Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a 2004 decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the Federal Communications Commission‘s authority to regulate media ownership but remanded aspects of the Commission‘s 2003 Order that were not adequately supported by the record, including numerical limits for local television ownership, local radio ownership rule, rule on cross-ownership of media within local markets, and repeal of the failed station solicitation rule. A 2008 FCC rule retained radio/television cross-ownership rule, local television and radio ownership rules in existence prior to the 2003 order, a failed station solicitation rule, and set out a series of other measures to address broadcast ownership diversity, in a separate order. The Third Circuit affirmed the order, excepting the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, for which the Commission failed to meet the notice and comment requirements of the APA, and remanded provisions of the diversity ordered that relied on a revenue-based "eligible entity" definition. The court also remanded the FCC decision to defer consideration of other proposed definitions (such as for a socially and economically disadvantaged business), so that it may adequately justify or modify its approach to advancing broadcast ownership by minorities and women.

This appeal involved a putative class action filed by three Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) liens against future settlements or judgments. At issue was whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania's statutory framework was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn. The court examined the text, structure, history, and purpose of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., and held that liens limited to medical costs were not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court upheld Pennsylvania's longstanding practice of imposing such liens. The court also held that Pennsylvania's current statutory framework, which afforded Medicaid recipients a right of appeal from the default allocation, was a permissible default apportionment scheme.

Oyster Creek in Ocean County, New Jersey was licensed under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2133(c) in 1969 for a 40-year term and is the oldest operating commercial nuclear power plant in the country. Objectors claimed that the application for license renewal was deficient with respect to detection of corrosion in a safety structure. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board rejected the claims; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted the license. After examining the objectors' specific technical claims, the Third Circuit denied review. The Board and the NRC provided hundreds of pages detailing their decision-making and gave due consideration to objectors' concerns; the review was well-reasoned and within the realm of the agency's unique expertise.

The governor terminated two public employees. The district court ordered reinstatement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. After examining the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the court determined that the employees were "career service," not exempt employees, but were not "regular" employees and, therefore, did not have a protected property interest in their jobs.

An Erie County resident had spoken during the public part of 14-15 council meetings before he attempted to object to a motion on an ordinance after the close of public comments. After being told that he was out of order, the resident continued to assert violation of the Sunshine Act and was escorted out. The chair sent a letter stating that the resident could be banned from future meetings if he was disruptive. The district court dismissed civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983), except against the chair. A jury awarded $5,000, but the court entered judgment in favor of the chair. The Third Circuit affirmed. The meeting was a limited public forum, so the council had the right to impose narrowly-tailored, reasonable content-neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions. The resident had adequate alternatives for raising objections to procedures used in adopting ordinances; the evidence did not establish that the chair intended to suppress his message because of content or personal hostility. The only difference between the resident and other speakers at the meeting was the timing of his comments. Because the resident had waived the claim, the court declined to consider whether the council satisfied the state Sunshine Act by reserving time for public comment, but held that the Act does not change the scope of First Amendment rights.