Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Newark detectives were watching a building in connection with a crime that occurred at another location, two months earlier. They did not have a description of anyone involved and had no information whatsoever about Navedo. After watching an interaction between Navedo and Pozo, the officers thought that Pozo had a gun. The officers approached and identified themselves and clearly saw that Pozo had a gun. Pozo threw it into his bag and ran. As one officer chased Pozo, Navedo ran up the stairs to his home with another officer pursuing him into the building. As Navedo opened the door to his apartment, he was tackled by the officer, who testified that he handcuffed Navedo, then observed a shotgun, rifles, and ammunition on the floor. The court denied a motion to suppress, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Navedo and that Navedo’s flight elevated the reasonable suspicion to “probable cause for arrest and justified entry” under the theory of hot pursuit. The Third Circuit vacated. The police had no reason to suspect that Navedo was involved in criminal activity, and even if they had appropriately formed such suspicion, they would only have been entitled to detain and investigate, not arrest. View "United States v. Navedo" on Justia Law

In 2003, Berberena pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine; possession of crack with intent to distribute; and possession of powder cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 210-262 months but varied downward to impose a sentence of 150 months. In 2006, Gayle was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; possession of crack with intent to distribute; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court calculated a range of 168-210 months for two counts, but varied downward to 120 months. Because one count carried a mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence, the court sentenced him to 180 months. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act changed the threshold quantities of crack that trigger mandatory minimum sentences. Berberena and Gayle moved for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court applied a policy statement that generally prohibits a reduction below the low end of a prisoner’s new range, even if the prisoner originally received a below-Guidelines sentence. Berberena’s motion was denied. Gayle’s motion was granted in part. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority, violated separation-of-powers principles, and failed to comply with APA notice-and-comment requirements. View "United States v. Gayle" on Justia Law

In 1986 Munchinski was convicted of two counts of first-degree homicide and two counts of second-degree homicide arising out of a pair of murders that occurred in 1977 in Bear Rocks, Pennsylvania. Munchinski later discovered that prosecutors had withheld from his counsel almost a dozen articles of exculpatory evidence. After unsuccessfully petitioning for post-conviction relief several times in state and federal court, Munchinski filed a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244 & 2254(d), arguing that the Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied Brady, when it declined to grant Munchinski post-conviction relief. The district court granted habeas relief. The court equitably tolled the statute of limitations for some untimely claims; excused certain procedural defaults, finding that applying the procedural default doctrine would effect a fundamental miscarriage of justice; and agreed that the state court had unreasonably applied Brady. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the scope of the Brady violations was “staggering.” Munchinski demonstrated actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. View "Munchinski v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Roye, a 58-year-old native of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. in 1984 as the spouse of a citizen. In 1992, he pled guilty to aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of a child by having sexual intercourse with his eight-month old daughter. The trial judge sentenced Roye to six to 20 years’ imprisonment but strongly recommended transfer into a psychiatric facility. Fourteen years later, DHS charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An Immigration Judge found that Roye granted for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ emphasized testimony indicating “that mentally ill detainees and prisoners are often sexually and physically assaulted in the Jamaican prison system because of the nature of their mental illness” and that Roye will be homeless in Jamaica due to a lack of family ties. The BIA ordered immediate removal. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA must review the conclusion that the evidence demonstrates that Roye’s persecutors will physically and sexually abuse him in a manner that rises to the level of torture under the CAT, and decide whether Jamaican public officials will consent to or acquiesce in such abuse. View "Roye v. Atty Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

In 2005 Anderson was charged with federal tax evasion (26 U.S.C. 7201) for tax years 1995 through 1999, while Anderson was an entrepreneur and venture capitalist involved in operating several international companies, including G & A, which generated hundreds of millions of dollars of income. The government alleged that because G & A was a “controlled foreign corporation,” he was required to recognize a share of its income on his tax return; that he fraudulently failed to do so; and thatAnderson had fraudulently underpaid his taxes by $184 million, 99% of which stemmed from G & A. He pleaded guilty with respect to two years and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment. In 2007 Anderson filed a petition to redetermine his tax deficiencies, 26 U.S.C. 6213(a). The Tax Court granted partial summary judgment to the IRS. The Third Circuit affirmed. Anderson’s conviction for tax evasion in 1998 and 1999 precludes him, by virtue of collateral estoppel, from contesting in civil fraud proceedings that G & A income was taxable to him in those years. The IRS’s concession of all deficiency and penalty issues for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 has no preclusive effect on those issues for 1998 and 1999. View "Anderson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2002 Murray pleaded guilty, in New Jersey, to traveling interstate to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor. Later that year, in a Pennsylvania district court, he pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 95 months’ imprisonment, followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release. Both sentencing judges imposed special conditions of release that, for example, required him to register as a sex offender and to submit to unannounced searches of his computer. After Murray was released from prison in 2010, he moved to the Western District of Pennsylvania, which assumed jurisdiction for the remainder of his term of supervised release. Though Murray had not violated his existing supervised release conditions, the probation office sought to modify them to bring them in line with the conditions of release that are typically used in that district. The court granted the request and imposed several new, more stringent conditions, including a prohibition on possession of sexually-oriented material and a requirement to submit to workplace searches. The Third Circuit remanded the new conditions for an explanation of why they are no greater than necessary to satisfy the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Murray" on Justia Law

Martorano was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole after pleading guilty, in 1984, to 19 counts related to the wholesale distribution of drugs. He appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court imposed an illegal general sentence; and that his undifferentiated sentence for conspiring to distribute drugs (21 U.S.C. 846) and supervising a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (21 U.S.C. 848) violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Third Circuit rejected the arguments and affirmed, noting that, since 1988, the sentence has been reviewed by various district court judges and Third Circuit panels. View "United States v. Martorano" on Justia Law

Powell’s cousin, Lassiter, testified that he and Powell engaged in robberies of college students and drug dealers in North Philadelphia in 2008. They decided their crimes were attracting too much attention and determined instead to rob business owners by following them from their stores to their homes. They targeted immigrant business owners in the belief that “Chinese people” would keep business proceeds at home because they did not use banks. They cased Star Wigs, owned by Y.B., a female Korean immigrant. The store sold merchandise from multiple out-of-state suppliers. They followed Y.B. to her home, invaded the house, beat the occupants, took credit cards, a handgun, jewelry, handbags, heirlooms, cash that belonged to Y.B.’s husband, receipts and petty cash from the business, and personal electronics. During a subsequent, similar robbery, the victim’s daughter called police, who were able to follow and arrest defendants in possession of stolen items. Powell was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for both robberies and sentenced to 697 months’ imprisonment and restitution of $20,762.55. The Third Circuit affirmed. The critical jurisdictional question under the Hobbs Act is the robbery’s effect on interstate commerce; where the robbery occurs is but one factor. View "United States v. Powell" on Justia Law

Stoerr pled guilty to bid rigging, 15 U.S.C. 1; conspiracy to provide kickbacks and to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371; and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). The convictions stemmed from kickback payments that Stoerr solicited and accepted from sub-contractors in connection with environmental remediation projects managed by Sevenson, his employer from 1980 to October 2003. In total, the district court determined that the scheme resulted in losses of $134,098.96 to the EPA and $257,129.22 to Tierra. After Sevenson learned of the kickbacks scheme, it paid Tierra approximately $241,000 to compensate for its losses. It then commenced a civil action against Stoerr in state court to recover its losses, and sought restitution in connection with Stoerr’s sentencing, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A, for reimbursement of the amount that it paid to Tierra. The district court denied Sevenson‟s request for restitution, instead ordering that Stoerr pay restitution to Tierra. The Third Circuit dismissed; as a non-party, Sevenson lacks standing to appeal. View "United States v. Stoerr" on Justia Law

In 2005 a house that had operated as an unlicensed bar was robbed by three men with guns. The men took cell phones and cash from patrons and were apprehended in the area shortly after the robbery, carrying some of the stolen items, and were identified by witnesses. Three defendants, Shavers, White, and Lewis were convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce, conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce, witness tampering, and using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. The Third Circuit vacated Shavers’s and White’s witness tampering convictions and Shavers’s eight-year term of supervised release. The court affirmed the other convictions and Lewis’s sentence. The court upheld jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act stating that property crimes like robbery and extortion are, unlike possession of a gun in a school zone or gender-motivated violence, indisputably economic, and, in the aggregate, have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. View "United States v. Shaver" on Justia Law