Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A joint undercover investigation determined that a single computer was sharing 1400 images or video files of child pornography. Pennsylvania State Police learned that the computer was located in the home of retired police Lieutenant Handerhan. A search warrant was executed and his computer was seized. It contained more than 6,000 images and video files of child pornography, including images of pre-pubescent children and images depicting sadomasochism and bondage. Forensic analysis revealed that Handerhan had configured a file sharing program to distribute the images. Charged with distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(A) and 2252A(2)(a), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(A), Handerhan pled guilty to one count of possession. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the distribution charge and recommended that he receive a three-level offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The probation officer calculated a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. Sentenced to 96 months, Handerhan argued that the court erred by failing to explicitly address his request for a downward departure based on mental health issues and meaningfully consider factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including arguments regarding the unreasonable nature of U.S.S.G. 2G2.2. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence reasonable, but “reminded” the district court that motions seeking departure should be formally decided. View "USA v. Blaine Handerhan" on Justia Law

Grimes, a former professor of engineering at Pennsylvania State University and the owner of three research companies, pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957, based on his fraudulent conduct involving federal science grants. The plea agreement in indicated that his advisory sentencing range under the USSG would be 41 to 51 months and contained a waiver of Grimes’s direct and collateral appeal rights. Grimes and his attorney signed acknowledgements that they had read the agreement and that the plea was voluntary. During his plea colloquy, Grimes discussed the agreement with the judge and acknowledged that no one could guarantee how the court would sentence him. The district court sentenced Grimes to 41 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The Third Circuit rejected Grimes’s argument that his appellate waiver was not knowing and voluntary because it contained a waiver of his right to collaterally challenge his guilty plea, conviction, or sentence that did not exempt Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Grimes claimed that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive his appellate rights because his trial counsel faced an inherent, actual conflict of interest in negotiating and advising him on the waiver. View "United States v. Grimes" on Justia Law

Orabi, an Egyptian citizen, was admitted to the U.S. in 1990. He became a lawful permanent resident without conditions in 1996. In 2010, he was convicted, in federal court, of conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with access devices, possession of counterfeit access devices, possession of counterfeit and forged checks, and aggravated identity theft, and was sentenced to 70 months in prison. Appeal to the Second Circuit is pending. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on conviction for an aggravated felony. Orabi notified DHS and the Immigration Court that he was appealing the conviction, and DHS moved to withdraw the removal charge. At a subsequent removal hearing, Orabi appeared pro se. Following an ambiguous exchange, removal charges were reinstated, although there is no documentary evidence that Orabi withdrew his appeal. Orabi was ordered removed. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Third Circuit reversed. A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived. View "Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Andrea and Aaron lived together with their infant son from 2007 until 2009, when Andrea obtained an order of protection that described Aaron’s history of violence, including incidents of choking, slapping, and giving Andrea a black eye. Aaron had a criminal history that included check fraud, intimidation of another woman with whom he had a child, and shoplifting as a juvenile. He had also been charged with “indecent assault/rape” but found not guilty. Aaron’s father, Michael, a police officer, was aware of his son’s history and that two of Aaron’s children had died under mysterious circumstances while in his custody (he later confessed to killing them). Aaron had a room in his father’s home, drove his father’s truck, and received mail at his father’s address. Five days after the order issued Aaron returned to Andrea’s apartment and threatened to “cut her up.” An arrest warrant for Aaron issued. While Michael was on vacation, Aaron went to his home, found a copy of the criminal complaint against him, drank a bottle of 99-proof alcohol, ransacked the house and found his father’s service-issued gun, then used it to kill Andrea. Aaron was later killed by police, outside his father’s house. Andrea’s estate sued Michael for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Michael’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and statutory immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, with instructions to dismiss, finding that Michael’s conduct fell within the immunity established by the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 922(z)(3). View "Estate of Arrington v. Michael" on Justia Law

George, a 21-year old U.S. citizen, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia to California to begin his senior year at Pomona College. George claims that at the Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, because he was carrying a deck of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of American interventionism. The flashcards included every day words and phrases such as “yesterday,” “fat,” “thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” and “friendly,” but also contained such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.” George had a double major in Physics and Middle Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as part of a study abroad program; he then spent five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. He was released after about five hours. In his suit against three employees of the Transportation Security Administration and two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members, the district court’s denied motions in which the defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity against claims that they violated George’s Fourth and First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered the case dismissed. View "George v. Rehiel" on Justia Law

Ottaviano, believing himself not bound by U.S. tax law, marketed his views to others through his company, Mid-Atlantic, which offered financial products he claimed would help others avoid taxation and have the government pay their debts. Ottoviano made many representations about himself and the financial products. Customers paid Mid-Atlantic $3,500 each ($5,000 if purchased jointly) to participate. After a trial at which he represented himself, Ottaviano was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 371, eight counts of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1957, and two counts of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. 51. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting overwhelming evidence of guilt and rejecting arguments that the district court denied him a fair trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law when it cross-examined him and violated his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself when it ordered him to leave the courtroom during a discussion about a letter he sent to the Treasury Secretary. View "United States v. Ottaviano" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals discovered that Gillette had not registered as a sex offender and was living in St. Croix with a teenage boy. They arrested him for violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901, and failure to register as a sex offender within 10 days of establishing residency in a state other than the state within which he was convicted, in violation of the Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 14072(g)(3) (repealed 2009). M.B., a 15-year-old boy, stated that he had been living with Gillette since he was about 12, and that they had been sexually involved. Agents learned that Gillette had also victimized M.B.’s younger cousin, A.A. The district court dismissed the federal counts for lack of evidence of interstate travel by Gillette after SORNA’s effective date and found that Gillette’s failure to register after relocating did not violate the Wetterling Act because the Virgin Islands is not a “State” as contemplated by that law. Gillette was convicted on local charges and sentenced to 155 years. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions: under these circumstances, the district court retained concurrent jurisdiction over the local charges after the federal charges were dismissed. View "United States v. Gillette" on Justia Law

Blair participated in the sale of guns. After his arrest, he pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A presentence report recommended that Blair be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Blair had pled guilty in Pennsylvania in 1987, to third-degree robbery in the form of “physically tak[ing] or remov[ing] property from the person of another by force however slight,” and to armed burglary. In 1991, he pled guilty to four counts of first-degree robbery. The 1991 charging documents state that, for each count, the “[f]elony committed or threatened” was “[a]ggravated [a]ssault.” The PSR recommended that each of the 1991 counts be treated as a separate criminal episode. Blair argued that his 1987 conviction was not for the generic offense of burglary required under ACCA; that “robbery by force however slight” is not a violent felony under ACCA; and that his 1991 convictions qualified as, at most, one violent felony because the charging documents did not conclusively establish that the crimes were “committed on occasions different from one another.” The district court determined that his 1987 convictions were for violent felonies and that the 1991 convictions “at a minimum” established three separate violent felonies and sentenced Blair to 180 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Blair" on Justia Law

Since September 11, 2001, efforts to restructure the FBI as the “domestic equivalent” of the Central Intelligence Agency have included revising internal FBI guidelines. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), released by the Attorney General in 2008, authorizes FBI agents to engage in limited racial and ethnic profiling when conducting proactive assessments of criminal and terrorist threats and allows the FBI to collect and map data related to “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU launched an initiative entitled “Mapping the FBI,” including a series of coordinated FOIA requests (28 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A)) seeking records related to the FBI’s use of ethnic and racial data. One request targeted six FBI field offices in New Jersey and sought information concerning implementation of authority to collect information and map racial and ethnic demographics and behaviors in local communities. The FBI identified 782 pages of potentially responsive records, eventually released 312 pages (some of which were partially redacted), withheld 186 pages as duplicative, and withheld 284 pages as exempt from disclosure. The ACLU sought an injunction for release of the withheld records. The district court ruled in favor of the FBI. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the in camera procedure employed for determining whether reliance on FOIA exclusion provision was justified.View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

In 2009-2010, Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey had a wave of pharmacy burglaries, many of which affected Rite Aid pharmacies. The FBI joined the investigation. A suspect emerged: an electrician, Harry Katzin, had recently been caught burglarizing a Rite Aid pharmacy; his brothers also had criminal histories that included burglary and theft. Over the following months, the Katzins were repeatedly seen outside pharmacies where phone lines had been cut. After consulting with the U.S. Attorney, but without obtaining a warrant, the FBI affixed a “slap-on” GPS tracker to the exterior of Harry’s van. Within days, state troopers stopped the van on a Pennsylvania highway. Local police notified the troopers that the Rite Aid closest to where the van had been parked had been burglarized. Inside the van, troopers found the Katzin brothers. From outside of the van, the troopers could see pill bottles and Rite Aid storage bins. The police impounded the van and arrested the Katzin brothers. The district court suppressed the evidence found in the van. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that police must obtain a warrant prior to a GPS search and that the conduct in this case cannot be excused based on good faith. All three brothers had standing to challenge evidence recovered from Harry’s van. View "United States v. Katzin" on Justia Law