Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a fired employee, sued his former employer, alleging a pattern or practice of race discrimination against non-South Asians in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The employee had previously attempted to join another class action against the company, but after that case was stayed, he filed this suit – years after his termination. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely. In response, the employee conceded that the relevant statutes of limitations had expired, and instead, he resorted to two forms of tolling: wrong-forum and American Pipe. The district court concluded that American Pipe tolling did not allow the employee to commence a successive class action, and the employee does not contest that ruling. But the district court dismissed the complaint without considering the applicability of wrong-forum tolling.   The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether wrong-forum tolling applies and/or whether Appellant has plausibly pleaded a prima facie pattern-or-practice claim. The court explained a class plaintiff’s burden in making out a prima facie case of discrimination is different from that of an individual plaintiff “in that the former need not initially show discrimination against any particular present or prospective employee,” including himself. As a result, Appellant was not required to plead but for causation on an individual basis to avoid dismissal, given the availability of the pattern-or-practice method of proof at later stages of the case. View "Lee Williams v. Tech Mahindra Americas Inc" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law

Twelve current and former Philadelphia police officers posted highly offensive Facebook messages that glorified violence and denigrated minority groups. The posts became part of an expose by a national online news organization. The officers, who were disciplined or terminated, alleged First Amendment retaliation.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of their suit, noting that it did not condone the officers’ conduct and that the city has an interest in protecting the public’s perception of its officers. There were material factual gaps concerning when certain posts were written and by whom and which posts were the basis of the disciplinary actions. With respect to causation, there was unsubstantiated speculation about the impact of the posts, some of which had been public for years. View "Fenico v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Nitkin, a Nurse Practitioner, worked in an MLH hospital. During team meetings, the Lead Doctor would sometimes discuss inappropriate sexual topics and his substance misuse and would ask team members about their personal lives, including dating and traumatic experiences. Nitkin also recounted that the Lead Doctor made her feel uncomfortable in private; he never propositioned her for a date or stated that he wanted to have sexual relations with her. Nitkin reduced her work hours and reported his conduct. After an investigation, MLH removed the Lead Doctor from his director role and assigned Dr. Tyson. Nitkin still had to work occasionally with the Lead Doctor.Shortly after telling Tyson that she did not want to work with Lead Doctor, Nitkin received a new job offer and decided to resign. Tyson, however, indicated that Nitkin had divulged confidential information by telling him that she filed a complaint against the Lead Doctor, which was a terminable offense. According to Nitkin, she was told that, if she was terminated for violating policies, her new employer would be informed but that she could avoid that outcome by making her resignation effective immediately. Nitkin did so.Nitkin filed suit, alleging hostile work environment on the basis of sex and retaliation, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted MLH summary judgment on Nitkin’s hostile work environment and wrongful termination claims but denied it on her retaliation claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Nitkin did not demonstrate that the harassment was severe or pervasive. View "Nitkin v. Main Line Health" on Justia Law

Current or former Uber drivers from different states agreed to Uber’s “Technology Services Agreement” as a condition of using Uber’s platform. The agreement requires drivers to resolve disputes with Uber on an individual basis through final and binding arbitration. Drivers may opt-out by sending Uber an email or letter. Singh’s class action alleged Uber had violated New Jersey wage and hour laws by misclassifying drivers as independent contractors, failing to pay them the minimum wage, and failing to reimburse them for business expenses. Calabrese’s class action, which was joined to Singh’s, sought to proceed collectively under the Fair Labor Standards Act.The district court ruled in Uber’s favor, compelling arbitration, having defined the relevant class as Uber drivers nationwide. The court found that interstate "rides constitute just 2% of all rides, resemble in character the other 98% of rides, and likely occur due to the happenstance of geography” for purposes of the exception in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) for arbitration agreements contained in the “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” 9 U.S.C. 1. The Third Circuit affirmed. The drivers' work is centered on local transportation. Most Uber drivers have never made an interstate trip. When Uber drivers do cross state lines, they do so only incidentally. They are not “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” View "Singh v. Uber Technologies, Inc" on Justia Law

In 2014, National Park Service (NPS) entered a contract with Perini to perform work on Ellis Island and hired Jacobs to provide contract management services on that contract. Jacobs assigned Weber to the project. Weber observed what he believed to be discrepancies between Perini’s work and its billing practices and disclosed those discrepancies to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which concluded that there was no misconduct. In 2015, the NPS informed Jacobs that it would not extend its contract, purportedly because there was not enough work. Weber told OIG that he believed NPS’s decision was due to his reports and that he feared Jacobs would not retain him. Jacobs ultimately discharged Weber, who filed an OIG complaint in December 2015. In April 2016, Weber agreed to, an extension of OIG’s 180-day statutory deadline to complete its investigation. In February 2017, beyond the 360-day extended deadline, OIG completed and transmitted its report, with redacted copies to Weber and Jacobs. More than three years later, Jacobs asserted that it had never received the report.Jacobs subsequently declined to respond, asserting that the report was issued after the statutory deadline, 41 U.S.C. 4712, and that OIG lacked jurisdiction. The final determination and order were issued in December 2021, well beyond the 30-day deadline, and concluded that Jacobs had engaged in a prohibited reprisal against Weber. The Third Circuit denied an appeal, holding that the deadlines are not jurisdictional. View "Jacobs Project Management Co v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Bayada employees are paid extra for exceeding their weekly productivity minimums. If they fail to meet those minimums, Bayada withdraws from their available accumulated paid time off (PTO) to supplement the difference between the points they were expected to earn and what they actually earned. Bayada does not deduct from an employee’s guaranteed base salary when the employee lacks sufficient PTO to cover a productivity point deficit. The plaintiffs filed a collective action and putative class action alleging that the deductions effectively reduced their salary and violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, and state employment laws; they claimed that PTO qualified as salary under the FLSA and its related regulations.The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Bayada. As a matter of first impression, the court held based on the plain meaning of the regulatory language promulgated under the FLSA, that PTO is not part of an employee’s salary. The FLSA prohibits an actual, improper deduction from an employee’s salary. Bayada did not reduce the guaranteed base pay of any of the plaintiffs. View "Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees at the Maid-Rite meatpacking plant, were exposed to COVID-19 in 2020. Maid-Rite issued masks and face shields but allegedly forced workers to work shoulder-to-shoulder. Plaintiffs sent OSHA an inspection request on May 19. Two days later, OSHA requested a response from Maid-Rite within a week, treating the inspection request as “non-formal,” so that it initially proceeded through document exchange. On May 27, Plaintiffs asserted that they continued to face an imminent danger of COVID-19; they also contacted OSHA on June 2, requesting Maid-Rite’s response and reasserting that conditions had not changed. They sent OSHA another letter on June 29th. On July 8, OSHA informed Maid-Rite that OSHA would inspect the plant the following day. OSHA acknowledged that advance notice of an inspection was not “typical,” but cited the need “to protect [OSHA’s] employees” from COVID-19. Plaintiffs claimed the notice allowed Maid-Rite to direct its employees to change their conduct and created the appearance of compliance with mitigation guidance. OSHA determined that the plant's conditions did not constitute an imminent danger and did not seek expedited relief.Plaintiffs sued under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 662(d), limited private right of action. While OSHA’s motion to dismiss was pending, OSHA concluded its standard enforcement proceedings and declined to issue a citation. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Act mandated the dismissal of the claim once enforcement proceedings were complete. View "Doe v. Scalia" on Justia Law

O’Brien worked at Forum, a think tank, from 2016-2020. She served as its controller and was responsible for human resources tasks. In 2019, O’Brien sued Forum, its President, and its Director (Roman). She alleged a hostile work environment under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Trial testimony indicated that Roman had made sexual advances toward O’Brien and other female employees. In Title VII cases where no tangible adverse employment action was taken, an employer may escape liability by raising an affirmative defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities provided The district court held that O’Brien was not entitled to a jury instruction that this defense is unavailable where the harasser functions as the alter ego or proxy of the employer.The Third Circuit upheld a verdict against O'Brien. Although the affirmative defense is not available in an "alter ego" situation, the district court’s refusal to so instruct the jury here was harmless because the jury found that O’Brien was not subjected to sexual harassment. The existence of an affirmative defense was therefore irrelevant. View "O''Brien v. The Middle East Forum" on Justia Law

Jaludi worked at Citigroup. After he reported company wrongdoing, he was demoted, transferred, and (in 2013) terminated. He claims Citigroup blacklisted him from the financial industry. In 2015, Jaludi sued Citigroup for retaliation under both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and RICO. The district court sent his claims to arbitration. Jaludi appealed the arbitration order. In early 2018, while that appeal was pending, he filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor, adding one new allegation that, in late 2017, a headhunter had stopped returning his calls. In 2019, the Third Circuit remanded, holding that he was not required to arbitrate his Sarbanes-Oxley claims.On remand, the district court dismissed, finding his administrative complaint untimely. Though Sarbanes-Oxley required an administrative complaint within 180 days of the retaliatory conduct, he had waited more than two years after the last incident. Jaludi argued that the court should have granted him leave to amend because the 2017 allegation that he added in his administrative complaint happened fewer than 180 days before that complaint, making it timely. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although neither filing the administrative complaint after the statute of limitations had run nor suing before exhausting his administrative remedies was jurisdictional under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Jaludi’s delay in filing justified the dismissal. View "Jaludi v. Citigroup & Co." on Justia Law