Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The school district hired Connelly as a teacher. Connelly had nine years of teaching experience, all in Maryland. Because Connelly acquired his teaching experience outside Pennsylvania, the district credited him with only one year. Other new teachers with like experience acquired within Pennsylvania (but not in the district) received at least partial credit for each year they had taught. Connelly’s initial annual salary was $38,023, which was substantially less than the $49,476 Connelly alleged he would have received with full credit for his experience. Connelly‘s initial salary determination continued to adversely affect his pay. In 2011 Connelly filed suit, asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983: that failure to fully credit his out-of-state teaching experience violated his right to interstate travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and denied him equal protection of the law. The district court dismissed, holding that the classification alleged is based on location of teaching experience, not residency. The Third Circuit affirmed, applying rational basis review. A school district may rationally place a premium on teachers who have more experience working within the Pennsylvania school system in order to achieve the legitimate goal of an efficient and effective public education system. View "Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2003, D.K. began kindergarten; he struggled in school and had behavioral issues. In 2007, at the urging of a private therapist, his parents requested a second evaluation. Two months later, the district determined that D.K. was eligible for special education services as a student with “other health impairment,” and he was offered an Individualized Education Program. In 2008, while finalizing D.K.’s IEP, his parents requested a due process hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1419, and requested an award of compensatory education for September 2004 through March 12, 2008. The district court affirmed the denial, holding that the IDEA’s statute of limitations, passed in 2004, barred relief for conduct prior to January 8, 2006, and that plaintiffs were ineligible for two statutory exceptions to the IDEA statute of limitations. The school district did not violate its obligation to identify students in need of special education and did not fail to provide D.K. a free appropriate public education before November 2007. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the district consistently monitored, documented, and responded to D.K.’s individual educational needs, developed behavioral improvement systems with his parents’ cooperation, and offered him special attention and testing accommodations. View "D. K. v. Abington Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

D.F. was a five-year-old African-American male kindergartener during the 2008-2009 school year, his first in Collingswood. He had previously been educated in the Camden school system, which had identified him as a special needs student and developed an Individualized Education Plan for him. Collingswood adopted the Camden IEP in substantial part, with the consent of D.F.’s mother, A.C. In January 2009, A.C. filed a due process petition alleging violation of D.F’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act; later, she filed a second petition expanding the claims. D.F. and A.C. subsequently moved out of state and the New Jersey Administrative Law Judge dismissed the pending petitions as moot. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the move did not render all claims moot. The ALJ did not make any factual findings that related to the claim for compensatory education for violations of the right to a free and appropriate public education beyond the absence of a one-to-one aide during the September 2008-January 2009 period, nor any related to the summer 2009 compensatory education claim. View "D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

E.R., now 10 years old, attended kindergarten and first grade at a public school. E.R. has been identified as having numerous learning disabilities, and health-related problems, including severe food and contact allergies. During the summer after first grade, her parents determined that programs offered by the district were inadequate to address E.R.'s unique needs, and decided to enroll her at a private school that specializes in instructing students with learning disabilities. They filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, seeking compensatory education for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and tuition reimbursement, including transportation expenses. A hearing officer awarded compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school year, reimbursement of tuition for the 2008-2009 school year, and reimbursement for transportation. The district court reversed and the Third Circuit affirmed. The district took reasonable steps to accommodate E.R.'s disabilities and include her in all class activities; it was not required to grant the specific accommodations requested by her parents or otherwise make substantial modifications to the programs that were used for all other students. View "Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R." on Justia Law

The District, which operates six elementary schools and two very highly-rated high schools set goals for redistricting, including: equalizing enrollment of the high schools and middle schools; operating elementary schools at or under capacity; not increasing the number of buses required; giving 2010 graduates the choice to either follow the redistricting plan or stay at the high school of their previous year; and basing decisions on current and expected future needs, not on past practices. The district court concluded that the plan required strict scrutiny because race was a factor in the formation of the plan, but concluded that the plan is constitutional because it does not use race impermissibly. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that strict scrutiny did not apply, simply because decision-makers discussed race. The plan neither classifies on the basis of race nor has a discriminatory purpose. The plan met the rational basis test.View "Student Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The student was suspended for using a home computer to create an internet profile of her middle school principal, including sexual content and vulgar language. The site did not include the principal's name, but did include his picture from the school website. Other students were not able to view the site from school computers and the student made an effort to limit viewers to a few of her friends. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school on First Amendment claims (42. U.S.C. 1983). The Third Circuit reversed in part. The school violated the student's rights in suspending her for for off-campus speech that caused no substantial disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption in school. There was no disruption beyond "general rumblings" and a few minutes of talk in class; the profile was outrageous and there was no evidence that anyone took it seriously. The court rejected the parent's Fourteenth Amendment claim of interference with their "liberty" interest in raising their child. The court affirmed that the school handbook and computer use policy were not overbroad and vague.

A student created a fake profile of his high school principal on a social networking internet web site, using his grandmother's computer. Some students saw the profile from school computers before the school disabled them. The student was suspended for 10 days, required to finish the school year at an alternative school, and banned from extra-curricullar activities and the graduation ceremony. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the student on his First Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983) claim. The Third Circuit affirmed, but vacated for rehearing en banc, following which it again affirmed. The school district response to the conduct transcended the protection of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. Student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school. The school district could not establish a sufficient nexus between the speech and disruption of the school environment. The student's attempt to use a picture from the district website did not establish such a connection, nor did the use of school computers, by other students, to access the site.

A student reported to her aunt, a member of the school board (plaintiff), that she had seen a teacher hugging another student. The investigation ended because the teacher and minor student denied the incident and the plaintiff raised concerns about the reporting student's credibility. More than a year later, a police officer saw the teacher and the minor student in a sexual encounter and the teacher was arrested. A copy of the report on an investigation that followed, containing plaintiff's assertions about her niece's credibility, was leaked to the press during a school board election. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy with respect to the information at issue. Plaintiff may not have intended wide-dissemination of her opinion but she volunteered it to others and it did not concern autonomy and independence in personal decision-making.