Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Decedent was treated at a non-profit clinic, by volunteer physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services deemed those physicians to be Public Health Service employees (Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(o)), immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680. A suit against the U.S. was the exclusive remedy for alleged malpractice at the clinic. Decedent also treated at a facility where physicians did not enjoy those protections. Her estate sued the U.S., the clinic, the other facility, the doctors at that facility, and their physicians' group. The district court granted summary judgment for the clinic, predicated on immunity under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (NJCIA), and ultimately dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, except for remanding with respect to the physicians' group. The trial court properly held that the U.S. was immune from suit under the NJCIA, which provides that a similarly-placed private employer would be entitled to the defense. The court properly held that the treatment provided constituted emergency medicine, so that N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-41 applied and one of plaintiff's experts was not qualified to testify. The court erred in not considering treatment by a physicians' assistant in considering claims against her employer, the physicians' group.View "Lomando v. United States" on Justia Law

After defendant was in a serious automobile accident, a benefit plan administered by plaintiff paid $66,866 for his medical expenses. Defendant then recovered $110,000 from third parties, with the assistance of counsel. Plaintiff, which had not sought to enforce its subrogation rights, demanded reimbursement of the entire $66,866 it had paid without allowance for legal costs, which had reduced defendant's net recovery to less than the amount it demanded. Plaintiff sued for "appropriate equitable relief" pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) B). The district court ordered plaintiff to pay the entire. $66,866. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that defendant may assert equitable limitations, such as unjust enrichment, on plaintiff's equitable claim. View "US Airways, Inc v. McCutchen" on Justia Law

Husband worked as a miner from 1970 to 1987. In 2000, he was found to be totally disabled by coal workers' pneumoconiosis and was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901. He died in 2005. His widow sought survivor’s benefits. At the time, she was required to prove that pneumoconiosis caused, contributed to, or hastened husband's death. An ALJ denied the claim. The Board vacated. On remand, the ALJ again denied benefits. While appeal was pending, Congress amended the Act, retroactively applicable to claims filed after January 1, 2005. The Board reversed and remanded for an order awarding survivor's benefits, holding that section 932(l), as amended, entitled the widow to benefits because husband was receiving black lung benefits at the time of his death and her claim was filed after January 1, 2005. The First Circuit denied the company's petition for review. Under the amendment, the widow is entitled to benefits without having to file a new claim or otherwise revalidate husband's claim because she filed her claim after January 1, 2005. The company's claim that she failed to establish the cause of death is irrelevant. Section 932(l) as amended does not violate the Due Process Clause or Takings Clause. View "B&G Constr. Co Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

The company issued the family auto insurance when they lived in New Jersey. The family moved to Pennsylvania, and made the company aware of the permanent relocation, before being involved in a traffic accident in Pennsylvania that killed one member of the family and injured others. The policy of the other driver has paid its limit. New Jersey law limits personal injury protection claims to $250,000 per person; under Pennsylvania law the family would be entitled to "stacked" underinsured motorist benefits. The district court granted the company declaratory relief, finding that New Jersey law applied to the contract. The Third Circuit remanded holding that Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules do not apply, but that New Jersey choice-of-law rules point to Pennsylvania law as governing the dispute. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the company on a counterclaim alleging that it engaged in a bad faith denial of insurance coverage.

Named plaintiffs are residents of a residential area of about 2000 people. Defendants, chemical companies, operated a facility one mile north of the area. Plaintiffs allege that defendants dumped wastewater into a lagoon that seeped into an aquifer where it degraded into vinyl chloride, a carcinogen. The district court denied certification of a class seeking medical monitoring for village residents exposed to airborne vinyl chloride between 1968 and 2002, and a liability-only issue class seeking compensation for property damage from the exposure. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in finding plaintiffs would be unable to prove a concentration of vinyl chloride that would create a significant risk of contracting a serious latent disease for all class members. A single injunction or declaratory judgment could not provide relief to each member of the class, due to individual issues unrelated to the monetary nature of the claim. Each person's work, travel, and recreational habits may have affected their level of exposure. Certification of a liability-only issue class could unfairly impact defendants and absent class members.

Plaintiff was injured while driving a rental car on a defendant's Virgin Islands property. Her suit against two Virgin Islands companies was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on a determination that plaintiff was domiciled in the Virgin Islands at the time, notwithstanding her insistence that she was domiciled in Texas. Plaintiff owned a house in Texas, but had been living in an apartment and working on "indefinite" work assignment in the islands for seven months. She was born in the islands and has friends and relatives there as well as in Texas. The Third Circuit remanded, stating that the court did not give adequate consideration to plaintiff's declaration that she intended to return to Texas upon completion of her work assignment.

A 36 year-old schoolteacher sustained serious brain injuries when he was struck by a car while bicycling to work. His parents, appointed as his legal guardians, filed a products liability suit against the manufacturer of the bicycle helmet their son wore during the collision. The district court permitted the manufacturer to introduce expert testimony, based in part upon the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission's Safety Standard for Bicycle Helmets (16 C.F.R. 1203). Ultimately, experts for both sides agreed that the CPSC Standard forms the starting point for any bicycle helmet design, and that the helmet at issue satisfied the CPSC Standard in all respects. The court instructed the jury pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The Court also instructed the jury that, in determining whether the helmet was defective, it could consider evidence of standards or customs in the bicycle helmet industry, including the CPSC Standard. The jury returned a verdict for the defense. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the jury instructions and admission of the CPSC standard represented Pennsylvania law.

This appeal involved a putative class action filed by three Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) liens against future settlements or judgments. At issue was whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania's statutory framework was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn. The court examined the text, structure, history, and purpose of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., and held that liens limited to medical costs were not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court upheld Pennsylvania's longstanding practice of imposing such liens. The court also held that Pennsylvania's current statutory framework, which afforded Medicaid recipients a right of appeal from the default allocation, was a permissible default apportionment scheme.

Plaintiff was unloading a railway tank car filled with sulfuric acid when its chemical contents exploded, spraying across his face and chest and inflicting severe burns. He sought damages under the common law, but the district court held that his lawsuit was preempted by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Act expressly preempts any common law requirement about the design of a package, container, or packaging component qualified for use in transporting hazardous materials in commerce. The tank car at issue is a container qualified for such use, regardless of whether what plaintiff was doing constituted transport or his employment status at the precise moment of his injury.

The defendants (Connelly firm) represented plaintiff in his divorce until July 2005. In July 2006 plaintiff consulted attorney, Downey, who notified the Connelly firm of a malpractice claim in October. In March 2007 plaintiff signed an agreement to file suit, but Downey did not file. In February 2008 Downey notified the plaintiff that he was terminating representation and stated that the limitations period on the malpractice claim ran out before Downey began representation. In 2009 plaintiff filed a malpractice suit against the Connelly firm, under a contract theory, and against Downey. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded claims against Downey, applying the "discovery rule" rather than the occurrence rule to negligence by the Connelly firm. Although plaintiff knew that certain witnesses were not called during a 2004 hearing, he claims that he relied on the firm's assurances and did not have constructive notice of negligence until a July 2005 hearing. The question of when the limitations period began to run was for a jury.