Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty (SPTT), a limited number of licenses to fish the waters of the Pacific Island nations are available to vessels under the control and command of U.S. citizens. Moore, a law firm, filed suit under the False Claims Act against Korean nationals and LLCs, alleging that the LLCs acquired two SPTT licenses by fraudulently certifying to the U.S. government that they were controlled by U.S. citizens and that their fishing vessels were commanded by U.S. captains. Moore first learned of this alleged fraud through discovery in a wrongful death action that it litigated in federal court against two of the defendants. The district court dismissed, citing the FCA’s public disclosure bar and its “original source” exception, particularly the 2010 amendments to those provisions. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the alleged fraud was disclosed through any of the qualifying public disclosure sources, but that Moore has materially added to those public disclosures by contributing details of the alleged fraud that it independently uncovered through discovery in the wrongful death action in federal court. The court noted that the public disclosure bar is no longer jurisdictional. View "Moore & Co., P A v. Majestic Blue Fisheries LLC" on Justia Law

The members of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PPUC) and Core Communications, Inc., appealed a District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T Corp. Core billed AT&T for terminating phone calls from AT&T’s customers to Core’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers from 2004 to 2009. When AT&T refused to pay, Core filed a complaint with the PPUC, which ruled in Core’s favor. AT&T then filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction on the ground that the PPUC lacked jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic because such traffic is the exclusive province of the Federal Communications Commission. After review of the matter, the Third Circuit found that the FCC’s jurisdiction over local ISP-bound traffic was not exclusive and the PPUC orders did not conflict with federal law. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded this case for entry of judgment in favor of Core and the members of the PPUC. View "AT&T Corp v. Core Communications Inc" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7491, and EPA regulations require states to evaluate the impact of emissions from certain pollution sources within their borders on atmospheric visibility in national parks and wilderness areas. After conducting this evaluation, Pennsylvania declined to require its sources to implement additional pollution controls, concluding that costs associated with the controls outweighed the limited visibility improvements they would produce, and set forth its conclusions in its 2010 State Implementation Plan (SIP), which was approved by the EPA in 2014. Conservation Groups sought review. The Third Circuit denied the petition to the extent it challenged the Transport Rule or Pennsylvania’s reliance on it in lieu of conducting source-specific best available retrofit technology (BART) analysis regarding SO2 and NOx emissions from each source with an electricity generating capacity of at least 750 megawatts. This appeal was not the appropriate vehicle to challenge EPA’s finding that the Transport Rule is better-than-BART or decision to approve state reliance on that rule; both stem from a final rule and separate rule-making proceeding not before the court. The court nonetheless vacated and remanded, finding that Pennsylvania’s source-specific BART analysis failed to comply with the Guidelines, and that the EPA arbitrarily approved the SIP despite these flaws. View "Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

WICO was founded as a coal bunkering business before the U.S. acquired the Virgin Islands (VI) in 1917 and grew to serve as “Port Agent” for cruise lines that visit the port of Charlotte Amalie and to manage the port's Havensight Mall. In 1986, WICO began dredging St. Thomas harbor, leading to public opposition and litigation. In 1993, the VI Government purchased all of the shares of WICO. The purchase was approved by the VI Legislature. The Act stated that “the Company is hereby granted the status and authority of a public corporation and governmental instrumentality … and shall be deemed to be a public entity operating on behalf of the Government, rather than a private corporation.” All WICO shares were transferred to the VI Public Finance Authority, a public corporation and governmental instrumentality. Two former WICO employees filed suit, alleging violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed, finding that “WICO cannot be considered a purely public entity,” and that its employees are not public employees, so its conduct could not be considered to have been “under color of state law” for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed in part, applying the 1995 Supreme Court decision, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, to hold that WICO is a government entity for the purposes of Sprauve’s and Smith’s constitutional claims. View "Gershwain Sprauve v. West Indian Company Limited" on Justia Law

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) is a national electronic loan registry system that permits its members to transfer, among themselves, promissory notes associated with mortgages, while MERS remains the mortgagee of record in public records as “nominee” for the note holder and its successors and assigns. MERS facilitates the secondary market for mortgages by permitting members to transfer the right to repayment pursuant to the terms of the promissory note, recording such transfers in the MERS database to notify one another and establish priority, instead of recording such transfers as mortgage assignments in local land recording offices. It permits note holders to avoid recording fees. Recorders of deeds in Pennsylvania counties sued, seeking an injunction, and to recover millions of dollars in unpaid recording fees, contending that the MERS entities violated 21 Pa. Cons. Stat. 351. The Third Circuit rejected the claims, holding that section 351 does not create a duty to record all land conveyances and is so clear that certification to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was unnecessary. The transfers of promissory notes among MERS members do not constitute assignments of the mortgage itself. View "Cnty. of Montgomery Recorder v. MERSCorp Inc" on Justia Law

Hospitals that are disadvantaged by their geographic location may reclassify to a different wage index area for certain Medicare reimbursement purposes by applying for redesignation to the Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board. Section 401 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999, enacted 10 years after the Board was established, creates a separate mechanism by which qualifying hospitals located in urban areas “shall [be] treat[ed] . . . [as] rural” for the same reimbursement purposes. To avoid possible strategic maneuvering by hospitals, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a regulation providing that hospitals with Section 401 status cannot receive additional reclassification by the Board on the basis of that status, 42 C.F.R. 412.230(a)(5)(iii) (Reclassification Rule). Geisinger, a hospital located in an urban area, received rural designation under Section 401 but was unable to obtain further reclassification by the Board pursuant to the Reclassification Rule. Geisinger sued. The district court upheld the regulation. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that Section 401 is unambiguous: HHS shall treat Section 401 hospitals as rural for Board reclassification purposes, 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(8)(E)(i) View "Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Sec'y United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Chesapeake Bay is plagued by dead zones with opaque water and algae blooms that render significant areas unable to support aquatic life. Surrounding jurisdictions recognize that the Bay absorbs far too much nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment to be a healthy ecosystem and threatens the livelihood of many. In 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency published the “total maximum daily load” (TMDL) of nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment that can be released into the Bay under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251. Opponents alleged that aspects of the TMDL that go beyond an allowable sum of pollutants (i.e., the most nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment the Bay can safely absorb) exceeded EPA’s regulatory authority, because they may intrude on states’ role in regulating land use. The district court and Third Circuit ruled in favor of EPA, stating that Bay pollution is a complex problem affecting at least 17,000,000 people. Any solution will have winners and losers, considering the interests of: environmental groups, adjoining states, tourists, fishermen, municipal waste water treatment works, urban centers, rural counties, nonpoint source polluters, and agriculture. Congress determined, with the Act, that the states and the EPA could, working together, best allocate the benefits and burdens of lowering pollution. The Bay TMDL will require sacrifice as a consequence of the tremendous effort necessary to restore the Bay’s health. View "Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Envt'l Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 114 Stat. 202, an “effort to deter government overreaching,” requires the government, if it has seized property that someone else purports to own, to file a complaint for judicial forfeiture within 90 days of receipt of a seized asset claim or to return the property, 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(3)(A). The government has a heightened burden of proof. The Langbords purportedly found, in their father’s safe deposit box, 10 double eagle $20 gold coins, minted in 1933, allegedly “the most valuable ounce of gold in the world.” President Roosevelt issued an executive order in 1933 removing gold coins from circulation. In 2004, the Langbords made the coins available to the government solely for authentication. When the Langbords requested their return, the Mint responded: “Mint has no intention of seeking forfeiture … they already are, and always have been, property belonging to the United States; this makes forfeiture proceedings entirely unnecessary.” Langbords’ counsel submitted a “seized asset claim,” demanding return of the coins or institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. The Mint refused to take action. The Langbords filed suit. The Third Circuit found that the government had ignored CAFRA and that the Langbords were entitled to return of the coins. View "Langbord v. Dep't of the Treasury" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Prisons terminated Kannikal on September 3, 1999. In 2001, Kannikal filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, but he did not receive an administrative hearing until 2006. Kannikal’s case was then held in abeyance because it was considered part of a pending class action complaint. In 2007, the Department of Justice informed Kannikal that his case would no longer be held in abeyance. Kannikal asked the EEOC about his case status in 2008 and 2009, but never received a response. He filed suit on March 28, 2012. The district court dismissed, citing 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which provides that “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” The court held that Kannikal’s cause of action accrued on October 17, 2001, 180 days after he filed his EEOC complaint, and expired six years later. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that section 2401’s six-year limitations period does not apply to suits brought under Title VII. View "Kannikal v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Flora worked as Luzerne County Public Defender from 1980- 2013. He became Chief Public Defender in 2010, maintaining a private practice. His predecessor had tried to secure additional funding by submitting weekly reports concerning excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies. Flora obtained grant funding for representing juveniles, but was not able to obtain additional money for adult offenders. Flora reported that the existing level of resources did not allow the Office to provide constitutionally adequate representation. The County was unresponsive, so Flora refused representation to those not faced with incarceration. In 2012 Flora initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants and sought an injunction to prevent his firing. The state court ordered the County to provide adequate funding and prohibited refusing representation to indigent defendants. While the parties were in mediation, the County approved new positions. The funding litigation followed the “Kids for Cash” scandal. From 2003-2008, about 50% of Luzerne County juvenile offenders appeared in court without counsel. Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent. Federal investigators uncovered that judges had accepted kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention facilities to send unrepresented juveniles to those facilities. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency adjudications. Flora alleges that, in 2013, he learned that 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged and reported the matter. Flora was relieved of his duties. Flora sued, alleging retaliation for his funding lawsuit and for reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that, under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Lane v. Franks, Flora pled facts sufficient to allege that he spoke as a citizen. View "Flora v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law