Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Roldan, a pretrial releasee under supervision of the Virgin Islands Probation Office, was found murdered. Probation officer Semper was fired, as “extremely negligent in the supervision” of Roldan. Semper claimed that he was not the officer assigned to Roldan. He sought reinstatement and back pay, alleging violation of his due process rights and 18 U.S.C. 3602, which provides that a district court shall appoint probation officers and “may, for cause, remove a probation officer appointed to serve with compensation.” ‖The district court dismissed. Rejecting the government’s argument Roldan was not among those excepted service employees eligible for review of adverse agency actions under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Semper failed to set forth a money-mandating statute or regulation giving him the right to contest his termination in a Tucker Act proceeding. Following denial of certiorari, Semper filed another suit, citing federal question jurisdiction, and asserting a Bivens claim against the chief judge in his individual capacity; a claim against that judge in his official capacity; a claim against the United States pursuant to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act; and a claim under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, against the judge. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of three claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded with instructions to dismiss his individual capacity claim against the judge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Semper v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Bason was an Assistant Attorney General with the Virgin Islands Department of Justice, subject to a collective bargaining agreement. The Governor of the Virgin Islands approved Bason’s immediate termination. The Union submitted a grievance challenging the decision. An arbitrator found that the Governor lacked just cause to remove Bason and awarded immediate reinstatement. The Virgin Islands Superior Court vacated the award “only to the extent that it grants relief prior to July 23, 2010.” The Government filed a notice of appeal. The Union moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because neither the court nor the arbitrator ever established the amount of back pay owed to Bason, rendering the judgment non-final. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court held that an order mandating immediate reinstatement constitutes an appealable injunction and reversed the reinstatement. The Union sought certiorari, but on December 28, 2012, the President signed H.R. 6116, to eliminate Third Circuit certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Third Circuit concluded that it retained certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in Virgin Islands courts before the enactment of H.R. 6116, but dismissed the petition as moot because Bason had died.View "United Indus., Serv., Transp., Prof'l, & Gov't Workers v. Gov't of the V.I." on Justia Law

New Jersey and Pennsylvania municipalities sued the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) (collectively, the Enterprises). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are federally-chartered but privately owned corporations that issue publicly traded securities, created by Congress to establish and stabilize secondary markets for residential mortgages, 12 U.S.C. 1716; 12 U.S.C. 1451. Fannie and Freddie purchase mortgages from third-party lenders, pooling them together and selling securities backed by those mortgages. In the wake of the housing market collapse of 2008, Fannie and Freddie owned many defaulted and overvalued subprime mortgages. They went bankrupt, and Congress created the FHFA to act as conservator for Fannie and Freddie. Congress exempted the Enterprises from all state and local taxation, with an exception for taxes on real property. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments that the Enterprises were not exempt from paying state and local real estate transfer taxes. The district courts dismissed. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. View "Delaware Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is a federal agency that, under the Federal Power Act, regulates rates charged by public utilities for transmission and sale of energy in interstate commerce, and rules pertaining to such rates, 16 U.S.C. 824d. In 2006, FERC approved a new tariff (rules governing interstate sale of electricity and electric capacity) for the PJM market, covering 13 states and the District of Columbia, as a result of an extensively negotiated settlement between power providers, utility companies, government authorities and others. The order required that load serving entities (LSEs) in the market procure a certain amount of energy capacity for access during peak load; included a rule that offers for the sale of capacity in the markets at artificially low prices would, with some exceptions, be required to be raised to a competitive level (mitigation). In 2011, FERC altered the 2006 Order: eliminating a mitigation exemption for resources built under state mandate; eliminating a provision that guaranteed that LSEs would be able to use “self-supply” to satisfy capacity obligations; and changing factors used in determining whether an offer was subject to mitigation. Objectors argued that the changes amounted to direct regulation of power facilities in violation of the FPA, and that FERC arbitrarily eliminated the mitigation exemption for state-mandated resources. Electric utilities challenged elimination of self-supply assurances for LSEs. Others challenged new rules governing calculation of a resource’s net cost of new entry (for determining whether an offer for sale of capacity will be mitigated) and FERC’s determination that a new generation resource must clear only one capacity auction to avoid further mitigation. The Third Circuit rejected all of the challenges. View "NJ Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs involved in, or wishing to be involved in the “death care industry” challenged Pennsylvania’s Funeral Director Law, 63 Pa. Stat. 479.1 provisions that: permit warrantless inspections of funeral establishments by the state Board of Funeral Directors; limit the number of establishments in which a funeral director may have an ownership interest or practice the provision; restrict the capacity of unlicensed individuals and certain entities to hold ownership interests in a funeral establishment; require every funeral establishment to have a licensed full-time supervisor; require funeral establishments to have a “preparation room”; prohibit service of food in a funeral establishment; prohibit use of trade names by funeral homes; govern the trusting of monies advanced under pre-need contracts for merchandise; and prohibit payment of commissions. The district court found several provisions unconstitutional. The Third Circuit reversed: invalidation of the warrantless inspection scheme; holdings on dormant Commerce Clause challenges to certain provisions; conclusions that disputed provisions violate substantive due process; a ruling that the Board’s actions unconstitutionally impair private contractual relations with third parties; and invalidation of the ban on payment of commissions to unlicensed salespeople. The court affirmed that the ban on the use of trade names in the funeral industry violates First Amendment protections. The court noted that antiquated provisions are not necessarily unconstitutional. View "Heffner v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a new regulation governing calculation of the minimum wage an employer must offer (prevailing wage) under the H-2B visa program, which permits U.S. employers to recruit foreign workers to fill unskilled, non-agricultural positions that no qualified U.S. worker will accept, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b). Associations representing employers in non-agricultural industries that recruit H-2B workers, concerned about higher labor costs as a result of the 2011 Wage Rule, challenged its validity. The district court and the Third Circuit upheld the regulation, rejecting arguments that DOL lacked authority to promulgate legislative rules concerning the H-2B program and that, even if the DOL has such rulemaking authority, its violation of certain procedural requirements invalidated the Rule.View "LA Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Since September 11, 2001, efforts to restructure the FBI as the “domestic equivalent” of the Central Intelligence Agency have included revising internal FBI guidelines. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), released by the Attorney General in 2008, authorizes FBI agents to engage in limited racial and ethnic profiling when conducting proactive assessments of criminal and terrorist threats and allows the FBI to collect and map data related to “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU launched an initiative entitled “Mapping the FBI,” including a series of coordinated FOIA requests (28 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A)) seeking records related to the FBI’s use of ethnic and racial data. One request targeted six FBI field offices in New Jersey and sought information concerning implementation of authority to collect information and map racial and ethnic demographics and behaviors in local communities. The FBI identified 782 pages of potentially responsive records, eventually released 312 pages (some of which were partially redacted), withheld 186 pages as duplicative, and withheld 284 pages as exempt from disclosure. The ACLU sought an injunction for release of the withheld records. The district court ruled in favor of the FBI. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the in camera procedure employed for determining whether reliance on FOIA exclusion provision was justified.View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services approved a 2008 amendment to Pennsylvania’s state plan for administering its Medicaid program. Private nursing facilities that provide services to Medicaid recipients challenged the amendment as violating Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396, by adjusting Pennsylvania’s method for determining Medicaid reimbursement rates to private nursing facilities for the 2008-09 fiscal year without considering quality of care, which they claim violates 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A) and without satisfying the public process requirements of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13)(A). The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, finding the state immune from the requested relief under the Eleventh Amendment. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to the federal defendants. By approving the amendment without any assurance that the amended plan would produce payments that are consistent with quality of care, HHS acted arbitrarily. View "Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Seeking to address illegal sports wagering and to improve its economy, New Jersey sought to license gambling on rofessional and amateur sporting events. Sports leagues sought to block those efforts, claiming, with the United States intervening, that the proposed law violates the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. 3701, which prohibits most states from licensing sports gambling. New Jersey argued that the leagues lacked standing because they suffer no injury from legalization of wagering on their games and that PASPA was beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. The state claimed that PASPA violates principles under the system of dual state and federal sovereignty: the “anti-commandeering” doctrine, on the ground that PASPA impermissibly prohibits states from enacting legislation to license sports gambling; and the “equal sovereignty” principle, in that PASPA permits Nevada to license sports gambling while banning other states from doing so. The district court enjoined New Jersey from licensing sports betting. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the leagues have Article III standing to enforce PASPA and that PASPA is constitutional. The court noted that accepting New Jersey’s arguments would require extraordinary steps, including invalidating a law under the anti-commandeering principle (the Supreme Court has only twice done so) and expanding that principle to suspend commonplace operations of the Supremacy Clause over state activity contrary to federal laws. View "Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law

In the 1960s Penelec and NYSEG built the Homer City coal-burning power plant in Indiana County, Pennsylvania. The Clean Air Act of 1970 subsequently charged the EPA with setting national maximum permissible levels of common pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)–(b). In 1990 the CAA was amended by Title V, the Operating Permit Program, which requires all major sources of air pollution to obtain operating permits. The Plant’s “grandfathered” status ended in the 1990s, when Penelec and NYSEG made changes to boilers that increased emissions of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Penelec and NYSEG believed the changes were “routine maintenance” and did not apply for a permit. In 1995, Penelec and NYSEG applied for a Title V operating permit; they subsequently sold the Plant to EME, which then sold to OLs, which simultaneously leased it back to EME. By 2004, the Plant had become “one of the largest air pollution sources in the nation,” and was a target of the EPA’s new enforcement initiative. In 2008 the EPA filed suit, alleging that the former owners had modified the Plant without a permit and without installing required emissions controls. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. The relief sought would require distortion of plain statutory text to shore up what the EPA views as an incomplete remedial scheme. View "United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P." on Justia Law