Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1956, the New Kensington Eagles donated to Valley High School a six-foot granite monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments, an eagle, an American flag, the Star of David, the Chi-Rho symbol, a Masonic eye, and Hebrew and Phoenician lettering. It is near the gymnasium entrance, which is accessible from the student parking area. In 2012, FFRF, an organization dedicated to promoting separation of church and state, unsuccessfully requested the monument's removal. Schaub saw a story on television and contacted FFRF. Schaub had visited Valley and seen the monument while taking her daughter to a karate event, picking the girl up from the swimming pool, and dropping off her sister, whose child attends Valley. Schaub’s daughter was to attend Valley beginning in August 2014. Schaub views the monument as “commanding” students and visitors to worship “thy God,” brands her as “an outsider because [she] do[es] not follow the particular religion or god that the monument endorses,” and makes her “stomach turn.” She wishes to raise her daughter without religion. While a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, Schaub’s daughter began attending a different high school. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed. Schaub has standing to seek nominal damages and injunctive relief, and her request for injunctive relief was not moot. With respect to FFRF’s claims, the court remanded for consideration of whether Schaub was an FFRF member when the complaint was filed. View "Freedom From Religion Found. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After attending a parochial school, G.L. entered high school in the Ligonier Valley District in 2008. At an open house shortly after he started, G.L.’s teacher told his father that G.L. seemed distracted and lacked organizational skills. G.L.’s father orally requested that the District evaluate G.L. for special education needs. No evaluation was conducted and, following a car accident in which G.L. lost his sister, the District purportedly investigated whether G.L. lived within its boundaries. That investigation confirmed the District’s obligation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to provide G.L. a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Little was done to deal with G,L.’s struggles or alleged bullying, while the District repeatedly investigated residency. His parents withdrew G.L. from the school in March 2010. Within two years (the limitations period set forth in 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(3)(C)), G.L.’s parents filed a due process complaint, alleging that the District denied him a FAPE and requesting compensatory education for September 2008 through March 2010. A hearing officer adopted a two-year remedy cap, compensating only injuries that occurred within two years of the filing date, regardless of whether filing occurred within two years of reasonably discovering older injuries. The Third Circuit disagreed and remanded, concluding that section 1415(b)(6)(B) is simply an inartful attempt to mirror the two-year statute of limitations. View "G L v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist" on Justia Law

E.M. is a student at the Learning Center for Exceptional Children (LCEC), a private school for children with intellectual disabilities. E.M.’s federally-mandated individualized education plan created by her parents, teachers, and local public-school system—says that she should attend LCEC and integrated classes with students from Today’s Learning Center (TLC), a private school for regular-education students that shares classroom space with LCEC. The New Jersey Department of Education asserts that it has not approved LCEC or TLC to teach integrated classes of regular-education students and students with disabilities. The Department directed LCEC to confirm that it would not place its public-school students with disabilities in classrooms with private-school regular-education students. LCEC agreed under protest. E.M.’s parents and LCEC obtained preliminary injunctive relief under the so-called “stay-put” rule of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412, which allowed her to attend classes with TLC’s regular-education students during the pendency of the case. The Third Circuit remanded with the injunction intact for additional fact finding, including whether other educational alternatives are available to E.M. View "D. M. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Munroe was an English teacher, generally considered to be effective and competent. The District granted Munroe tenure in 2010. In 2009, Munroe began a blog, using the name “Natalie M.” She did not expressly identify where she worked or lived, the name of the school or the names of her students. According to Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she had asked to subscribe. There were fewer than 10 subscribed readers, but no password was required for access. Most of the blog posts were unrelated to her school or work. Some postings included complaints about students, her working conditions, and related matters. The District administration first learned of Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from a local newspaper began to ask questions; students apparently were commenting on social media.” Munroe was placed on paid suspension and, later, fired. The District had no regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on his or her own time. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Munroe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit; under the Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech, in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and did not rise to the level of constitutionally protected expression. View "Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Juanya, age 15, participated in a mandatory swimming class run by his physical education teacher, Rodgers. Juanya, a non-swimmer, was submerged for a few seconds, possibly inhaling or swallowing water. Juanya exited the pool and told Rodgers that his chest hurt. Rodgers told Juanya to sit on the bleachers. Several minutes later, Rodgers went over to check on Juanya, who requested to remain out of the pool for the rest of class. Rodgers denied the request. Juanya followed instructions and stayed in the shallow end for the remainder of the period. In his next class, nearly an hour and a half after leaving the pool, Juanya fell backward and hit the desk behind him. As he rolled off his chair and onto the floor, he had a seizure. A school nurse attempted to revive Juanya. Paramedics took Juanya by ambulance to a hospital, where he died that day, apparently of a rare form of asphyxiation called “dry” or “secondary drowning.” Juanya’s mother sued Rodgers and the Bethlehem Area School District, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Rodgers moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, which the court denied. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Rodgers’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, View "Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Daniels is an African-American educator born in 1950. She has a masters degree in elementary education and is certified as a reading specialist. She sued her former employer, the School District of Philadelphia, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, substantively and by retaliating against her because she opposed what she believed was SDP’s discriminatory conduct in violation of the acts. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. She appealed only the retaliation claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. Daniels failed to establish a causal link between her protected activities and the adverse actions; she did not show an “unusually suggestive” temporal proximity. View "Daniels v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that African American students who were placed in remedial classes after being identified as learning “disabled” in the Lower Merion School District (LMSD) public schools in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, were deprived of appropriate educational services due to racial discrimination and segregation in violation of federal law. The claimed that the disproportionate placement of African American students in remedial classes had a discriminatory purpose and was the result of racial bias The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C 12101, 12132; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794(a); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state law. The Third Circuit affirmed. Looking at the whole record, which included statistical evidence showing that minorities are overrepresented in low achievement classes, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s intent to discriminate against plaintiffs or that LMSD had knowledge of any intentional discrimination on the part of its employees, including deliberate indifference to discriminatory practices against African American students. View "Blunt v. Lower Merion Schs." on Justia Law

D.E., now 23 years old, was a minor diagnosed with a learning disability and enrolled in school in the Central Dauphin School District. His parents claimed that while D.E. was enrolled in Central Dauphin he was deprived of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, and that he was discriminated against based upon his disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court dismissed the IDEA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and later granted summary judgment in Central Dauphin's favor as to the ADA and RA claims. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the ADA and RA claims, but reversed dismissal of the IDEA claim. Individuals seeking to enforce a favorable decision obtained at the administrative level are "aggrieved" for purposes of the IDEA and may properly pursue such claims in court. The court stated: "we encourage the District Court to consider any form of compensatory education proposed" in a manner consistent with the IDEA and Third Circuit precedent. View "D.E v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Batchelors sued the Rose Tree Media School District and six individual employees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1482, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, based on the treatment of their son, a high school student was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. They claimed that the district failed to honor a settlement of prior claims and retaliation against their son. The district court dismissed for intentional failure to exhaust the administrative remedies under the IDEA. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the claims fell within the ambit of the IDEA and required exhaustion and that no exception to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies under the facts presented. View "Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist." on Justia Law