Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mayorga, a native of El Salvador, entered the U.S. as a teenager in 1988 because of the then on-going civil war in El Salvador. He applied for asylum in 1995, and has had work authorization since then. He married a U.S. citizen and has five children under the age of 15, all U.S. citizens. In 2010, Mayorga pled guilty to engaging in the unlicensed business of firearms dealing, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2), and was sentenced to 46 months in prison. When he was released, the Department of Homeland Security served Mayorga with notice of removal proceedings, alleging two grounds: under 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled, and having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). At his hearing Mayorga contested his removability for having been convicted of a CIMT and applied for cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ denied each application, reasoning that if Mayorga’s crime was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, he would likely be ineligible for cancellation of removal under the “person of good moral character” requirement, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(B). The BIA upheld the decision. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Mayorga would suffer a serious adverse consequence if his crime were found to be a categorical CIMT, and that his challenge was therefore justiciable. Mayorga’s crime was not categorically a CIMT.View "Mayorga v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

In 2011 Cadapan, a citizen of the Philippines and a lawful permanent U.S. resident, was convicted of indecent assault with a person less than 13 years of age, indecent assault without consent, corruption of minors, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than three months nor more than 23 months and supervised probation for 36 months, In 2012, Cadapan was granted parole and was transferred to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security, which charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien who, after admission, was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) and with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien convicted of a crime of child abuse. He argued that the Pennsylvania statute for indecent assault encompassed conduct that could not be considered sexual abuse of a minor under the federal statute. The Immigration Judge rejected this argument. The BIA dismissed Cadapan’s appeal. The Third Circuit dismissed and also rejected an argument that the statute did not apply because Cadapan had not been admitted to the U.S. as not having been raised below.View "Cadapan v. Att'y Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Mahn, a citizen of Liberia, entered the U.S. in 2000 as a refugee. Five years later, he adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident. In 2007-2008, Mahn pled guilty in Pennsylvania to theft by deception and forgery and to recklessly endangering another person, based on losing control of his car and hitting a building. In 2011, DHS charged that he was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having “been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme.” Mahn unsuccessfully moved to terminate removal proceedings. The IJ ordered Mahn removed to Liberia. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Mahn’s reckless endangerment conviction constituted a CIMT because “the statute under which [he] was convicted defines recklessness as a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of such a nature that it amounts to a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable person” and is “coupled with the requirement that the conduct place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. Applying the categorical approach, the least culpable conduct punishable under Pennsylvania’s reckless endangerment statute does not implicate moral turpitude. View "Mahn v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Hernandez, a 34-year-old Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1998. In 2009, he pled guilty to simple assault and endangering the welfare of a child, stemming from striking his 10-year-old stepson. DHS issued a Notice to Appear, charging that Hernandez was removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Hernandez conceded removability as an alien present without being admitted or paroled, but denied removability as an alien convicted of a CIMT and sought cancellation of removal, claiming that his children, U.S. citizens, would experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon his removal. The Immigration Judge concluded that the children would suffer hardship, but that Hernandez was removable. The IJ found that the assault conviction was not a CIMT, but that the conviction for child endangerment constituted a CIMT because the statute requires “awareness by the accused that his violation of his duty of care, protection and support, is practically certain to result in the endangerment to his children’s welfare.” The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit granted a petition for review, finding that the least culpable conduct criminalized under Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute does not implicate moral turpitude. View "Hernandez-Cruz v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Syblis, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the U.S. in 2000 as a non-immigrant visitor. He remained beyond three months without seeking additional authorization. In 2004 he was charged with possession of marijuana. The charges were later amended and he was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. In 2008, in an unrelated incident, Syblis was convicted of possession of marijuana. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Syblis, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his visa authorization, and under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for his paraphernalia and marijuana convictions. He contested his removability on the grounds that he was convicted of an offense relating to a controlled substance and renewed a previous application for an adjustment of status and requested a waiver of criminal inadmissibility grounds. The IJ concluded that both of Syblis's convictions related to "controlled substances" and found him ineligible for a waiver of criminal inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The BIA upheld the decision. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Syblis failed to meet his statutorily prescribed burden of demonstrating eligibility for relief from removal. View "Syblis v. Att'y Gen of the U.S/" on Justia Law

In 1984, Petitioner, a citizen of Colombia, was admitted to the U.S. at age 20 as a lawful permanent resident. He married a U.S. citizen and has a son, also a citizen. Until 2009, Petitioner lived without incident. In 2009, he was stopped at a checkpoint near North Hudson, New York, with two passengers in his car. Petitioner admitted that he was aware they were illegal aliens, that he had picked them on the U.S. side of the border, that he was to be paid $1,000 to drive them to Queens, and that he had performed such work twice before. Petitioner was charged with Bringing In and Harboring Aliens, 8 U.S.C.1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and Transporting Illegal Aliens, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i). Charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), based on conviction for an aggravated felony, Petitioner applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). The government conceded that an aggravated felony conviction does not, alone, render an alien ineligible for adjustment of status, but urged that conviction under 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 182(a)(6)(E)(i), as “an alien who … knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of law.” The IJ denied adjustment of status. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit reversed. Petitioner’s conduct did not constitute encouraging, inducing, assisting, abetting, or aiding another alien to enter the U.S. View "Parra-Rojas v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law

Zhu, from Fujian Province, China, entered the U.S. in 1999 without proper documentation. In an INS interview, she stated that she feared persecution under China’s population control policies. She was paroled into the U.S. for a hearing. In 2000, Zhu applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Zhu testified that birth control officials tried to force her to wear an IUD. The IJ found Zhu’s testimony lacked credibility and ordered her removed. The BIA affirmed. In 2002, Zhu moved to reopen, alleging that she had married and given birth to a son and would be forcibly sterilized if she returned to China. The BIA denied the motion, noting that Zhu was not in violation of Chinese population control policies and had not shown that a Chinese national becomes automatically subject to punitive birth control measures if she returns with a child born outside China. In 2008, Zhu again moved to reopen, alleging that she had given birth to two more children and that the Chinese government now counted children born overseas when considering violations of population control policies. She submitted a notice indicating that Zhu must submit to sterilization upon her return to China, and a letter from her mother, noting that the officials had learned about her children. The BIA denied the motion. In 2013, Zhu filed a third motion, with voluminous documentation. The BIA denied Zhu’s motion to reopen. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that the BIA’s opinion did not reflect meaningful consideration of much of the evidence. View "Zhu v. Att'y Gen. of United States" on Justia Law

Bautista, a legal permanent resident, was ordered removed from the U.S. as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The IJ found him ineligible for cancellation of removal because his New York conviction for attempted arson constituted an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, finding that the arson conviction fell within the definition of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). The Third Circuit granted a petition for review. The attempted arson conviction is not an aggravated felony with respect to collateral immigration consequences. Applying the categorical approach, the New York statute under which Bautista was convicted does not match the elements of 18 U.S.C. 844(i), the corresponding federal statute, which requires a connection to interstate commerce. View "Bautista v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a new regulation governing calculation of the minimum wage an employer must offer (prevailing wage) under the H-2B visa program, which permits U.S. employers to recruit foreign workers to fill unskilled, non-agricultural positions that no qualified U.S. worker will accept, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b). Associations representing employers in non-agricultural industries that recruit H-2B workers, concerned about higher labor costs as a result of the 2011 Wage Rule, challenged its validity. The district court and the Third Circuit upheld the regulation, rejecting arguments that DOL lacked authority to promulgate legislative rules concerning the H-2B program and that, even if the DOL has such rulemaking authority, its violation of certain procedural requirements invalidated the Rule.View "LA Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law