Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bayada employees are paid extra for exceeding their weekly productivity minimums. If they fail to meet those minimums, Bayada withdraws from their available accumulated paid time off (PTO) to supplement the difference between the points they were expected to earn and what they actually earned. Bayada does not deduct from an employee’s guaranteed base salary when the employee lacks sufficient PTO to cover a productivity point deficit. The plaintiffs filed a collective action and putative class action alleging that the deductions effectively reduced their salary and violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, and state employment laws; they claimed that PTO qualified as salary under the FLSA and its related regulations.The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Bayada. As a matter of first impression, the court held based on the plain meaning of the regulatory language promulgated under the FLSA, that PTO is not part of an employee’s salary. The FLSA prohibits an actual, improper deduction from an employee’s salary. Bayada did not reduce the guaranteed base pay of any of the plaintiffs. View "Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees at the Maid-Rite meatpacking plant, were exposed to COVID-19 in 2020. Maid-Rite issued masks and face shields but allegedly forced workers to work shoulder-to-shoulder. Plaintiffs sent OSHA an inspection request on May 19. Two days later, OSHA requested a response from Maid-Rite within a week, treating the inspection request as “non-formal,” so that it initially proceeded through document exchange. On May 27, Plaintiffs asserted that they continued to face an imminent danger of COVID-19; they also contacted OSHA on June 2, requesting Maid-Rite’s response and reasserting that conditions had not changed. They sent OSHA another letter on June 29th. On July 8, OSHA informed Maid-Rite that OSHA would inspect the plant the following day. OSHA acknowledged that advance notice of an inspection was not “typical,” but cited the need “to protect [OSHA’s] employees” from COVID-19. Plaintiffs claimed the notice allowed Maid-Rite to direct its employees to change their conduct and created the appearance of compliance with mitigation guidance. OSHA determined that the plant's conditions did not constitute an imminent danger and did not seek expedited relief.Plaintiffs sued under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 662(d), limited private right of action. While OSHA’s motion to dismiss was pending, OSHA concluded its standard enforcement proceedings and declined to issue a citation. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Act mandated the dismissal of the claim once enforcement proceedings were complete. View "Doe v. Scalia" on Justia Law

O’Brien worked at Forum, a think tank, from 2016-2020. She served as its controller and was responsible for human resources tasks. In 2019, O’Brien sued Forum, its President, and its Director (Roman). She alleged a hostile work environment under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Trial testimony indicated that Roman had made sexual advances toward O’Brien and other female employees. In Title VII cases where no tangible adverse employment action was taken, an employer may escape liability by raising an affirmative defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities provided The district court held that O’Brien was not entitled to a jury instruction that this defense is unavailable where the harasser functions as the alter ego or proxy of the employer.The Third Circuit upheld a verdict against O'Brien. Although the affirmative defense is not available in an "alter ego" situation, the district court’s refusal to so instruct the jury here was harmless because the jury found that O’Brien was not subjected to sexual harassment. The existence of an affirmative defense was therefore irrelevant. View "O''Brien v. The Middle East Forum" on Justia Law

Jaludi worked at Citigroup. After he reported company wrongdoing, he was demoted, transferred, and (in 2013) terminated. He claims Citigroup blacklisted him from the financial industry. In 2015, Jaludi sued Citigroup for retaliation under both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and RICO. The district court sent his claims to arbitration. Jaludi appealed the arbitration order. In early 2018, while that appeal was pending, he filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor, adding one new allegation that, in late 2017, a headhunter had stopped returning his calls. In 2019, the Third Circuit remanded, holding that he was not required to arbitrate his Sarbanes-Oxley claims.On remand, the district court dismissed, finding his administrative complaint untimely. Though Sarbanes-Oxley required an administrative complaint within 180 days of the retaliatory conduct, he had waited more than two years after the last incident. Jaludi argued that the court should have granted him leave to amend because the 2017 allegation that he added in his administrative complaint happened fewer than 180 days before that complaint, making it timely. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although neither filing the administrative complaint after the statute of limitations had run nor suing before exhausting his administrative remedies was jurisdictional under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Jaludi’s delay in filing justified the dismissal. View "Jaludi v. Citigroup & Co." on Justia Law

Ascolese, a compliance officer, brought a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation claim against his former employer, MBP, in connection with a qui tam action involving a federally-funded public housing construction project for the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA). In 2009–2010, Congress amended the FCA, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A), to expand the scope of protected conduct shielded from retaliation and the type of notice an employer must have of the protected conduct. The new standard is whether Ascolese showed he engaged in protected conduct in furtherance of an FCA action or other efforts to stop or more violations of the FCA and that he was discriminated against because of his protected conduct. The court believed that the pre-amendment standard was required by the Third Circuit, and concluded that Ascolese failed to show MBP was on notice that he was attempting to stop MBP from violating the FCA and not merely doing his job.The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The right question is whether Ascolese pled facts that plausibly showed MBP was on notice he tried to stop MBP’s alleged FCA violation. Ascolese sufficiently pled that he engaged in protected conduct when he went outside of his chain of command to report his concerns of fraudulent work to the PHA. View "Ascolese v. Shoemaker Construction Co" on Justia Law

Canada, a Black man, worked for Grossi for 10 years. Canada suffered from back problems and claims that Grossi prevented him from accessing Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) forms and harassed him when he tried to use FMLA leave. Osorio, Grossi’s director of human resources, testified that she “let [Canada] take his FMLA” leave. Canada sued, alleging race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the FMLA.Canada was terminated a month later. Grossi based the termination on text messages found on Canada’s cell phone. Grossi claims that Canada was using a locker on the shop floor which was designated as a company tool locker. While Canada was on vacation, Grossi cut the padlock off of his locker because the lockers needed to be moved. Osorio testified that she believed that the phone might have been a company phone and guessed the phone’s password. Osorio found text messages from a year earlier in which Canada appeared to have solicited prostitutes “while at work and clocked in.”The district court granted Grossi summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, in part. An employer’s motivation for investigating an employee can be relevant to pretext. There is a “‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence,” which, taken as a whole and viewed in a light favorable to Canada’s case, could convince a reasonable jury that Canada was the victim of unlawful retaliation. There is also evidence that Grossi treated other employees more favorably. View "Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Uronis’ former co-worker, Messenger, filed a putative Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action against Cabot and another company on behalf of himself and other employees similarly situated, alleging that the companies jointly employed the employees and failed to pay them required overtime pay. Uronis, as a similarly situated employee who had yet to file a consent to join the collective action, was a putative member of the Messenger action. Uronis applied for a position with Cabot’s subsidiary, GDS. Cabot and GDS were aware Uronis was a putative member of, and anticipated witness in, the Messenger action, and that he was about to file his consent to join. A GDS manager sent Uronis a text message stating that although Uronis was qualified for the position he applied for, Cabot declined to hire him or any other putative members of the Messenger action “because of” that lawsuit.The FLSA prohibits discrimination against an employee because the employee has engaged in protected activity 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3), including having “testified” or being “about to testify” in any FLSA-related proceeding. The district court dismissed Uronis’ suit, reasoning that being “about to testify” requires being “scheduled” or subpoenaed to do so. The Third Circuit reversed. The FLSA “about to testify” language protects employees from discrimination because of an employer’s anticipation that the employee will soon file a consent to join a collective action. View "Uronis v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

Clemens, then an employee, provided ExecuPharm with sensitive information, including her address, social security number, bank, and financial account numbers, insurance, and tax information, passport, and information relating to her family. Clemens’s employment agreement provided that ExecuPharm would “take appropriate measures to protect the confidentiality and security” of this information. After Clemens left ExecuPharm, a hacking group (CLOP) accessed ExecuPharm’s servers, stealing sensitive information pertaining to current and former employees, including Clemens. CLOP posted the data on the Dark Web, making available for download 123,000 data files pertaining to ExecuPharm, including sensitive employee information. ExecuPharm notified current and former employees of the breach and encouraged precautionary measures. Clemens reviewed her financial records and credit reports for unauthorized activity; placed fraud alerts on her credit reports; transferred her bank account; enrolled in ExecuPharm’s complimentary one-year credit monitoring services; and purchased three-bureau additional credit monitoring services for herself and her family for $39.99 per month.Clemens's suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), was dismissed for lack of Article III standing. The court concluded that Clemens’s risk of future harm was not imminent, but “speculative.” Any money Clemens spent to mitigate the speculative risk was insufficient to confer standing; even if ExecuPharm breached the employment agreement, it would not automatically give Clemens standing to assert her breach of contract claim. The Third Circuit vacated. Clemens’s injury was sufficiently imminent to constitute an injury-in-fact for purposes of standing. View "Clemens v. Execupharm Inc" on Justia Law

Crosbie was hired by Gateway to help Highmark, a health insurance company, investigate fraud. While auditing Highmark’s network of doctors, Crosbie claims he discovered that some doctors had prior convictions for selling opioid prescriptions; others lacked required Medicaid licenses. He reported his concerns to Gateway's managers. They investigated but did not take any action. Crosbie kept pressing the issue. More than a year after his report. Crosbie’s coworker lodged a complaint that Crosbie had called her “Miss Piggy” and “oinked” at her. Gateway’s human-resources team investigated. An eyewitness corroborated the complainant’s story. Other people described past issues between Crosbie and the complainant.Gateway fired Crosbie. Crosbie sued Gateway and Highmark under the False Claims Act for retaliation based on his fraud reports. The employers replied that the people who had decided to fire Crosbie knew nothing about his reports and that they had good reason to fire him. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employers. Crosbie has not shown that the employers’ reason was a mere pretext for retaliation. View "Crosbie v. Highmark Inc" on Justia Law

Crozer owns healthcare companies that operate as wholly owned subsidiaries: Prospect, employs professionals working at hospitals; CCMC, is a hospital and hired Abdurahman as an emergency medical resident. Abdurahman signed new-hire paperwork, including an at-will employment agreement with Crozer and an arbitration agreement with Prospect. Several weeks later, Abdurahman signed a residency agreement with CCMC. Dr. Jacobs was an employee of Prospect, working as CCMC’s Director of Toxicology and supervised Abdurahman. Abdurahman alleged that Jacobs sexually harassed her; Jacobs claimed the opposite and informed CCMC Human Resources that Abdurahman had assaulted her. The dispute escalated until Abdurahman was fired.Abdurahman filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the EEOC, alleging defamation and discrimination under Title VII, Title IX, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. She subsequently filed suit against CCMC and Jacobs. The district court denied a motion to compel arbitration. The Third Circuit affirmed. Abdurahman signed an arbitration agreement with Prospect, not CCMC. That agreement cannot stretch to govern Abdurahman’s employment with CCMC. The court noted that the corporations are sophisticated entities that drafted the forms. View "Abdurahman v. Prospect CCMC LLC" on Justia Law