Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections brought a civil rights action in 2000 claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group, a subgroup of Sunni Muslims. Several claims were dismissed, and, following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of individual defendants on a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim that policies and practices violated the inmate's right to practice his religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The Third Circuit affirmed. RLUIPA does not permit individual-capacity suits and defendants had qualified immunity with respect to the 1983 claims. Plaintiff did not have a clearly established right to separate religious services in accordance with the Habashi sect when Sunni Islamic services were already available. View "Sharp v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1990 of murder and arson after his 20-year-old mentally ill daughter died in a fire at a religious retreat. His attorney argued that the deceased set the fire as a suicidal act. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. On remand for an evidentiary hearing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court received substantial evidence about developments in the field of fire science that provided reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation. The court nonetheless affirmed the convictions and sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied an appeal. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. The Third Circuit remanded for discovery. Petitioner was diligent in state court to develop his claims that newly developed scientific evidence establishes that the expert testimony at his trial was fundamentally unreliable, in violation of due process, and that he is actually innocent. He has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that discovery is essential to the development of his federal claims. View "Lee v. Tennis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Liberia, was admitted as a visitor in 1980. In, 1983, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1988, he pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct. In 1995, Minnesota enacted a predatory offender registration statute. Petitioner initially complied, but in 1998, pled guilty to failing to register. In 2009, DHS began removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his date of admission and alleging that his 1998 conviction, coupled with his 1988 conviction, made him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme. Several months later, petitioner asserted for the first time that he was admitted in 1980, not 1983, but did not support his assertion with any evidence. The IJ ordered him removed. The BIA dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, reversing the treatment of petitioner's conviction under the predatory offender registration statute. The court remanded with instructions to allow him to supplement the record to show that he was legally admitted in 1980 and to enter an order that he is not removable. View "Totimeh v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

A federal grand jury returned an indictment against defendant and her boyfriend; she was charged with knowingly aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)1 and 2(a)2. The boyfriend pled guilty as a felon in possession. The district court dismissed the indictment against defendant. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. A finding that the government would not be able to prove the charge was premature; an aiding and abetting charge required proof that the substantive crime has been committed and that the defendant knew of the commission of the substantive offense and acted with intent to facilitate it. Rejecting a Second Amendment claim, the court reasoned that the indictment did not charge that defendant's mere possession of a gun violated the law.View "United States v. Huet" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1346, mail fraud ("traditional" fraud), 18 U.S.C.1341, and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, based on a defendant (city councilman) taking official actions in exchange for gifts. Their appeal claimed that the 2010 Supreme Court decision, Skilling v. U.S., affected the law of honest services fraud. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. While the evidence was sufficient to convict on each count, the Skilling decision made jury instructions on honest services fraud incorrect. The jury should have been instructed on a bribery theory but not on a conflict-of-interest theory. The error was not necessarily harmless; the law of honest services fraud depends on intent and finding intent requires a jury to make reasonable inferences. Evidence of honest services fraud overlapped substantially evidence submitted on traditional fraudView "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Defendants came to the FBI's attention because of a video taken to a store for copying; it depicted defendants shooting weapons and shouting jihad slogans. At trial, the government presented evidence of a plot to attack military bases: recorded conversations; testimony by confidential informants and agents who coordinated the 16-month investigation; videos of training in the Poconos; propaganda videos advocating violent jihad, including attacks against service members; and video of defendants purchasing automatic weapons. Defendants were convicted of conspiring to murder U.S. military personnel, 18 U.S.C. 1114 and 1117 and of firearm offenses. The Third Circuit affirmed most of the convictions, rejecting evidentiary and other challenges to the conduct of the trial. The court rejected a constitutional challenge to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. 1801) as amended by the Patriot Act, under which evidence was procured. The "significant purpose" standard of the Act reflects a balance between legitimate needs of government for intelligence information and protected rights of citizens. The court properly admitted certain out-of-court statements against a defendant under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The court vacated one conviction of attempted possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)). View "United States v. Duka" on Justia Law

Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), defendant agreed to plead guilty and to cooperate with the government. A pre-sentence report indicated that he qualified as a career offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). His total offense level was calculated as 30 and his criminal history category as IV, yielding a guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. Defendant's status as a career offender subjected him to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. The district court accepted inclusion of a 1980 Pennsylvania simple assault conviction as a predicate violent felony, but determined that it was not bound by the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence because the government had filed a motion requesting a downward departure for "substantial assistance." Noting the defendant's many illnesses, the court imposed a prison sentence of time-served (one month and three days) and five years of supervised release. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence, holding that a district court cannot use factors unrelated to a defendant's substantial assistance to the government in order to reduce a sentence below the minimum.View "United States v. Winebarger" on Justia Law

In 1984, petitioner was sentenced to death following his convictions in Pennsylvania state court for first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. After exhausting state court remedies, he filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied relief on guilt phase claims, but granted the writ as to the death sentence, finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or introduce expert mental health testimony and institutional records in mitigation. Petitioner then filed, and the court denied, an FRCP 59(e) motion to amend the judgment based on alleged newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase of trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first holding that a timely Rule 59(e) motion is not a second or successive petition, whether or not it advances a claim; such a motion lies outside jurisdictional limitations that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) imposes upon multiple collateral attacks. The district court was within its discretion in finding that the evidence submitted was not newly discovered, since petitioner had possession of it many months before the District Court denied habeas relief. Trial counsel's performance was inadequate and petitioner can show prejudice. View "Blystone v. Horn" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 144 months in prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 371; armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(d); and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). He appealed enhancement of his sentence under USSG 3C1.2 for recklessly endangering others while fleeing from law enforcement officers, which was based on his participation in a conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He was merely a passenger in the car which was driven recklessly by a co-conspirator. The Third Circuit remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. Application of a 3C1.2 enhancement based on the reasonable foreseeability of a confederate's reckless endangerment during flight, using the generally applicable standard of 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), would enhance a defendant's sentencing without him having engaged in the specific conduct set forth with respect to the reckless endangerment. View "United States v. Cespede" on Justia Law

Defendants, who operated what purported to be online pharmacies, were convicted on a 42-count indictment alleging crimes arising from a multi-national, internet-based, controlled-substance-distribution scheme. They have appealed multiple decisions of the trial court and appealed their conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed. Among other challenges, the court rejected arguments: that the money-laundering convictions impermissibly merge with underlying predicate felonies; that the district court should have suppressed evidence from untimely-sealed surveillance records; that the indictment, evidence, and jury instructions were insufficient to sustain a Continuing Criminal Enterprise conviction; and that the court erred in calculating sentences; the the alleged conduct, distribution of controlled substances via the internet, was not illegal at the time charged; that the money laundered was obtained by lawful means; and that certain convictions were misdemeanors, not felonies. View "United States v. Mullinix" on Justia Law