Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Washington’s friend, Taylor, worked at Dollar Express in 2000. Taylor observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no guards, cameras, or other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor met at Waddy’s home to plan the robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove the group to the store. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered, carrying tools to open the safe, and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington heard the shots, ran into the store, and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with items to sell. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. After learning that police had designated him a person of interest, Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify in exchange for a sentence of 55 to 110 years. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy for his participation as the driver. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained a conditional federal writ of habeas corpus, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried nontestifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause; the redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers were patrolling an area where drug deals are common. They spotted a Jeep with Davis and Blackshear inside; the engine was running. Davis and Blackshear reached toward each other with “body motions [that] were consistent with the exchanging of narcotics in a narcotics transaction.” Seeing the officers, Davis and Blackshear had “expressions of shock,” and tossed something into the backseat. They exited the Jeep and quickly walked away without closing a door. The officers stopped the men and patted them down for weapons, but found wads of cash in their pockets. An officer saw a handgun through the open door. They arrested Davis and Blackshear, returned to the Jeep, and spotted a shopping bag in the backseat. It was open and contained a white substance. A drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers obtained a warrant and recovered 10 cell phones and shopping bags with 740 grams of cocaine distributed among smaller Ziploc bags. As evidence that Davis recognized the cocaine in the Jeep, the government proved that he had two prior cocaine convictions. The Third Circuit vacated Davis’s conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), noting that the government never proved that the cocaine from his past was similar in appearance, quantity, or form. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Rodriguez and Diaz triggered suspicion of the Drug Enforcement Administration by purchasing last-minute one-way airplane tickets from San Juan to Philadelphia, using cash, checking no luggage, and holding no carry-on baggage. They proceeded to the baggage claim after deplaning, where they met Cordero and retrieved suitcases that had distinctive markings. As agents watched, they loaded the cases into one vehicle and got into another. The vehicle containing the suitcases was searched; the cases each contained 12-13 kilograms of cocaine, for a total retail value of $5 million. Despite taking evasive actions, the other vehicle was stopped. Cordero had thrown the memory chip from his phone out of the window before being pulled over. Diaz was carrying $456 in cash, Rodriguez had $33 in cash, and Cordero had $1,173 in cash. Rodriguez and Diaz were charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and aiding possession with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Diaz entered a guilty plea and testified against the others. The district court overturned a verdict finding them guilty, stating that the evidence only showed that Rodriguez knew that he was being entrusted with a suitcase which could contain a “wide variety of contraband items.’” The Third Circuit vacated, declining to apply a “strict standard,” as it has in prior cases, and employing “the proper deferential standard.” View "United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

An FBI Agent and others were in an unmarked car with tinted windows, at a Newark intersection, as part of a drug investigation. People scattered when the vehicle arrived, but the agent saw Smith across the street, staring into the vehicle. Smith disappeared, but returned a minute later. As Smith passed under a light, the agent saw a handgun. As Smith approached, the agent called out that he had a gun. Smith was arrested. Officers recovered a semi-automatic handgun, but no drugs were found on Smith. Smith confessed that he had been on the corner and that he had a gun, but claimed that he retrieved the gun in self-defense because there had been a shooting nearby two weeks earlier involving a similar car. Smith was indicted for threatening a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) & (b); possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court admitted evidence under Rule 404(b) that, two years earlier, Smith had engaged in a drug transaction at the same corner. The Third Circuit vacated the convictions, holding that admission of the prior conviction violated the requirement that the proponent of such admission set forth a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because the defendant committed offenses before, he is more likely to have committed this one. View "Unted States v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1993, Dillon and Lollis were convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack and 500 grams of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; use of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1); and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court imposed a prison sentence of 262 months for two counts and 60 months for another, to be served consecutively, with five years of supervised release--the minimum under then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. The crack guidelines were amended in 2008 and 2011. Dillon’s sentence was reduced, first to 270 months, and then to time served. Dillon served 28 months more than called for by amended guidelines. While on supervised release, he was arrested when Lollis’s car, in which he was riding, was found to contain more than 65 pounds of marijuana. The court noted that under U.S.S.G. 7B1.4(a), the recommended sentence was four to 10 months, but imposed a term of 24 months: one month at Count 1, 11 months at Count 2, and 12 months at Count 4, with supervised release for 59 months. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The erroneous multiple-terms sentence was prejudicial due to its implications for a hypothetical second revocation of supervised release. View "United States v. Dillon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Shotts was charged with a string of burglaries. Following his arrest, Shotts offered to assist in an investigation into corruption at the county prison and the District Attorney helped secure Shotts’ release on bail. Once released, Shotts engaged in another crime spree and was charged with burglary, theft, criminal mischief, criminal conspiracy, receiving stolen property, passing bad checks, criminal trespass, aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment of another person, driving under the influence of alcohol, and with three probation violations. Because Shotts had made confessions, his attorney pursued a plea deal, but did not request discovery of police records. The Commonwealth offered a plea deal with a sentence of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The judge commented that the sentence seemed high, given Shotts’ assistance with the corruption investigation. Shotts rejected the deal and entered a general guilty plea, confirming that his lawyer had explained the maximum sentences. Despite evidence of Shotts’ cooperation and his earlier statement, the judge sentenced Shotts to 30½ to 133 years. Following state collateral review, during which Shotts had five different lawyers, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that his first attorney rendered ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted. The Third Circuit affirmed on the merits, but stated that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s determination that Shotts’ claim was defaulted because he failed to raise it when first represented by new counsel was “an exorbitant application of an otherwise independent and adequate state rule” that cannot bar federal review. View "Shotts v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

Flemming, convicted in 2004 of possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 841(b)(1)(C), and two firearm counts, had a Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. Because he had two prior controlled substances convictions, he was classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), so that his Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months. The court granted a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, based on “reliable information . . . that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes” and sentenced Flemming to 175 months in prison (115 months plus a 60 month term for one of the firearm convictions). The Third Circuit affirmed. In 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, lowering by two the base offense levels for most crack-cocaine offenses. It later made the amendment retroactive. Flemming moved for a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c). The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. Individuals who were designated as career offenders under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and 3 and were granted a downward departure under 4A1.3 are not eligible for resentencing. View "United States v. Flemming" on Justia Law

Kluger and Bauer were charged as conspirators in an insider-trading scheme in which Robinson was the third participant. The conspiracy spanned 17 years and was likely the longest such scheme in U.S. history. Kluger entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit securities fraud; securities fraud; conspiracy to commit money laundering; and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 371, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff(a); 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), and 18 U.S.C. 2. The plea agreement did not include a stipulation as to the guidelines sentencing range. The district court imposed a 60-month term on Count I and 144-month custodial terms on each other count, all to be served concurrently, thought to be the longest insider-trading sentence ever imposed. After a separate hearing on the same day, the court sentenced Bauer to a 60-month term on Count I and 108-month terms on each other count to be served concurrently. Robinson, who was the “middleman,” in the scheme, pled guilty to three counts and was sentenced to concurrent 27-month terms. Robinson’s sentence was far below his guidelines range of 70 to 87 months but the prosecution sought a downwards departure because Robinson was cooperating in its investigation and prosecution. The Third Circuit upheld Kluger’s sentence. View "United States v. Kluger" on Justia Law

Moreno, born in Mexico in 1971, was adopted by a U.S. citizen at age nine. New Mexico issued a birth certificate, indicating a birth place of Mexico. In the 1990s, Moreno was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and of false imprisonment. In 2006, she was deported, after an immigration judge, the Board of Appeals, and the Fifth Circuit found that she was not a U.S. citizen. She returned to the U.S. in 2007 and obtained a passport, listing her place of birth as New Mexico. In 2008, the passport was confiscated by Border Patrol, but it was never revoked. She was released pending investigation. In 2011, DHS informed her that she was not a citizen. When she arrived in St. Thomas after a cruise, she told immigration officers that she was a U.S. citizen and presented her New Mexico driver’s license and a copy of her U.S. passport. Moreno was charged with falsely representing herself to be a citizen, 18 U.S.C. 911. On the night before trial, the government disclosed a DHS report concluding that the passport was valid but recommending investigation into her citizenship. Moreno did not accept a continuance. The district court did not admit the documents into evidence, finding that the non-exculpatory information had been previously disclosed. The court also declined to admit an FBI report, listing her citizenship as “United States,” and rejected an argument that the passport was conclusive evidence of citizenship. Moreno was sentenced to 29 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that under 22 U.S.C. 2705, a passport constitutes conclusive proof of citizenship only if issued to a U.S. citizen. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

On March 2, 2011, Graves was indicted for attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. 846. He was arraigned on March 31. The district court ordered a psychiatric examination and mental competency evaluation, 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). That evaluation was pending on June 3, 2011, three days before Graves’s trial was scheduled to begin, so the case was continued. On June 22, the Bureau of Prisons completed the report, concluding that Graves was competent to stand trial. The report was received on July 7. On September 21, 2011, the court ruled that Graves was competent to stand trial and appointed defense counsel, who moved for a continuance. The court set Graves’s trial date for February 27, 2012. Weeks after seeking the continuance, Graves moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that more than 70 days of inexcusable delay had passed since the filing of the indictment, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion. Graves was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no speedy trial violation. View "United States v. Graves" on Justia Law