Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant broke into a gun shop and absconded with 30 firearms. He entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit an offense against the U.S. (18 U.S.C. 371), stealing firearms from a federally licensed dealer (18 U.S.C. § 922(u)), and possessing an unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The Presentence Report, calculated a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history category as I, for a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months' imprisonment. The offense level included a four-point enhancement pursuant to USSG 2K2.1(b)(6), which must be applied if the defendant "used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense;" or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. The district court found that the enhancement did not apply to defendant's conduct, reduced the Guidelines range to 46 to 57 months and sentenced him to 48 months in prison. Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 691 (2006) indicates that USSG 2K2.1(b)(6) does apply when the predicate offense is burglary of the firearms that are the subject of the conviction, contrary to cases decided before the amendment. View "United States v. Keller" on Justia Law

Petitioner, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and possession of an instrument of crime, for a drive-by shooting. The court rejected his evidence of misidentification and alibi. He exhausted state court remedies. The district court granted a habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, which was essentially a new trial. The purpose of the Antitterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254 is to channel prisoners' claims first to the state courts. Defendant did not establish that his attorney's failure to develop his alibi prejudiced his trial; the prosecution had physical evidence and eyewitness testimony. View "Brown v. Wakefield" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 846). The district court sentenced him to 70 months of imprisonment, classifying a crime he committed at the age of 16 as a prior felony conviction under the sentencing guidelines (4B1.2). Under New York law, an individual between the ages of 16 and 19 may be deemed an "eligible youth" if he is charged with a criminal offense and fulfills other specified conditions. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 720.10(1)-(2). If classified as an eligible youth, the court will vacate and replace the conviction with a youthful offender finding. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the conviction was an adult conviction, regardless of a subsequent "youthful offender" adjudication. View "United States v. Wallace" on Justia Law

From 1996 until 2003, petitioner, a Columbian, laundered money for Colombian drug traffickers. He was arrested and agreed to cooperate with the FBI. Conviction and sentencing were deferred. He worked with the FBI from 2003 to 2007. In 2007, petitioner was arrested in Colombia for failure to pay a fine years earlier. He paid the fine, but remained in jail for 22 days. He claims that his arrest was to facilitate his murder by the paramilitary group targeted by his FBI work. When he returned to the U.S. he was arrested because FBI agents believed he was involved in money laundering outside of his cooperation. Petitioner pled guilty based on the 1999 transfers. DHS charged him as removable. An IJ and the BIA denied his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Third Circuit remanded. The BIA must consider that an applicant can establish governmental acquiescence even if the government opposes the paramilitary organization that is engaged in torturous acts. The BIA must also consider that country conditions can, by themselves, constitute grounds for determining that an applicant would more likely than not be subjected to torture upon return to the country of removal. View "Pieschacon-Villegas v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

The district court accepted a guilty plea to charges relating to cocaine distribution, but did not expressly rule on a request for reduction of sentence under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 based on a claim that defendant was a minimal participant. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. During the sentencing hearing on remand, the court declined to consider defendant's efforts toward rehabilitation since he was sentenced and reimposed the original sentence. About one week later, the Supreme Court decided U.S. v. Pepper. The Third Circuit again vacated and remanded. Postsentencing rehabilitation is a critical part of a defendant's history that can be relevant in assessing likelihood of future criminal behavior. Any limitation precluding the consideration of postsentencing rehabilitation must clearly appear on the face of the opinion vacating the original sentence. View "United States v. Salinas-Cortez" on Justia Law

After defendant's plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), a presentence report indicated that the base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2) was 24 because he had at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. Defendant acknowledged the controlled substance conviction, but argued that his base offense level should have been only 20 because his 1994 conviction under Pennsylvania law for making terroristic threats in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2706 did not qualify as a COV. The district court rejected the argument and sentenced him to a within-guidelines sentence of 80 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, applying a modified categorical approach. The charging document and plea colloquy demonstrated that the conviction under 2706 for threatening to commit criminal homicide constituted a COV because it always has as an element threatened use of physical force against the person of another. View "United States v. Mahone" on Justia Law

Defendant was acquitted of carjacking (18 U.S.C. 2119), but convicted of possession of ammunition by a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), and committing an offense while on pretrial release (18 U.S.C. 3147(1). Section 3147 states that, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense, the offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not more than 10 years if the offense is a felony or not more than one year if the offense is a misdemeanor, consecutive to any other sentence. The district court added four levels because defendant possessed ammunition in connection with another felony, added two levels for reckless endangerment during flight, and added three levels for commission of an offense while on release, for a total offense level of 29. Defendant has a Category V criminal history, so the advisory range was 140 to 175 months, exceeding the 10-year maximum sentence for the possession count. The court imposed a sentence of 96 months on the possession of ammunition count and 42 months on the 3147 count. The Third Circuit reversed the 3147 conviction; the section is a sentencing enhancement, not a description of an offense. The section can, however, increase the maximum sentence for the underlying felony offense committed while on pretrial release by 10 years. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant, a licensed financial adviser, pled guilty to 34 counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) based on his solicitation of bank clients to invest in speculative real estate transactions that he controlled, unrelated to bank products, an illegal practice in the securities industry known as "selling away." The Government accused him of collecting $1.55 million between October 2002 and January 2006. The district court denied his motion to withdraw the plea when he claimed that his prior attorney, unprepared to go to trial, had browbeaten him. The court imposed a sentence of 180 months and $1.3 million in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. With no evidence of actual innocence and the death of some of the government's elderly witnesses, there was no "fair and just" reason to allow withdrawal of the plea. Because defendant was an investment advisor when he initiated the fraud, the court properly applied a four-level enhancement at section 2B1.1(b)(16)(A); an obstruction of justice enhancement was justified by defendant's lies concerning his guilty plea and his contact with witnesses. View "United States v. Siddon" on Justia Law

Defendant, an apartment building owner convicted of bribery of building officials, (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2)), was sentenced to 34 months of imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed and remanded for resentencing. The district court provided thorough instructions as to the elements of bribery, defining "knowingly," "corruptly," and "willfully," and was within its discretion in denying a separate instruction on intent. The court correctly excluded testimony of a defense witness and limited defense cross-examination of certain witnesses. The court was within its discretion in holding that defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of prior knowledge of a change of testimony. In sentencing, the court did not follow the correct order of steps set forth in "Gunter," did not compute a definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach its Guidelines range nor did it meaningfully consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct (18 U.S.C. 3553 (a)(6).

Defendant was the fiancee of the leader of a Philadelphia drug distribution ring responsible for selling a large amount of cocaine and cocaine base (crack) from 1998 to 2005. In 2005, the couple used drug money to purchase a new home, which was titled in defendant's name. When her fiancee was charged with drug trafficking and firearms offenses, defendant was charged with money laundering in purchasing the house, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She appealed her conviction. The Third Circuit vacated. The evidence was not sufficient to establish knowledge of a design to conceal on defendant's part. Defendant lied about her income and had the property titled in her name, not to hide her fiancee's involvement (which was obvious), but to get around his bad credit and purchase the house.