Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being told, by children, that defendant, a teacher, had touched them inappropriately and kept a notebook of information about students, an officer applied for a warrant to search defendant's home for child pornography. The affidavit established only probable cause to believe that she would find evidence of sexual assaulted on children; it did not allege any direct evidence that defendant possessed child pornography or any connection between the two crimes. The search turned up incriminating documents relating to the alleged assaults, but no child pornography. The district court suppressed the documents. The First Circuit affirmed. A probable cause affidavit must set forth all the facts upon which the affiant seeks to rely; the affidavit in this case omitted the linchpin allegation on which any reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause must have depended. The government cannot draw an inference from facts not stated in the affidavit or rely on the affiant's personal knowledge.

In March 2010, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (21 U.S.C. 846) and possession of an unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. 5861(d)). At the time, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 mandated penalties for powder cocaine and crack cocaine according to a 100:1 ratio, so that conviction for five grams of crack cocaine resulted in the same five-year mandatory minimum term as a conviction involving 500 grams of powder cocaine. Before defendant's sentencing, the Fair Sentencing Act, 21 U.S.C. 841, became law in August 2010. The FSA reduced the crack/powder ratio to approximately 18:1; the five-year mandatory minimum penalty for crack is not triggered until a person possesses 28 grams and the 10-year mandatory minimum penalty is not triggered until a person possesses 280 grams. The Act does not state whether it should apply retroactively. The district court imposed a sentence of 121 months, based on the 1986 Act. The Third Circuit vacated, concluding that the FSA requires application of the new mandatory minimum sentencing provisions to all defendants sentenced on or after August 3, 2010, regardless of when the offense conduct occurred.

Defendant purchased guns in Tennessee, where such purchases are minimally regulated, and transported them to the Virgin Islands, which has more stringent regulation. A jury found him guilty of 12 counts of transporting a firearm in the course of dealing firearms without a license (18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A)), transporting a firearm with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to commit a crime (18 U.S.C. 924(b)), transferring a firearm to an out-of-state resident (18 U.S.C. 922(a)(5)), conspiring to unlawfully transport firearms (18 U.S.C. 371), and 10 counts of unauthorized possession of a firearm under Virgin Islands law. Following the verdict, the district court granted a judgment of acquittal on each of the federal counts. The Third Circuit reversed in part and remanded for reinstatement of the verdict on all federal counts, except a count charging conspiracy to transport firearms in violation of federal law. While declining to apply the rule of consistency based on the fact that a co-defendant was acquitted on all charges, the court found insufficient evidence of conspiracy. There was sufficient evidence to support all of the other convictions.

A task force searching for an escaped fugitive entered the common areas of a multi-unit apartment building. The building had a locked exterior door. An inspector entered through a partially opened side window. Once inside, the task force apprehended defendant in a common-use stairwell, and, after a struggle, defendant informed the inspector he had a firearm. The inspector retrieved the firearm from defendant's pocket. The district court denied his motion to suppress the firearm and the statement made to the inspector. The Third Circuit affirmed, expanding its prior holding that a resident of an unlocked multi-unit apartment building lacks an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the building's common areas. The presence of a locked exterior door does not alter that expectation; the defendant had no control of the common areas.

An essential witness in a rape, robbery, murder prosecution refused to testify because of threats to her family and went as far as pulling a knife on a police officer. She evaded capture during two trials and, after a second conviction was overturned, was jailed as a material witness. A February 2 trial date was continued until May 25; the witness was incarcerated for 54 days before being released. The prosecution did not notify the judge who had ordered the incarceration of the continuance and, when the witness's father died, allowed her only a short visit to the funeral home, in handcuffs. Following a remand, the district court denied the prosecutor qualified immunity with respect to claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed. The incarceration was a seizure, for Fourth Amendment purposes, and a reasonable jury could find the duration unreasonable. As the sole government official in possession of the relevant information, the prosecutor had a duty of disclosure that was neither discretionary nor advocative, but was a purely administrative act, not entitled to the shield of immunity,

Defendant was indicted on one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846). Following indictment, arrest, and detention, the government sought to collect a DNA sample, relying on 42 U.S.C. 14135a(a)(1)(A), which permits the collection of DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted. The district court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and prohibited the government from taking the sample prior to conviction. After determining that the matter concerned a collateral order, subject to interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. Arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their identities, and DNA collection from arrestees serves important law enforcement interests; such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Petitioner, convicted of armed assault and murder in 1977, is detained in a federal facility in West Virginia. While in prison he was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. He is serving an aggregate sentence comprised of sentences that were imposed under the D.C. Code and the U.S. Code. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition, reasoning that the U.S. Parole Commission had a rational basis for denying parole (the unusual circumstances of his offenses) and that petitioner was not entitled to benefit from the release-date guarantee under the earlier version of the Sentencing Reform Act because the Commission applied D.C. Code regulations, not the current SRA, in declining to set a parole date. The District Court also denied a certificate of appealability explaining that petitioner, in custody by virtue of a District of Columbia judgment, is considered a state prisoner and had not made the threshold showing for issuance of such a certificate. The First Circuit agreed, stating that petitioner had not made the necessary showing of constitutional violations that would justify issuance of a COA.

Petitioner, serving two consecutive life sentences for murders, exhausted state appeals and filed a federal habeas corpus petition, pro se. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. Petitioner concedes that his petition was not timely under the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254, but contends that equitable tolling should be granted because his inability to speak, read, or write English, coupled with the prison's lack of Spanish-language legal materials and repeated denials of translation assistance, are extraordinary circumstances. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that language inability coupled with lack of assistance can constitute extraordinary circumstances and that petitioner exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his claims. His claim that the trial court committed a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation under by admitting a non-testifying co-defendant's confession into evidence despite its potential to prejudice petitioner's defense is debatable and requires further development.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of simple possession of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 844(a) and his conviction subsequently triggered removal proceedings against him some years later. Defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis to challenge the plea conviction, arguing that his attorney's failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a federal drug charge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Having concluded that defendant's petition failed to allege Strickland v. Washington prejudice and hence was deficient as a matter of law, the district court dismissed the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. At issue was whether Padilla v. Kentucky, which was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during the pendency of defendant's appeal, had retroactive applicability. The court held that, because Padilla followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional norms, it was an "old rule" for Teague v. Lane purposes and was retroactively applicable on collateral review. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded to that court to decide the case within the framework of Padilla and on the basis of a developed factual record.

Plaintiff, arrested for violating a township public intoxication ordinance, argued that the law was superseded by or contrary to the New Jersey Alcoholism Treatment and Rehabilitation Act. The judge dismissed the charge. Plaintiff's federal suit, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law, was dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not provide a remedy because the ordinance under which plaintiff was arrested is not unambiguously invalid.