Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a US citizen, Abdoulai Bah, had his life savings of $71,613 seized by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under suspicion of being the proceeds of illegal activities. The CBP returned the money with interest two-and-a-half years later. Bah then sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), seeking damages for personal injury and property damage, arguing that the seizure of his money prevented him from conducting business, caused him to lose his livelihood, and resulted in health problems.The District Court dismissed Bah's case, asserting that the United States was immune from Bah's claims. The court held that the FTCA did not permit Bah's claims as they were seeking prejudgment interest— a type of relief for which the United States has not waived sovereign immunity.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the Detention Exception of the FTCA, under which Bah's claim was filed, only waives sovereign immunity for "injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer," but it does not waive immunity for personal "injury" or "loss" incurred due to the government's seizure of property. As such, the court concluded that Bah's cash was not injured or lost in the sense meant by the FTCA, and his personal injuries were not covered under the Act. Furthermore, the court determined that Bah's claim of "loss" was really a claim for "loss of use" of his cash, which is not covered under the FTCA. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Bah's case. View "Bah v. USA" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard an appeal by Mark Jordan regarding his conviction for armed bank robbery and associated gun charges. The main issue was whether armed bank robbery can be considered a "crime of violence" under a federal gun statute. Jordan argued that armed bank robbery could be committed recklessly, and therefore should not count as a crime of violence.The court, however, found that the federal armed bank robbery statute is divisible into different crimes, and the specific crime that Jordan pleaded guilty to required purpose or knowledge, not recklessness. Therefore, using the modified categorical approach, the court held that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence. The court also held that whenever a federal crime is predicated on committing another crime, the elements of the predicate crime are considered elements of the first crime as well.In regards to the facts of the case, Jordan committed three bank robberies, during two of which he fired a gun. He was charged with three counts of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and two gun charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He pleaded guilty to all five counts and was sentenced to 318 months in prison. He later challenged his sentence, arguing that § 2113(d) is not a "crime of violence" under § 924(c), which is what the court ultimately disagreed with. View "USA v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Sherelle Thomas, on behalf of the estate of Terelle Thomas, sued the City of Harrisburg, PrimeCare Medical, Inc., and several individual law enforcement officers (the Officers) alleging that they failed to provide medical care and to intervene in the prevention of a violation of Thomas's right to medical care. The Officers moved to dismiss the case on grounds of qualified immunity, but the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the motion. The Officers then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, reviewing the case de novo, affirmed the District Court's denial of qualified immunity regarding the failure to render medical care. The court found that the Officers, based on their observations and knowledge, should have recognized that Thomas had ingested a significant amount of cocaine, presenting a serious medical need. The Officers' decision not to take Thomas to the hospital amounted to deliberate indifference to that need, constituting a violation of Thomas' constitutional right to medical care.However, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's recognition of a claim of failure to intervene. The court explained that neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit have recognized a right to intervene in the context of rendering medical care. As such, the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the claim regarding the Officers' failure to intervene. View "Thomas v. City of Harrisburg" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a case involving the estate of Terelle Thomas who died after ingesting a large amount of cocaine while in police custody. The plaintiffs, acting on behalf of the estate, brought a suit against the City of Harrisburg, PrimeCare Medical, and several individual law enforcement officers, alleging that they failed to render medical care and intervene to prevent a violation of the right to medical care. The officers moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of qualified immunity, but the District Court denied the motion.On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for the failure to render medical care claim as the plaintiffs successfully alleged a violation of the constitutional right to medical care. The court found that the officers had a clear indication that Thomas had ingested a significant amount of drugs and thus had a serious medical need, and their decision to book Thomas instead of taking him to a hospital demonstrated deliberate indifference to that need.However, the court reversed on the failure to intervene claim. The court noted that neither the Third Circuit nor the Supreme Court had recognized a right to intervene in the context of rendering medical care. Therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the failure to intervene claim. The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the failure to intervene claim. View "Thomas v. City of Harrisburg" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a consolidated action related to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) acceptance of a tariff filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), a Regional Transmission Organization managing a system that serves around fifty million consumers in thirteen mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states and the District of Columbia. The tariff was challenged by PJM Power Providers Group and Electric Power Supply Association, two nonprofit associations representing energy generators, and Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The challengers argued that the tariff, which was approved by inaction due to a deadlock among FERC commissioners, was arbitrary and capricious. The court disagreed, ruling that FERC's acceptance of the tariff was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. The court also confirmed that it could review FERC's inaction under the Federal Power Act. View "PJM Power Providers Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act requires any tobacco product not on the market before February 15, 2007, to receive FDA approval, 21 U.S.C. 387j(a)(1)–(2). Only if the FDA concludes that “permitting such tobacco product to be marketed would be appropriate for the protection of the public health” can the product be approved. Manufacturers seeking advance permission to market new products. In 2020, the FDA began taking aggressive action to remove fruit- and dessert-flavored e-cigarettes (electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS)) from the market, leaving aside tobacco- and menthol-flavored ENDS. More recently, based on additional studies and market data, the FDA has denied the applications of importers and manufacturers to market menthol-flavored ENDS.An importer challenged that denial, arguing that it was arbitrary and capricious for the FDA to apply the same regulatory framework to menthol that it used to assess the appropriateness of sweeter flavors, to ultimately reject its applications for its menthol-flavored ENDS to remain on the market, and to do so without granting a transition period. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The FDA applied a regulatory framework consistent with its statutory mandate, provided a reasoned explanation for its denial, and based its decision on scientific judgments that courts may not second-guess. View "Logic Technology Development LLC v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Port Hamilton Refinery purchased an existing St. Croix petroleum refinery at a 2021 bankruptcy auction, hoping to resume operations. The Refinery had for decades served as the backbone of St. Croix’s local economy until it ceased operations in 2012. Months later, the EPA notified Port Hamilton that it would need a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit before the Refinery could resume operations.The PSD program is part of the Clean Air Act (CAA); a facility must not contribute to the violation of applicable air quality standards and must implement the “best available control technology” to limit air pollution, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), 7479(3). PSD applies to newly constructed stationary sources of air pollution and sources that undergo emissions-altering modifications. Under EPA’s “Reactivation Policy,” an existing facility is “new” if EPA concludes that it had previously been “shut down” and restarted. If the EPA determines that the facility had only been “idled,” it need not obtain a permit.In 2018, EPA notified the Refinery’s prior owner that it need not obtain a PSD permit because the Refinery had been only “idled” since 2012. In 2022, EPA reversed course. The Third Circuit vacated the EPA decision. The Reactivation Policy, as applied to the Refinery, exceeds EPA’s statutory authority. View "Port Hamilton Refining and Transportation LLLP v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Gillette, a serial sex offender, received a 27-year sentence for sex crimes. After his release, he never registered as a sex offender. On a tip, law enforcement found that Gillette had been living with a 15-year-old boy and had engaged in sexual contact with that child and another child. Gillette was convicted on 20 counts of territorial-law offenses; federal charges were dismissed. The court sentenced Gillette to 155 years’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed.Gillette filed a habeas petition in the Virgin Islands Superior Court. At Gillette’s request, the Superior Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO). As required by Department of Justice regulations, the USAO requested that Gillette submit “a summary of the information” sought “and its relevance to the proceeding.” Gillette instead moved for contempt and sanctions against the USAO for failing to respond to his subpoena. The USAO then removed the proceedings to federal court and successfully moved to quash the subpoena. The Third Circuit dismissed Gillette’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The government never waived its sovereign immunity concerning non-monetary actions against it, so the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the USAO; the district court derived its jurisdiction over Gillette’s subpoena-enforcement action from 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) and also lacked jurisdiction. View "Gillette v. Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Vepuri is the de facto director of KVK-Tech, a generic drug manufacturer. He employed Panchal as its director of quality assurance. KVK-Tech manufactured and sold Hydroxyzine, a prescription generic drug used to treat anxiety and tension. The government alleges that Vepuri, Panchal, and KVK-Tech sourced active ingredient for the Hydroxyzine from a facility (DRL) that was not included in the approvals that they obtained from the FDA and that they misled the FDA about their practices.An indictment charged all three defendants with conspiracy to defraud and to commit offenses against the United States and charged KVK-Tech with an additional count of mail fraud. The district court dismissed the portion of the conspiracy charge that alleges that the three conspired to violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which prohibits introducing a “new drug” into interstate commerce unless an FDA approval “is effective with respect to such drug,” 21 U.S.C. 355(a).The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a deviation from the approved drug application means that the approval is no longer effective. The approval ceases being effective only when it has been withdrawn or suspended. The indictment does not include any allegations that the KVK-Tech Hydroxyzine manufactured with active ingredients from DRL had a different composition or labeling than the KVK-Tech Hydroxyzine with the effective approval. View "United States v. Vepuri" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law