Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hospitals that are disadvantaged by their geographic location may reclassify to a different wage index area for certain Medicare reimbursement purposes by applying for redesignation to the Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board. Section 401 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999, enacted 10 years after the Board was established, creates a separate mechanism by which qualifying hospitals located in urban areas “shall [be] treat[ed] . . . [as] rural” for the same reimbursement purposes. To avoid possible strategic maneuvering by hospitals, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a regulation providing that hospitals with Section 401 status cannot receive additional reclassification by the Board on the basis of that status, 42 C.F.R. 412.230(a)(5)(iii) (Reclassification Rule). Geisinger, a hospital located in an urban area, received rural designation under Section 401 but was unable to obtain further reclassification by the Board pursuant to the Reclassification Rule. Geisinger sued. The district court upheld the regulation. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that Section 401 is unambiguous: HHS shall treat Section 401 hospitals as rural for Board reclassification purposes, 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(8)(E)(i) View "Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Sec'y United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Chesapeake Bay is plagued by dead zones with opaque water and algae blooms that render significant areas unable to support aquatic life. Surrounding jurisdictions recognize that the Bay absorbs far too much nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment to be a healthy ecosystem and threatens the livelihood of many. In 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency published the “total maximum daily load” (TMDL) of nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment that can be released into the Bay under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251. Opponents alleged that aspects of the TMDL that go beyond an allowable sum of pollutants (i.e., the most nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment the Bay can safely absorb) exceeded EPA’s regulatory authority, because they may intrude on states’ role in regulating land use. The district court and Third Circuit ruled in favor of EPA, stating that Bay pollution is a complex problem affecting at least 17,000,000 people. Any solution will have winners and losers, considering the interests of: environmental groups, adjoining states, tourists, fishermen, municipal waste water treatment works, urban centers, rural counties, nonpoint source polluters, and agriculture. Congress determined, with the Act, that the states and the EPA could, working together, best allocate the benefits and burdens of lowering pollution. The Bay TMDL will require sacrifice as a consequence of the tremendous effort necessary to restore the Bay’s health. View "Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Envt'l Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 114 Stat. 202, an “effort to deter government overreaching,” requires the government, if it has seized property that someone else purports to own, to file a complaint for judicial forfeiture within 90 days of receipt of a seized asset claim or to return the property, 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(3)(A). The government has a heightened burden of proof. The Langbords purportedly found, in their father’s safe deposit box, 10 double eagle $20 gold coins, minted in 1933, allegedly “the most valuable ounce of gold in the world.” President Roosevelt issued an executive order in 1933 removing gold coins from circulation. In 2004, the Langbords made the coins available to the government solely for authentication. When the Langbords requested their return, the Mint responded: “Mint has no intention of seeking forfeiture … they already are, and always have been, property belonging to the United States; this makes forfeiture proceedings entirely unnecessary.” Langbords’ counsel submitted a “seized asset claim,” demanding return of the coins or institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. The Mint refused to take action. The Langbords filed suit. The Third Circuit found that the government had ignored CAFRA and that the Langbords were entitled to return of the coins. View "Langbord v. Dep't of the Treasury" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Prisons terminated Kannikal on September 3, 1999. In 2001, Kannikal filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, but he did not receive an administrative hearing until 2006. Kannikal’s case was then held in abeyance because it was considered part of a pending class action complaint. In 2007, the Department of Justice informed Kannikal that his case would no longer be held in abeyance. Kannikal asked the EEOC about his case status in 2008 and 2009, but never received a response. He filed suit on March 28, 2012. The district court dismissed, citing 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which provides that “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” The court held that Kannikal’s cause of action accrued on October 17, 2001, 180 days after he filed his EEOC complaint, and expired six years later. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that section 2401’s six-year limitations period does not apply to suits brought under Title VII. View "Kannikal v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Flora worked as Luzerne County Public Defender from 1980- 2013. He became Chief Public Defender in 2010, maintaining a private practice. His predecessor had tried to secure additional funding by submitting weekly reports concerning excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies. Flora obtained grant funding for representing juveniles, but was not able to obtain additional money for adult offenders. Flora reported that the existing level of resources did not allow the Office to provide constitutionally adequate representation. The County was unresponsive, so Flora refused representation to those not faced with incarceration. In 2012 Flora initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants and sought an injunction to prevent his firing. The state court ordered the County to provide adequate funding and prohibited refusing representation to indigent defendants. While the parties were in mediation, the County approved new positions. The funding litigation followed the “Kids for Cash” scandal. From 2003-2008, about 50% of Luzerne County juvenile offenders appeared in court without counsel. Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent. Federal investigators uncovered that judges had accepted kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention facilities to send unrepresented juveniles to those facilities. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency adjudications. Flora alleges that, in 2013, he learned that 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged and reported the matter. Flora was relieved of his duties. Flora sued, alleging retaliation for his funding lawsuit and for reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that, under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Lane v. Franks, Flora pled facts sufficient to allege that he spoke as a citizen. View "Flora v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

From 2005-2007, Wright, a real estate agent and the chief of staff for Philadelphia councilman Kelly, received gifts from Chawla, a developer, and attorney Teitelman, who got most of his work from Chawla's company, World Acquisition. Wright received a free stint in an apartment, free legal services, and was promised commissions. Wright shepherded a bill that Chawla favored through Kelly’s office, arranged meetings about a World Acquisition development, and communicated with city offices for World Acquisition. In 2008, a grand jury returned a 14-count indictment, charging honest services fraud, traditional fraud, conspiracy to commit both kinds of fraud, and bribery in connection with a federally funded program. The jury convicted Chawla, Teitelman, and Wright of: conspiracy to commit honest services and traditional fraud and honest services and traditional fraud for the apartment arrangement and convicted Chawla alone of honest services for offering Wright liaison work. It acquitted on the other counts. After remand, the defendants moved, unsuccessfully, to preclude the government from relitigating certain issues under the Double Jeopardy Clause and from constructively amending the indictment. the Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction because the ruling is not a “collateral” order subject to immediate review and was not otherwise a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. 1291. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

The H-2B visa program allows U.S. employers to seek admission of foreign workers to perform temporary unskilled non-agricultural work by demonstrating that the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 1182 (a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(II). The employer must obtain certification from the Department of Labor (DOL) that: qualified workers are not available at the “prevailing wage” in the U.S. to perform the employment in question, and the aliens’ employment will not adversely affect wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. DOL has often changed its method for calculating prevailing wages without giving notice or an opportunity to comment and without explanation. Opponents challenged 20 C.F.R. 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance, which authorized use of privately-funded surveys to set the prevailing wage for certain occupations. A district court ruled in favor of the opponents. Following notice and comment, DOL announced the 2011 Wage Rule, but has continued to use the 2009 Guidance, having postponed the 2011 Rule’s effective date because it was subject to congressional appropriations riders precluding its implementation. The district court dismissed a challenge. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the case was ripe and that the 2009 Guidance was arbitrary and violated the APA. View "Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajad v. Perez" on Justia Law

Gonzalez sued his former employer, the Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor, a bi-state instrumentality of New Jersey and New York that was created in 1953 to investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity in the Port of New York-New Jersey. He sought to enjoin disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Commission as a violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the First Amendment. The Commission had determined that Gonzalez, an employee (detective) since 1999 had made false statement in an affidavit concerning another employee’s discrimination suit. The district court denied Gonzalez’s motion and ultimately stayed and administratively terminated the suit, finding that the Younger abstention doctrine precluded federal interference with the ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, clarifying the abstention inquiry and defining the outer boundaries of the abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the decision to abstain was appropriate under the Sprint decision. View "Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of NY Harbor" on Justia Law

Columbia, an interstate natural gas company subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), seeks to replace a portion of a natural gas pipeline that runs in and around York County, Pennsylvania. Because the original location of the pipeline has become heavily populated, the replacement will not track the original line but will be outside the existing right of way. To obtain easements necessary to complete construction of the replacement, in 2013, Columbia filed Complaints in Condemnation against four Landowners in federal court. The district court held that Columbia did not have the right of eminent domain required to condemn the easements, reasoning that 18 C.F.R. 157.202(b)(2)(i), was ambiguous. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation clearly anticipates replacement outside the existing right of way and contains no adjacency requirement. The district court erroneously adopted its own definition of “replace” and concluded that a “notice” of “proposed rulemaking” for “Emergency Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities” promulgated by FERC after 9/11 was relevant.View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres in Penn Twp" on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a., authorizes federal regulation of transmitting and selling electric power in interstate commerce and grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) jurisdiction over transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. The “filed rate doctrine” requires that interstate power rates filed with or fixed by FERC be given binding effect by state utility commissions determining intrastate rates. The electric companies suffered $250 million in “line losses,” energy lost when electricity travels over power lines, and interest related to those costs. Their line losses had increased under a mandate by FERC relating to calculation. The companies attempted to recover those costs on their customers’ utility bills. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) rejected their proposal to classify line-loss costs as a cost of transmission (as opposed to a cost of electricity generation), preventing them from passing those costs through to their customers. The companies lost in Pennsylvania state courts; the U.S. Supreme Court denied review. The companies then sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in federal court against the PUC. The district court held that their unsuccessful state efforts precluded relief in federal court under the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Third Circuit affirmed.View "Metro. Edison Co. v. PA Pub. Util. Co." on Justia Law