Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1993 Simon and others burglarized a house; the occupant arrived during the burglary and was shot dead. Simon was tried for felony murder, first degree robbery, and third degree burglary. Simon repeatedly moved to dismiss his appointed defender, Ayala. Ayala moved to withdraw claiming that Simon was hostile and was planning to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. The court declined. Ayala did not give an opening statement, call witnesses, or object to closure of the courtroom during closing arguments and jury instructions. Simon was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. His direct appeals were unsuccessful. Another participant, who testified against Simon, had his sentence reduced for his assistance. Virgin Islands court rejected a petition for habeas corpus and, on appeal, Simon's attorney filed an Anders motion to withdraw. The motion was granted and the petition was ultimately denied. The Third Circuit vacated, first rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction. The Appellate Division did not err in applying Anders procedures to assess motions filed by court-appointed counsel to withdraw on post-conviction appeal, but erred in finding the Anders brief sufficient on its face. There were nonfrivolous issues that should be reviewed on the merits. View "Simon v. Gov't of the VI" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Based on prior Pennsylvania convictions for simple assault and third-degree murder, the presentence report recommended that he be sentenced as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1. The district court agreed and imposed a sentence of 96 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s attempt to drag his wife up the stairs with his hands around her neck qualified as a crime of violence, as did his kicking a man to death after an attempt to buy drugs. View "United States v. Marrero" on Justia Law

Defendants owned an engineering and surveying company. Between 2002 and 2008, it failed to pay the IRS more than $500,000 in taxes withheld from employee paychecks. They were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371, and 21 counts of failure to account and pay over employment taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7202. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors, but remanded for resentencing. The district court erred in imposing a two-level increase to the offense levels for abuse of a position of trust, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.3.View "United States v. DeMuro" on Justia Law

An ATF agent noticed that his barber carried guns and that the shop was used for illegal activities. Learning that his barber had felony convictions, the agent purchased weapons from the barber, obtained warrants, searched the shop and arrested the barber, which led to indictment of Turner. Turner was convicted of conspiring to make false statements to a firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 371, 924(a)(1)(A), knowingly aiding and abetting in making false statements to a firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A), (2), and knowingly possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e), and sentenced to 190 months. On appeal, Turner‘s newly-appointed counsel filed a "quasi- Anders brief," raising a combination of colorable and frivolous arguments. The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, clarifying that, except in cases governed by Anders, parties represented by counsel may not file pro se briefs. When such briefs are filed the clerk will refer them to putative pro se litigant's counsel. Counsel may include a client's pro se arguments in their own briefs or, in an appropriate and unusual case, seek leave to file a separate, supplemental brief drafted by counsel that advances arguments raised by the client that counsel believes are meritorious. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

After police conducted a controlled buy, through a confidential informant, defendant was convicted of cocaine distribution and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); using and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the district court violated defendant's constitutional rights and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 by questioning prospective jurors on the record, at sidebar outside his presence. The court properly denied his motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant and properly imposed an upward variance. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Singh, born in Jamaica, has been a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. since 1975, married a U.S. citizen and raised three children. In operating a construction firm that bid on public works projects as a Minority Business Enterprise, Singh accepted kickbacks for falsely certifying that his business was serving as a subcontractor on government projects when, in fact, another did the work. When the company filed for bankruptcy in 2005, the scheme came to light. Singh was charged with failing to disclose all of the company’s accounts receivable on the bankruptcy petition, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). Singh pled guilty and agreed to restitution in the amount of $54,418.08. He was sentenced to 10 months. DHS initiated removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Immigration Judge entered an order of removal, which the BIA affirmed, finding that conviction under 152(3) categorically involves fraud and that the restitution order established that the offense caused loss to the trustee exceeding $10,000. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the statute requires actual, not merely intended, loss. The court rejected an argument that 152(3) is a perjury offense that must meet the requirements for perjury-based aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C 1101(a)(43)(S).View "Singh v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Two U.S. Army Reserve officers, deployed to Iraq in 2003 to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority, were convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.371, for participating in a bid-rigging scheme that involved directing millions of dollars in contracts to companies owned by an American businessman. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish participation in the conspiracy; to denial of a motion to suppress; and to denial of immunity for a co-conspirator. View "United States v. Whiteford" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of a series of carjackings, an attempted robbery, and the murder of a security guard. One was sentenced to life imprisonment and consecutive prison terms totaling 70 years on federal counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive prison term of 15 years on Virgin Islands counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to the federal sentences. Three others were sentenced to life imprisonment on federal counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive 15-year prison term on Virgin Islands counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to federal sentences. Each was fined $50,000. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors, prosecutorial misconduct, faulty jury instructions, insufficiency of the evidence, and double jeopardy. After examining 18 U.S.C. 924 (c) and (j) the court stated that Congress clearly intended to impose cumulative punishment when a killing occurs in connection with a predicate offense, including crimes of violence and drug trafficking. A "Title III" recorded conversation (18 U.S.C. 2510) admitted at trial was not testimonial, and not subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny. View "United States v. Berrios" on Justia Law

In 1977 defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree murder. He was released in 1992, and, still on parole, was accused of inappropriately touching his six-year-old daughter. He was convicted; the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections recommended that his sentence include participation in a sex offender treatment program. He has been repeatedly denied parole based on refusal to participate. He claims that the program requirement that he admit committing the sex crime for which he was convicted would amount to self-incrimination and would have compromised his then-pending appeal. His petition for habeas corpus was denied by the district court. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to address whether petitioner had exhausted state remedies. Even assuming that refusal to participate was the sole reason for denying parole, the actions of the Board did not amount to “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The purpose of the program is not simply to gather information and an inmate has no right to parole. Penalties that merely alter the degree of comfort or freedom that an inmate is afforded do not amount to compulsion under the Fifth Amend View "Roman v. DiGuglielmo" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, and was sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment, plus three years of supervised release. She began supervised release in 2007, but violated conditions. After first modifying the conditions, the district court revoked supervised release. She served about three months, was again released, and again violated conditions. The court modified the conditions to include four months of home detention with electronic monitoring. Violations continued; the court again revoked supervised release and sentenced her to 19 months' imprisonment and supervised release, with six months to be served in a halfway house, and six to be served under home detention. She violated again conditions. The district court concluded that the maximum term was not reduced by the aggregate length of previously-served revocation imprisonment and imposed what it viewed as the statutory maximum: 24 months' imprisonment, without supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the combined 25-month sentence of incarceration and home detention exceeded the 24-month maximum prison term under 18 U.S.C. 3583. Defendant argued that home detention counts as imprisonment, because 3583(e)(4) states that home detention "may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration." View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law