Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Moreno, born in Mexico in 1971, was adopted by a U.S. citizen at age nine. New Mexico issued a birth certificate, indicating a birth place of Mexico. In the 1990s, Moreno was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and of false imprisonment. In 2006, she was deported, after an immigration judge, the Board of Appeals, and the Fifth Circuit found that she was not a U.S. citizen. She returned to the U.S. in 2007 and obtained a passport, listing her place of birth as New Mexico. In 2008, the passport was confiscated by Border Patrol, but it was never revoked. She was released pending investigation. In 2011, DHS informed her that she was not a citizen. When she arrived in St. Thomas after a cruise, she told immigration officers that she was a U.S. citizen and presented her New Mexico driver’s license and a copy of her U.S. passport. Moreno was charged with falsely representing herself to be a citizen, 18 U.S.C. 911. On the night before trial, the government disclosed a DHS report concluding that the passport was valid but recommending investigation into her citizenship. Moreno did not accept a continuance. The district court did not admit the documents into evidence, finding that the non-exculpatory information had been previously disclosed. The court also declined to admit an FBI report, listing her citizenship as “United States,” and rejected an argument that the passport was conclusive evidence of citizenship. Moreno was sentenced to 29 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that under 22 U.S.C. 2705, a passport constitutes conclusive proof of citizenship only if issued to a U.S. citizen. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

On March 2, 2011, Graves was indicted for attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. 846. He was arraigned on March 31. The district court ordered a psychiatric examination and mental competency evaluation, 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). That evaluation was pending on June 3, 2011, three days before Graves’s trial was scheduled to begin, so the case was continued. On June 22, the Bureau of Prisons completed the report, concluding that Graves was competent to stand trial. The report was received on July 7. On September 21, 2011, the court ruled that Graves was competent to stand trial and appointed defense counsel, who moved for a continuance. The court set Graves’s trial date for February 27, 2012. Weeks after seeking the continuance, Graves moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that more than 70 days of inexcusable delay had passed since the filing of the indictment, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion. Graves was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no speedy trial violation. View "United States v. Graves" on Justia Law

Ciavarella and another state court judge, Conahan, received $2.8 million in three years from a commercial builder, Mericle, and an attorney and businessman, Powell, during the “Kids for Cash” scandal in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania . Ciavarella committed hundreds of juveniles to detention centers co-owned by Powell, including many who were not represented by counsel, without informing the juveniles or their families of his conflict of interest. The judges, aware that they were under investigation, met with Mericle and Powell to coordinate their stories in 2008. Powell was wearing a recording device, exposing the judges’ efforts to obstruct justice. The judges pled guilty to wire fraud and conspiracy in exchange for an agreed 87-month sentence. Noting that the stipulated sentences were significantly lower than the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for the offenses, the district court rejected the plea agreement; the judges withdrew their pleas. Ciavarella proceeded to trial, was convicted of racketeering, honest services mail fraud, money laundering conspiracy, filing false tax returns, and several other related crimes and was sentenced to 336 months’ imprisonment, restitution, forfeiture, and a special assessment. The Third Circuit remanded for modification of the special assessment for mail fraud, but otherwise affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial judge was biased. View "United States v. Ciavarella" on Justia Law

Turner, the author of Tax Free!, instructed readers to escape income taxation by using common law trust organizations (colatos), and established FAR to assist in implementing colatos. In 1991, Turner enlisted Leveto, the owner of a veterinary clinic, as a FAR member. FAR created Center, a foreign colato, and appointed Leveto as the general manager and Turner as a consultant. Leveto “sold” his clinic to Center, which “hired” Leveto as its manager. Leveto continued to control the clinic, but stopped reporting its income. Center did not pay taxes because it distributed the income to other foreign colatos, which, Turner claimed, “transformed” it to untaxable foreign source income. Leveto began to market Tax Free! In 1995, the IRS began a criminal investigation. In 2001, Turner and Leveto were charged with conspiracy to defraud the IRS by concealing Leveto’s assets, 18 U.S.C. 371. Turner moved to exclude recorded conversations between Leveto and an undercover agent and foreign bank records seized from Leveto’s office and residence. The district court admitted the conversations, reasoning that they furthered an unindicted conspiracy to impede tax collection efforts, and held that the government properly authenticated the foreign bank documents. Turner was convicted, sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay $408,043 in restitution, without any findings about his ability to pay. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Each defendant was convicted of a cocaine base (crack) related offense. The government moved for a downward departure due to substantial assistance by each. The district court granted the departure and sentenced the defendant below the statutory mandatory minimum. Shortly thereafter, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) became law, and the United States Sentencing Commission approved Amendment 750, a retroactive amendment, which lowered the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses. Defendants moved to further reduce their sentences. Although the qualifying amount of cocaine base necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence has been increased, the government argued that the duration of the statutorily required minimum sentence has not changed so that the defendants are still subject to the mandatory minimum sentence. The district courts denied defendants’ motions. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that defendants, who are convicted of crack cocaine offenses and whose original sentences were below the mandatory minimum applicable to them because of substantial assistance to the government, are not barred for policy reasons from seeking a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). View "United States v. Savani" on Justia Law

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, immigration officials “shall take into custody any‖ deportable alien who has committed various crimes” when the alien is released from detention for those crimes, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1). The Act requires officials to hold such aliens without any possibility of release while awaiting removal. Sylvain, a citizen of Haiti, entered the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1988. He has been convicted of more than 10 drug-related crimes and served a three-year prison sentence for making and selling cocaine. He was convicted for unlawfully possessing a weapon and for criminal mischief. Sylvain was last arrested in 2007 for possessing drugs. He pled guilty and received a conditional discharge. Under New York law, a conditional discharge does not require imprisonment or probation. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials arrested him in 2011, concluding that he was deportable and subject to mandatory detention, although he was last in custody four years earlier. The district court granted his petition for habeas corpus, finding that mandatory detention did not apply. Sylvain received a hearing, paid bond, and is not in custody. His next removal hearing is in 2014. The Third Circuit reversed; mandatory detention does not require immediate detention. View "Sylvain v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

From 1990 to 1995, Thomas directed an enterprise that transported marijuana from California to Pennsylvania. Thomas’ wife was murdered in 1995. He fled to Jamaica. In 1998, he was indicted on 33 counts, based on his marijuana enterprise. In 2001, Thomas was arrested in the United Kingdom. He contested a provisional extradition warrant until 2005. He was convicted and sentenced to 420 months imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed on direct appeal and, in 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. As a federal prisoner, Thomas could move to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence within one year from denial of certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f), but during that period, Thomas was temporarily in state custody, convicted of murdering his wife. Three weeks before the section 2255 deadline, he moved (pro se) for an extension of time. The district court denied the motion. Thomas appealed, but never filed an actual 2255 motion. He sought a certificate of appealability (COA), restating that he had been in state custody without access to legal materials, and asserted “a Batson challenge … Prosecutorial Misconduct for knowingly withholding material evidence of Petitioner’s innocence … and Jury Misconduct.” The Third Circuit granted a COA, finding that the issues were worthy of review. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In 2000, cab driver DeJesus suffered multiple fatal gunshot wounds during a robbery while his taxi was parked at a Harrisburg intersection. After a joint trial with Eiland and Mitchell Court, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Eley of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Eley was unsuccessful in direct appeal and seeking post-conviction relief in state courts. The district court denied his petition for habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that his non-testifying co-defendants’ confessions were admitted against him in violation of the Confrontation Clause under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The court rejected an argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions in violation of the Due Process Clause. View "Eley v. Erickson" on Justia Law

In 2000 Ross was convicted of first degree murder in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Ross was unable to obtain a state appellate court review due to extraordinary circumstances attributable to his attorney’s extreme neglect of his case, including missing deadlines for filing document, failure to communicate with Ross, and the attorney’s misleading statements when he did communicate with Ross. The court denied his motion for appointment of a new attorney. Ross’s mental health issues, limited education, and limited cognitive ability magnified his problems and his status as an inmate placed structural obstacles in his path. Ross subsequently brought this habeas corpus case, charging that because his attorney wrongfully abandoned him, he lost his appellate rights in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d), statute of limitations barred the action as untimely, the district court found that equitable tolling of the running of the statute was warranted because Ross had been diligent in pursuing his state court appellate remedies but that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control frustrated this attempt. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Ross v. Varano" on Justia Law

Former Superior Court Judge Kendall enforced an oral plea agreement that the prosecution had attempted to withdraw; Kendall believed that the defendants could not obtain a fair trial, due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus. Kendall published an opinion chastising the mandamus decision and recusing himself from the case due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Justices cited Kendall for criminal contempt and found him guilty because his opinion, in their view, obstructed the administration of justice and because his recusal was a pretextual effort to avoid complying with the writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the contempt conviction, finding that the First Amendment protects a sitting judge from being criminally punished for his opinion unless that opinion presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing ongoing proceedings. Kendall’s opinion did not pose such a threat. There was insufficient evidence that his recusal was pretextual. View "In Re: Kendall" on Justia Law