff worked overtime and was not compensated for this time.” View "Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law