Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Seamans received a Federal Perkins Loan of $1,180.00 from Temple University. The first payment was due in 1992. The loan was declared delinquent the following month. Nonths later, Temple notified Seamans that the account had been placed for collection. In 2010, Seamans enrolled at Drexel University. He sought a Pell Grant, but Drexel refused to provide with financial assistance until Seamans repaid the Temple Loan. In 2011, Seamans repaid that loan in full. Seamans then noticed a “trade line” on his credit report. The trade line may or may not have appeared on his credit report when the account was in default. Seamans formally disputed some of the information by contacting the credit reporting agency. Temple, had its loan servicer investigate, but resubmitted information virtually unchanged. Seamans again contacted Temple and credit agencies, to dispute the trade line. After a second investigation, Temple modified certain elements, but still did not report various details. There was evidence that Temple treated other disputes in a similar manner. Seamans sued, alleging that Temple negligently or willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681–1681x. The district court granted Temple summary judgment, finding that the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1001–1155, exempted Temple from FCRA compliance because the credit instrument was a Perkins Loan. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that Seamans’s dispute appears to have merit and that failure to report the dispute may constitute a material inaccuracy on his credit report. View "Seamans v. Temple University" on Justia Law

E attended kindergarten and first grade in the Ridley School District, 2006-2008, receiving special services for learning disabilities and health problems. After first grade, her parents concluded that the school was not meeting E’s needs, and enrolled her at a private school, Benchmark, that specializes in educating students with learning disabilities, then filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education claiming violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(b)(2), by failing to provide a suitable Individualized Education Program. A hearing officer found no violations during kindergarten year, but awarded compensatory education for first grade and ordered Ridley to reimburse tuition and transportation costs for 2008-2009. Two years later, a federal district court reversed, finding the proposed IEP adequate. The Third Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, the parents sought payment for Benchmark costs from the date of the hearing officer’s decision forward pursuant to the IDEA, which states that a disabled child shall remain in the child’s current educational setting pending resolution of a dispute over the child‘s placement. The district court ruled in favor of the parents, rejecting the district’s timeliness contentions and awarded costs for three years, $57,658.38. The Third Circuit affirmed. It is impossible to protect a child‘s educational status quo without sometimes taxing school districts for private education costs that ultimately will be deemed unnecessary. View "M. R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), states that provide special education funds are eligible for federal funds to implement state-wide special education programs that guarantee a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to eligible disabled children, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). Pennsylvania enacted 24 P.S. 25-2509.5, its special education funding formula, under which each school district receives a base supplement, calculated by apportioning the total amount of base supplement money available among all districts based on the average daily membership of the district from the prior year under the assumption that 16% of students in each district are disabled. Plaintiffs, disabled students who attend schools in districts with a 17% or greater enrollment of special needs students and with a market value/personal income ratio of .65 or greater, claimed that Pennsylvania’s method violates IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act The district court found that the formula did not deprive the class of a FAPE as required by the IDEA and did not discriminate in violation of either the ADA or RA. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that any class member was deprived of a service available to nonclass members. View "CG v. PA Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

In first grade (2000-2001 school year), S.H., who is African-American, was placed in Title I classes with her mother’s consent. S.H. received Title I services through fifth grade, but continued to struggle. In fifth grade she was diagnosed with a learning disability. An Individualized Education Program team considered S.H.’s personal sentiment that she did not want to be in special education and obtained her mother’s approval for services. In 2009, at her mother’s request, S.H. was evaluated by an independent psychologist, who concluded that S.H.’s learning disabled designation was, and always had been, erroneous. S.H. was removed from special education and, as of 2012 had been accepted at several colleges. She and her mother sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that the district misdiagnosed S.H. for several years, and was liable for compensatory education and compensatory damages. The district court rejected the claims. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the plaintiffs presented no evidence that would create a genuine dispute as to whether the district knew, prior to the 2009 evaluation, that S.H. had likely been misidentified as learning disabled and that The DIA only permits a child with a disability to bring a claim; S.H. is not disabled. View "S. H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Ashurov, a Tajikistani citizen, entered the U.S. under a visitor’s visa in 2007 and later sought a student visa. The application required submission of Form I-20, the school’s petition to sponsor a student. Ashurov stated that he planned to study English as a Second Language at the CMG School. CMG certified the form and Ashurov signed it without an oath, as required. The application was granted. In 2009 and 2010, Ashurov presented identical forms. In 2010, federal authorities determined that CMG was not providing students the required 18 hours of weekly in-class instruction. The school was closed and its designated official indicted. A jury convicted Ashurov under 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), which punishes a person who “knowingly makes under oath, or ... under penalty of perjury ... knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any ... document required by the immigration laws ... or knowingly presents any such ... document which contains any such false statement or which fails to contain any reasonable basis.” The district court granted an acquittal, finding that the oath requirement applied to both the “knowingly makes” and “knowingly presents” clauses and, alternatively, applying the rule of lenity. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the statute is “grievously ambiguous.” View "United States v. Ashurov" on Justia Law

Keep A Breast Foundation educates young women about breast cancer and believes that negative body image inhibits awareness. To “start a conversation about that taboo in a lighthearted way” and break down inhibitions keeping young women from performing self-examinations, the Foundation began its “I [heart] Boobies!” initiative, which included selling bracelets emblazoned with that motto, KEEP A BREAST” and “check yourself!” The School District banned the bracelets. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the ban. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Supreme Court precedent does not sustain the ban. Under those decisions plainly lewd speech, which offends for the same reasons obscenity offends, may be categorically restricted regardless of whether it comments on political or social issues; speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd but that a reasonable observer could interpret as lewd may be categorically restricted if it cannot plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues; and speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd and that could plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues may not be categorically restricted. The bracelets are not plainly lewd and comment on a social issue. The District did not show that the bracelets threatened to substantially disrupt school. View "B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Munir sent his son, O.M., to a private residential facility and a private boarding school after multiple suicide attempts, and sought reimbursement for the cost of the placements from the school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which requires that states receiving federal education funding ensure that disabled children receive a free appropriate public education, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1) or pay for their education elsewhere if a child require specialized services that the public institution cannot provide. The district court denied the request, reasoning that O.M. had emotional problems, but that those problems were not affecting his ability to learn. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that O.M.’s placement was to meet his mental health needs; any educational benefit he received from the placement was incidental. O.M. was an above-average student, without serious attendance problems, and socialized well in the district school. An individualized education plan offered by the district satisfied its IDEA obligations. View "Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Brittany and Emily Morrow were subjected to threats and physical assaults by Anderson, a fellow student at Blackhawk High School. After Anderson physically attacked Brittany in the lunch room, the school suspended both girls. Brittany’s mother reported Anderson to the police at the recommendation of administration. Anderson was charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, and harassment. Anderson continued to bully Brittany and Emily. A state court placed Anderson on probation and ordered her to have no contact with Brittany. Five months later, Anderson was adjudicated delinquent and was again given a “no contact” order, which was provided to the school. Anderson subsequently boarded Brittany’s school bus and threatened Brittany, even though that bus did not service Anderson’s home. School officials told the Morrows that they could not guarantee their daughters’ safety and advised the Morrows to consider another school. The Morrows filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of their substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the school did not have a “special relationship” with students that would create a constitutional duty to protect them from other students and that the Morrows’ injury was not the result of any affirmative action by the defendants, under the “state-created danger” doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Morrow v. Balaski" on Justia Law

Covington, a basketball official in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for more than 10 years, filed suit, alleging gender employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. 10:5-1, because she has been excluded from officiating at boys’ high school varsity basketball games. The district court dismissed all claims against all defendants: the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, Board 193 (Board 193), which assigns officials to officiate at regular season high school basketball games; the New Jersey State Interscholastic Athletic Association (NJSIAA), which controls and supervises post-season tournament games and assigns officials to referee those games; the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials (IAABO), the Colonial Valley Conference (CVC), the Hamilton Township School District (“Hamilton”), a school at which Covington has officiated, and Dumont, the President of Board 193. The Third Circuit remanded to give Covington an opportunity to provide more facts as to her claim against Hamilton, Board 193, and NJSIAA, but affirmed dismissal of claims against the CVC and IAABO. View "Covington v. Int'l Assoc. of Approved Basketball Officials" on Justia Law

K.A., a fifth-grade student, attempted to distribute, before the start of class, an invitation to a children’s Christmas party at her church. Students were normally allowed to distribute invitations to birthday parties, Halloween parties, and similar events during non-instructional time. The teacher told K.A. that the principal would have to approve the flyer. The principal later notified K.A.’s father that the superintendent had not approved the flyer, based on a policy concerning events not related to the school. Her father filed suit, alleging that the school district had violated K.A.’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court, applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), and finding no evidence that distribution of the invitations would threaten a “substantial disruption‖ of the school environment or interfere with the rights of others,” granted preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the original policy and subsequent revisions were broader than allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into a narrow exception. View "K. A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist." on Justia Law