Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to two crimes involving sexual exploitation of minors. After the plea agreement was signed, the probation office recommended a five-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.5(b), which applies to defendants who "engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct." The agreement referred to other USSG provisions, but not to criminal history enhancements. Defendant conceded the applicability of the enhancement in the district court, which imposed a sentence of 216 months. The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting an argument that the government breached the plea agreement by requesting the enhancement and a request for resentencing to a range of 108 to 135 months' imprisonment.View "United States v. Dahmen" on Justia Law

Serving a life sentence for murder, petitioner exhausted state appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Third Circuit affirmed. The petition was not timely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Allegedly "new," exculpatory evidence of witness tampering and the identity of the "actual shooter" was known to petitioner in 1994. Petitioner did not establish his diligence or extraordinarily burdensome circumstances and the evidence did not establish actual innocence. View "Sistrunk v. Rozum" on Justia Law

Defendant accepted $1,000 and Mets tickets for helping a consulting company obtain a contract with the county for temporary employment of individuals for clean-up after a 2006 flood. He pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The presentence report recommended a sentence of 15 to 21 months' imprisonment. USSG 2C1.2(a)(1) set the base offense level at 11; the report added two levels under 2C1.2(b)(1) because the offense involved more than one gratuity and four levels under 2C1.2(b)(3) because the offense involved a public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position. It subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility (3E1.1). The district court imposed a sentence of 15 months' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendant could not hire or fire; could not bind the county; could not act officially on the county's behalf; had administrative, not policymaking, duties; and reported to superiors, who reported to County Commissioners. The high-level government official enhancement was not applied to his superior, also implicated in the bribery scheme. Defendant was, however, responsible for the human resource department. View "United States v. Richards" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of third degree murder after a third trial concerning a 1996 shooting death. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act, then sought federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court admitted prior testimony from an unavailable government witness, even though petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness with newly-discovered impeachment evidence. Petitioner had a full opportunity for cross-examination at his second trial. The court also rejected claims based on the judge questioning a juror in camera, without petitioner present. View "Ross v. Dist. Attorney of the Cnty of Allegheny" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B). Using the 2006 USSG, the probation office determined a base offense level of 32, which was combined with 11 criminal history points and career offender status, due to prior felony convictions for aggravated assault and distribution of a controlled substance. After a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the total offense level was 31, resulting in an advisory range of 188-235 months. The court granted downward departure under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines, arrived at a range of 140-175 months, and sentenced him to 150 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendant filed a motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly determined that the advisory range was dictated by the Career Offender Guidelines, not his post-departure range, which corresponded to the range in the Crack Cocaine Guidelines. View "United States v. Barney" on Justia Law

Following a violent, racially-motivated fight among teenagers in a park, one person died. The mother of a participant was dating a police officer and the district attorney took over the investigation, believing there was a cover-up. The FBI became involved and officers were convicted of knowingly falsifying police reports with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation into a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1519 and knowingly making a false material statement in a matter within FBI jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support the convictions and rejecting a challenge to section 1519 as unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Nestor" on Justia Law

The tenant moved into an apartment in 2004. The building later came under management by defendants. In 2008 tenant filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962, alleging that defendants conspired to harbor illegal aliens and to encourage or induce illegal aliens to reside in the U.S. in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). He claimed that the apartment complex fell into disrepair and that criminal activity went unreported, causing injury to his leasehold property. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The "harboring" claim was properly dismissed; the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the conduct tended to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining in the U.S. illegally and to prevent government authorities from detecting the unlawful presence. With respect to the "inducing" claim, the court stated that it could not imagine that Congress contemplated that landlords and hotel and motel operators would be responsible for making complex legal determinations about who is permitted to live in this country, much less that they would be criminalized for an error in so doing.View "Delrio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc." on Justia Law

After receiving a tip from a reliable source that individuals in a white Toyota Camry were carrying firearms, police officers initiated a traffic stop. A firearm was discovered on the driver, who unsuccessfully moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and sentence. The requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was not established by the presence of illegal tints on the vehicle's windows or by the tip that firearms were in the possession of the individuals in the vehicle. The informant gave brief information, not including whether the firearm was legal or illegal. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2005, an inmate filed a pro se lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, alleging personal injuries caused by defendants' exposing him to second-hand smoke. The district court dismissed, but news of the dismissal did not reach him for almost a year because of a prison transfer. The district court denied untimely motions to reopen the time for appeal and for reconsideration. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that it could not relax the timing requirements for filing a motion to reopen the time for appeal under FRAP 4(a)(6), even for prison delay, because those requirements are governed by statute and are jurisdictional. The situation is not one in which time lost due to prison delays can be excluded. While prison delay may make an untimely motion for reconsideration timely, that motion was delayed by clerks' office errors, not by prison delay. View "Baker v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, Long filed an suit against city and state police and forensic chemists, claiming conspiracy to obtain a murder conviction against him by presenting false evidence and preventing him from obtaining DNA testing that would prove his innocence (42 U.S.C. 1983). After screening (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2); 1915A), the district court found that the claims were barred unless he could demonstrate that his conviction was invalid. Dismissal was entered on the docket August 21, 2006, so that he had until September 4 to file a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. On September 25, he filed the motion with a letter explaining that he had not received the filings until September 22, because of a transfer from one prison to another. The district court treated the motion as timely, but rejected it on the merits. The order was entered on the docket October 6. On October 31, Long signed a notice of appeal that was timely from the denial of reconsideration, but untimely from the dismissal order. The Third Circuit affirmed without deciding the delay issue, finding that it had jurisdiction based on the denial of reconsideration. View "Long v. Atl. City Police Dep't" on Justia Law