Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Lane hired Connelly as one of seven union truck drivers at its Pittsburgh facility. Connelly ranked fifth in seniority and was the only woman. In 2007, allegedly because Connelly had ended a romance with a co-worker (Nogy), her male co-workers began “curs[ing] ... and belittl[ing] her." Connelly notified supervisors. Lane suspended Nogy for three days but did not discipline or warn any other employees, who continued to harass Connelly. In 2009, Connelly learned about the company’s “Ethics Line,” which she called multiple times to report further harassment and make complaints about her male co-workers drinking on the job. In 2010, a Lane foreman made an unwanted physical advance to Connelly, which she reported to the Ethics Line and to her supervisor. In October 2010, a Lane supervisor became “incensed” at Connelly when she refused to drive a truck that had a flat tire and steering problems. Soon after, Connelly was laid off before the end of the construction season and before any other union truck driver. She was never recalled her to work. Lane did recall male truck drivers in 2011 and continues to employ them. The Third Circuit vacated dismissal of Connelly’s suit, which alleged disparate treatment, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding her claims plausible. View "Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp" on Justia Law

Willis worked as a Neonatal Nurse Practitioner at Children’s from August 1993 until her termination in January 2012. From 2001 until 2011, Willis served as co-lead NNP. Lamouree, the nurse manager for the newborn intensive care unit was Willis’s supervisor. Lamouree’s supervisors were Valenta and Hupp. Starting in August 2011, Children’s issued Willis disciplinary warnings for three distinct incidents, all involving communications Willis was 61 years old at the time of her termination. After the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission closed Willis’s case, Willis sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, stating that Willis was unable to provide specifics to establish that this other employee was in fact not disciplined, and if so, any reason why she was not disciplined. In the pretext context, this type of second-hand, general rumor regarding a single substantially younger employee is insufficient as a matter of law to show pretext. While evidence demonstrating that a single member of a non-protected group received more favorable treatment can be relevant, “[a] decision adversely affecting an older employee does not become a discriminatory decision merely because one younger employee is treated differently.” View "Willis v. Childrens Hosp. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

This putative class action was brought by Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at the Butler County Prison in Butler, Pennsylvania. Babcock claimed that Butler County failed to properly compensate her and those similarly situated for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). At issue in this appeal was whether a portion of time for the Butler County Prison corrections officers’ meal periods was compensable under the FLSA. The Third Circuit concluded there was no provision of the FLSA that directly addressed this issue. Two tests were suggested by other courts of appeal: one looked to whether the employee had been relieved from all duties during the mealtime; the other (more generally adopted) looked to the party to which the “predominant benefit” of the mealtime belongs. The District Court noted that the Third Circuit had not yet established a test to determine whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA. After its review of this case, the Court adopted the “predominant benefit test” and affirmed the District Court. View "Babcock v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Faush was an employee of a temporary staffing agency. He was assigned to Tuesday Morning, Inc., where he claimed he was subjected to slurs and accusations based on his race. Ultimately he was terminated. Appellant filed suit against Tuesday Morning, claiming violations of Title VII of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Tuesday Morning on the ground that because appellant was not Tuesday Morning’s employee, Tuesday Morning was not liable for employment discrimination. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that a rational jury, applying the factors announced by the Supreme Court in “Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,” could have found on these facts that appellant was Tuesday Morning’s employee for purposes of Title VII and the Human Relations Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc." on Justia Law

Until 2011, Woodbridge, the largest wholesale grocery distributor by revenue in the U.S., contributed to the fund pursuant to collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461, employers withdrawing from multi-employer pension plans must pay the share of the fund’s total unfunded vested benefits allocable to them. Woodbridge owes $189,606,875 and elected to satisfy its “withdrawal liability” through annual payments instead of a lump sum. Under the MPPAA, annual payments must be based on “the highest contribution rate at which the employer had an obligation to contribute under the plan.” The plan’s board claimed the single highest rate from the multiple contribution rates established in the three CBAs . Woodbridge argued that it was responsible only for a weighted average of those contribution rates. The board also claimed that Woodbridge’s payments should include a 10 % surcharge it had been paying under the 2006 Pension Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. 1085. The Third Circuit affirmed that the annual withdrawal liability payment should be based on the single highest contribution rate, but should not include the surcharge. The “highest contribution” rate means the single highest contribution rate established under any of the CBAs. View "Bd. of Trs. of the IBT Local 863 Pension Fund v. C&S Wholesale Grocers Inc" on Justia Law

Munroe was an English teacher, generally considered to be effective and competent. The District granted Munroe tenure in 2010. In 2009, Munroe began a blog, using the name “Natalie M.” She did not expressly identify where she worked or lived, the name of the school or the names of her students. According to Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she had asked to subscribe. There were fewer than 10 subscribed readers, but no password was required for access. Most of the blog posts were unrelated to her school or work. Some postings included complaints about students, her working conditions, and related matters. The District administration first learned of Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from a local newspaper began to ask questions; students apparently were commenting on social media.” Munroe was placed on paid suspension and, later, fired. The District had no regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on his or her own time. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Munroe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit; under the Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech, in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and did not rise to the level of constitutionally protected expression. View "Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) supervisor Outlaw suspended Jones with full pay after he discovered apparent fraud in her timesheets. Jones complained to SEPTA’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office that Outlaw had “sexually harassed” and “retaliated against” her. Outlaw referred the timesheet matter to SEPTA’s Office of Inspector General, which concluded that Jones collected pay for days she hadn’t worked by submitting fraudulent timesheets. SEPTA terminated her. Jones filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. SEPTA ended its internal investigation, concluding that Outlaw had engaged in inappropriate behavior by once asking Jones to step on his back to relieve spinal pain. This was noted in Outlaw’s performance evaluation, and he was required to attend training regarding SEPTA’s sexual harassment policy. Jones filed suit, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act; violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; common law wrongful termination; and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court rejected all claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Jones’s suspension with pay did not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. Any adverse actions Jones did suffer were not sufficiently linked to any alleged misconduct to support a claim of discrimination or retaliation. View "Jones v. SE Pa. Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

Boyd and Smith, both Caucasians, alleged that their former employer, Boeing, discriminated against them on the basis of their race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, when it terminated their employment after they appeared in a photograph taken at work with a third employee looking like members of the KKK. The district court granted Boeing summary judgment, finding that Boyd and Smith failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because they were not similarly situated to Kenta Smith, the African-American employee who took the photograph and reported the incident. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that “[e]ven if a jury could somehow find that the evidence met the prima facie threshold,” “[t]here is no evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Boeing did not really fire the plaintiffs for posing as the KKK, or that a more likely cause was Boeing’s animus toward” Caucasians. View "Barker v. Boeing Co" on Justia Law

Hansler was hired by Lehigh Valley in 2011. In 2013, Hansler began experiencing shortness of breath, nausea, and vomiting, of unknown origins. Hansler’s physician completed a medical certification form “requesting intermittent leave at a frequency of 2 times weekly starting on March 1, 2013 and lasting for a probable duration of one month.” Hansler submitted the certification as part of a formal request for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. Hansler was unable to work on March 13, 14, 23, 24, and 25. Without seeking further information from either Hansler or her physician, Lehigh terminated Hansler on March 28, citing absenteeism, including the five days she took off in March. Lehigh informed her, for the first time, that her leave request had been denied because her “condition presently does not qualify as a serious health condition under the criteria set forth by the [Act].” After her dismissal, Hansler received a diagnosis of diabetes and high blood pressure. The district court dismissed her suit under the Act, on the basis that the medical certification supporting Hansler’s request for leave was “invalid.” The Third Circuit reversed, finding that Lehigh violated the Act in failing to afford Hansler a chance to cure any deficiencies in her medical certification. View "Hansler v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Network" on Justia Law

Bonkowski worked for Oberg. He has health conditions, including an aortic bicuspid, diabetes, possible aortic aneurysm, and colon removal. On November 14, Bonkowski met with supervisors to discuss his suspension for allegedly sleeping on the job. According to Bonkowski, he experienced shortness of breath, chest pain, and dizziness, and the supervisors gave him permission to go home. He clocked out at 5:18 p.m. That night, his wife drove him to the hospital. He was admitted shortly after midnight. After testing, he was released in the early evening of November 15, with a doctor’s note. On November 16, Oberg notified Bonkowski that his employment was terminated because he had walked off the job on November 14. The district court rejected his suit under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2611(11)(A). The Third Circuit affirmed, based on a Department of Labor regulation, defining a “serious health condition.” The court held that “an overnight stay” means a stay for a substantial period of time from one calendar day to the next calendar day as measured by the time of admission and time of discharge. Bonkowski was admitted and discharged on the same calendar day. View "Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc" on Justia Law