Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being pulled over in February for a traffic violation, the defendant consented to a vehicle search. The officer found cash, marijuana, and guns. Five months later,during a fire code inspection of his girlfriend's apartment, the defendant was found sleeping in a room with a gun on the bureau. Money and drugs were also found. The defendant, convicted of possession of a stolen firearm (18 U.S.C. 922), challenged the district courtâs application of a four-level enhancement to his sentence for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The February and July incidents were not sufficiently similar or regular to be relevant for sentencing. The "sparse" evidence did not indicate that possession of the guns was related to possession of the marijuana.

The petitioner, convicted in 1982 of murdering a police officer and sentenced to death, exhausted state appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court denied a habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and subsequently remanded the Third Circuit's grant of relief on the sentence. On remand, the Third Circuit held that the death sentence must be vacated because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent (Mills v. Maryland). The verdict form and jury instructions, particularly a statement that â[w]e, the jury, have found unanimously . . . one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances,â created a substantial probability the jury believed it was precluded from finding a mitigating circumstance that had not been unanimously agreed upon. The court noted that the form has been amended since the petitioner's conviction.

After pleading guilty to possession of child pornography, the defendant was sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release, with conditions restricting Internet access and association with minors. The Third Circuit affirmed. The court acted within its discretion in enhancing the sentence based on involvement of material portraying sadistic or masochistic behavior or other violence, as described in the sentencing guidelines. The guidelines' use of those terms is not vague and the provision applies to depictions of sexual activity that would cause pain to a prepubescent boy. There is no need for the court to determine whether the defendant intended to possess the images or actually derived pleasure from viewing them; the image need not depict penetration or bondage. The sentencing judge was entitled to consider facts outside the plea agreement. The sentence, including the conditions of supervised release, was reasonable.

The defendant accepted a guilty plea on charges of intent to distribute cocaine; the government agreed not to file an information to increase the penalty based on prior conviction (18 U.S.C. 851). The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence of 248 months. Although the Miranda warning, as recited to the defendant, did not explicitly refer to the defendant's right to stop the interrogation and obtain counsel at that time, it adequately conveyed the substance of the defendant's rights. The government did not breach the plea agreement. The defendant argued for application of the sentencing guidelines for powder cocaine offenses, but was properly sentenced within the range for crack cocaine and as a career offender.

An officer issued a misconduct report against the plaintiff (an inmate) following an attack on another inmate. Although the officer had stated that the incident was recorded, a hearing officer accepted a statement that it was not recorded and accepted the victim's refusal to testify, found the plaintiff guilty, and imposed sanctions. Sanctions included loss of a prison job, disciplinary confinement, and assessment of the plaintiff's prison account; the Third Circuit later determined the plaintiff had a protected property interest in the account. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but on remand found a due process violation in the hearing officer's failure to independently evaluate the credibility of a confidential informant. The Third Circuit affirmed that due process was not violated by the decision to allow the victim not to testify, but reversed in part, holding that due process was violated by the hearing officer not seeking to view documentary evidence (the recording) requested by the inmate, absent legitimate institutional concerns. The court affirmed that damages are precluded by qualified immunity and ordered the misconduct expunged, but denied other relief. A reasonable official in the position of the hearing officer would not have known that her actions violated clearly established constitutional rights.

The defendant was sentenced to death for the 1987 robbery-murder of a bartender. The defendant claimed that he killed the woman while intoxicated and, after she was dead, decided to take the money. On petition for habeas corpus, the federal district court invalidated the murder conviction, finding that the prosecution withheld evidence that could have been used to impeach a witness, but upheld the robbery conviction. The state of Pennsylvania has indicated intent to retry the murder. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to the robbery. Although the witness did not testify about the robbery, his testimony undermined the defendant's credibility and suggested that the incident, as a whole, was premeditated and intentional. By failing to request a jury instruction on theft, trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Counsel's actions were unreasonable and, contrary to the state court's holding, prejudicial to the defendant. Considering the weight of the evidence, not just its sufficiency, there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted of theft, given that option. Counsel was also ineffective in failing to take corrective action after a venireman stated that he knew the defendant and that the defendant "used to do a lot of robbing."

The district court dismissed indictment of a criminal defense attorney and co-conspirators under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). The underlying criminal enterprises included murder of witnesses in drug cases, bribery of a witness, using the law office to sell cocaine and operate a prostitution business, wire fraud relating to real estate sales, and helping evade parole restrictions. The indictment adequately alleged facts to establish all sub-elements required to establish both a pattern of racketeering activity and an enterprise, as well as all of the other elements of a RICO offense. On a motion to dismiss, the court was required to accept the allegations as true. The government was not required to show a pattern of similar acts or that the enterprise had a "traditional" structure.

The defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 2250 of traveling in interstate and foreign commerce, knowingly failing to register under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act, (SORNA) 42 U.S.C. 16901. He admitted to his status as a sex offender and that he had traveled and was required to register, but disputed that he "resided" in Delaware and was required to register there. The defendant admitted that he had actually lived at an apartment in a Wilmington house, in addition to using the address for mail delivery, voter registration, and obtaining a passport and drivers license, although he apparently did not have a key and was rarely there. The defendant had fair notice of the requirements of federal law, which is not dependent on state law, despite the fact that Delaware law did not require registration. SORNA is a proper exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.

The defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 50 grams of cocaine base and sentenced to life in prison. The conviction was affirmed on appeal and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Subsequent challenges were also rejected. In 2010 the district court denied a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The writ claimed that officers involved in the prosecution had been indicted for perjury in an unrelated case. The Third Circuit affirmed, first noting that the writ is generally not appropriate where the defendant is still serving his sentence. The defendant did not allege a fundamental error that rendered his trial invalid. The defendant offered nothing but speculation that evidence concerning the officers would have led to a not guilty verdict, despite other evidence against him.

The defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of her husband. His death was caused by a lethal dose of liquid morphine. The defense argued that the death was a suicide. The court relied on circumstantial evidence and testimony by a pathologist that the substance is capable of being masked. After obtaining new counsel and exhausting direct appeals in state court, the defendant unsuccessfully pursued a collateral state claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The federal District Court granted a petition for habeas corpus. The Third Circuit affirmed, ordering a new trial. Distinguishing the Supreme Court's 2011 decision, Harrington v. Richter, the court noted that counsel failed to consult any one of three experts suggested by the defense psychiatrist as being able to discuss whether the substance can be masked and support the defense of suicide. Defense counsel misunderstood the facts and failed to ask questions that would have supported a claim of suicide. The state court's finding that counsel sufficiently dealt with the issues in closing arguments was unreasonable and the decision not to raise ineffective assistance on direct appeal was a reasonable tactical decision.